Hart, In re, 97-059
Decision Date | 25 March 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-059,97-059 |
Citation | 715 A.2d 640,167 Vt. 630 |
Parties | In re Phillip F. HART. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Before AMESTOY, C.J., and DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.
Petitioner appeals the Orange Superior Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7131. He argues that the court erred when it allocated to him the burden of proving that he had not deliberately bypassed the opportunity to directly appeal an error made by the sentencing court in the application of Rule 32(c)(3). We affirm.
In 1992, petitioner was sentenced to serve twelve to twenty years in prison for the sexual assault of a minor, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Hart, 161 Vt. 647, 643 A.2d 853 (1994). In 1996, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief requesting the superior court to vacate his sentence and order resentencing. As grounds for relief, petitioner alleged: (1) that counsel at his sentencing hearing had been ineffective, and (2) that, in determining the sentence, the court improperly considered and relied upon information not previously disclosed to petitioner and his counsel. See V.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3) ().
After a hearing on the merits, the superior court denied petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court concluded, however, that the sentencing court did "consider and rely upon petitioner's violent history with his former wife ... without providing notice in the manner described under V.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3)." Petitioner introduced no evidence to establish why he had not raised the Rule 32 issue in his direct appeal, although he did contend the record failed to show he had deliberately bypassed the opportunity. The State introduced no evidence on petitioner's bypass of the issue. The superior court concluded that petitioner had failed to satisfy his burden of showing that his failure to raise the claimed error on direct appeal was an "inadvertent waiver," and thus denied the petition. 1
Vermont's post-conviction relief statute, 13 V.S.A. §§ 7131-7137, permits "challenges to confinement ... [where] the sentence is subject to collateral attack," State v. Cooley, 135 Vt. 409, 411, 377 A.2d 1386, 1387 (1977), but is not a substitute for direct appeal. See In re Nash, 146 Vt. 259, 261, 499 A.2d 785, 786 (1985). Absent exigent circumstances, "collateral attack is barred if the movant deliberately bypassed the issue on appeal." In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361, 438 A.2d 1106, 1110 (1981) ( ). To allow an issue which had been deliberately waived on appeal to be asserted under post-conviction review would be "[t]o grant petitioner redress ... that he is entitled, at his own election, to have each claim of trial error the subject of separate appellate reviews." Berard, 132 Vt. at 600, 326 A.2d at 168.
Petitioner does not deny that the "deliberate bypass" standard applies in this case; rather, he argues on appeal that the superior court erred in holding that the burden of proof to satisfy the standard rests on the petitioner.
The allocation of the burden of proof between the petitioner for post-conviction relief and the State is governed by the usual principles of law according to the nature of the claim advanced. See In re Mossey, 129 Vt. 133, 138, 274 A.2d 473, 476 (1971). The burden rests with the party who advances the factual contention, and the risk of nonpersuasion is similarly assigned. See id. Under the "usual principles of law," id., issues not challenged on appeal are deemed waived. See Fyles v. Schmidt, 141 Vt. 419, 422-23, 449 A.2d 962, 965 (1982) ( ); Bigelow v. Department of Taxes, 163 Vt. 33, 38, 652 A.2d 985, 988 (1994) ( ). We have previously denied post-conviction relief where the petitioner did not show that his failure to raise an issue on direct appeal was inadvertent. See Nash, 146 Vt. at 261-62, 499 A.2d at 786.
Accordingly, we hold that to be eligible for relief under 13 V.S.A. § 7131 the petitioner must demonstrate that he did not deliberately bypass issues which could have been raised on direct appeal. Allocating the burden of proof in this manner maintains "an orderly process of review and appeal [that] is essential for the prompt and fair administration of criminal justice." Cooley, 135 Vt. at 412, 377 A.2d at 1387; see State v. Zankowski, 140 N.H. 294, 665 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1995) () (quoting ...
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...of the issues covered in that motion were raised in the district court or on direct appeal. ¶ 8. The State relies primarily on In re Hart, 167 Vt. 630, 631, 715 A.2d 640, 641 (1998) (mem.), which held that petitioner in a post-conviction relief proceeding under 13 V.S.A. § 7131 has the burd......
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