Harry E. Prettyman, Inc., v. Florida Real Estate Commission ex rel. Branham

Decision Date04 August 1926
Citation109 So. 442,92 Fla. 515
PartiesHARRY E. PRETTYMAN, Inc. v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ex rel. BRANHAM.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court
En Banc.

In a proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission, on the relation of Charles T. Branham, against Harry E. Prettyman Inc., the latter's license as real estate broker was revoked by the county judge, and it petitions for cortiorari. On motion to quash the writ.

Motion granted.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The writ of certiorari may be issued to final judicial or quasi judicial orders that are alleged to be invalid, where no other adequate remedy is afforded by appellate procedure or otherwise.

The issuance of an occupational license does not create any contract right.

Revocation of occupational license is not essentially judicial function but may be exercised by duly authorized administrative or executive officers. The revocation of an occupational license is not essentially a judicial function. Such a function may be exercised by administrative or executive officers, when duly authorized.

'Our state Constitution is a limitation upon power, and unless legislation duly passed be clearly contrary to some express or implied prohibition contained therein, the courts have no authority to pronounce it invalid.

While constitutional jurisdiction cannot be restricted or taken away, it can be enlarged by the Legislature in all cases where such enlargement does not result in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction of some other court, or where such enlargement is not forbidden by the Constitution.

Statute giving county judges power to revoke real estate broker's registration certificate and license held valid (Laws Ex Sess. 1925, c. 11336, §§ 9, 12; Const. art. 5, § 17). As the quasi judicial power to revoke a real estate broker's registration certificate and license, conferred upon the county judges by section 9 of chapter 11336, Laws of Florida is not forbidden by the Constitution and does not affect the constitutional jurisdiction of any other court, and as such quasi judicial function comports with powers expressly conferred upon county judges by section 17, art. 5 of the Constitution, such section 9, c. 11336, does not violate the last-named section of the Constitution, but is a reasonable exercise of legislative power in conferring quasi judicial power upon county judges in the enforcement of salutary police regulations affecting the public welfare.

COUNSEL

Edgar W. Waybright, of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Chas. O. Andrews, of Orlando, for respondent.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

A petition was presented to this court alleging that:

'Harry E. Prettyman, Inc., a corporation, by its undersigned counsel respectfully represents unto the court that the respondent filed a proceeding on the 19th day of April, A. D. 1926, in the form of a complaint against your petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of that certain act of the Legislature of the state of Florida, known as chapter 11336 of the Laws of Florida, enacted at the Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in the year 1925, and approved by the Governor on the 24th day of November, A. D. 1925, which act is entitled, 'An Act to define, regulate, and license real estate brokers and real estate salesmen; to create the Florida Real Estate Commission, providing for the appointment of its members, defining its powers and duties; providing for the payment of its expenses; providing certain offenses and penalties for violation thereof,' which complaint is attached to this petition, marked Exhibit A and made a part hereof, and in and by said complaint prayed that the registration certificate and license theretofore issued to your petitioner be revoked; that upon or about the 20th day of May, A. D. 1926, the said cause came on for trial before the county judge of Volusia county, Fla., after due notice in accordance with the statute, and a large number of witnesses having been subpoenaed respectively for your petitioner and the respondent, and a large amount of testimony taken in behalf of the respective parties to the cause, which trial and the taking of said testimony consumed approximately four days, and after considering the same, the county judge aforesaid entered an order, a copy of which is hereto attached marked Exhibit B and made a part of his petition, and the said county judge in and by said order ordered and adjudged that the registration certificate and occupational license theretofore issued to your petitioner as a real estate broker be and the same was thereby revoked and annulled.
'Your petitioner would further show unto this court by the record so made as aforesaid that the said trial court did not proceed in said cause according to the essential requirements of the law, and exceeded and acted without jurisdiction in the premises, in the following matters and for the following reasons, viz.:
'Reasons relied upon by your petitioner:
'(1) That section 9 of the Real Estate Broker's Act herein mentioned, in so far as it provides for and grants to the county judge power and jurisdiction to revoke real estate broker's licenses and certificates, is unconstitutional in that it is not within the jurisdiction conferred upon the county judge's court by section 17, art. 5, of the Constitution of the state of Florida.
'(2) That the power to revoke the real estate certificate and license is a judicial power and cannot be conferred upon the county judge because the jurisdiction of the county judge is prescribed by the Constitution itself, which can neither he added to nor taken away from.
'(3) That the circuit court in and for Duval county, Fla., has had this question before it and has held that said section is unconstitutional, and it is of vital importance, both in the administration of the law and to the trial of numerous cases in the state, that the question should be quickly determined by the Supreme Court of Florida.
'Wherefore, in view of the premises, petitioner prays that this honorable court will grant a writ of certiorari directed to the county judge in and for Volusia county, Fla., requiring that the record of the county judge, together with the judgment of said county judge in said cause, be certified to this court, and that this honorable court will thereupon proceed to review and determine that the order of judgment of said county judge in and for Volusia county, Fla., in said cause is erroneous and void for the reasons heretofore pointed out, and will quash said judgment of the said county judge, and will give to your petitioner such further and other relief as the nature of the case and as to this court may seem proper in the premises.'

A writ of certiorari was issued from this court.

The respondent moved to quash the said writ of certiorari heretofore issued in this cause upon the following grounds, to wit:

'(1) That if, as petitioner alleges, section 9 of the Real Estate Act confers quasi judicial power it could not be judicial power in equity or judicial power in civil action, but would necessarily be quasi criminal power.

'(2) That the county judges are specifically authorized to exercise such quasi criminal jurisdiction by section 17 of article 5, providing that 'the county judge shall have original jurisdiction * * * of such criminal cases as the Legislature may prescribe.'

'(3) That the Legislature has specifically 'prescribed' in said section 9 of the Real Estate Act that the county judge shall have this jurisdiction.

'(4) That the power exercised by the county judge, under said section 9 is quasi criminal, in that it provides a penalty, namely, the revocation of the certificate of registration, and the petitioner would have an absolute right of review by writ of error under section 11 of article 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the circuit court 'shall have final appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising * * * before the county judge.'

'(5) That if the power conferred by said section 9 is not quasi criminal it would necessarily be an administrative power specifically conferred by the Legislature.

'(6) That if the power conferred by said section 9 is administrative it could be exercised by any individual regardless of the position he holds under prior decisions of this court.

'(7) That the authority conferred by said section 9 being a police power to effectuate a public policy, it rests within the discretion of the Legislature to determine who shall exercise that power unless prohibited by some specific provision of the Constitution.

'(8) That the powers and duties imposed on the county judge by the act in question might be exercised by any person designated by the Legislature and may therefore be exercised by the county judge, not being otherwise prohibited by the Constitution.

'(9) That the jurisdiction of the county judge to revoke licenses is implied by that portion of section 17 of article 5 of the Constitution where the county judge is directed 'to issue all licenses required to be issued in the county.”

Section 17, art. 5, of the state Constitution, provides:

'The county judge shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law in which the demand or value of property involved shall not exceed one hundred dollars; of proceedings relating to the forcible entry or unlawful detention of lands and tenements; and of such criminal cases as the Legislature may prescribe. The county judge shall have jurisdiction of the settlement of the estates of decedents and minors, to order the sale of real estate of decedents and minors, to take probate of wills, to grant letters testamentary and of administration and guardianship, and to discharge the duties usually pertaining to courts of...

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