Hart v. Carruthers, (AC 22825).

• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: LAVERY, C. J.
• Citation: 823 A.2d 1284,77 Conn. App. 610
• Parties: CHARLES HART ET AL. v. THERESA CARRUTHERS.
• Docket Number: (AC 22825).
• Decision Date: 24 June 2003

77 Conn. App. 610
823 A.2d 1284

CHARLES HART ET AL.
v.
THERESA CARRUTHERS

(AC 22825).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 28, 2003.

Officially released June 24, 2003.

Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Bishop, Js.

Barry T. Pontolillo, for the appellant (defendant).

Max F. Brunswick, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

77 Conn. App. 611

Opinion

LAVERY, C. J.

The defendant landlord, Theresa Carruthers, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of the plaintiff tenants, Charles Hart and Annette Housley Hart (Annette Hart). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the agreement between the parties violated the terms of the rental assistance program, (2) concluded that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and (3) violated the parties' constitutional rights by impairing their contractual obligations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's appeal. On December 1, 1993, the plaintiffs, as tenants, entered into a written lease with the defendant for a dwelling at 39 Blakeslee Avenue in North Haven. The term of the lease was one year, and, after its expiration, the plaintiffs remained on the premises, on a month-to-month basis, through December, 1998. The plaintiffs qualified for the state department of housing's rental assistance program. Pursuant to that program, the Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., as designated agent for the state department of housing, paid a portion of the plaintiffs' rent. Also pursuant to that program, the defendant entered into a state department of housing rental assistance contract (rental assistance contract), the purpose of which was to assist the plaintiffs to lease a dwelling unit from the defendant, and the parties entered into a state department

77 Conn. App. 612

of housing rental assistance program lease (rental assistance lease)

In 1999, the plaintiffs brought the present action, claiming, inter alia, that by charging the plaintiffs $200 more per month in rent than was permitted by the terms of the rental assistance contract, the defendant breached her contract with the plaintiffs and the rental assistance program.¹ Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that under the rental assistance contract, the defendant agreed that the rent for the premises would be $700 per month and that she would not charge more than that amount, but that she breached that contract by charging $900 per month in rent. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant's conduct of charging $900 per month rent, when she had agreed not to charge more than $700, constituted a violation of CUTPA.

After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims that the defendant had breached the rental assistance contract and that the defendant's actions constituted an unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA.² This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We first set forth our standard of review. "The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To

77 Conn. App. 613

the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Verna v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 261 Conn. 102, 107, 801 A.2d 769 (2002)

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly determined that the agreement between the parties violated the terms of the rental assistance program by prohibiting the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of a garage. The defendant asserts that the parties had agreed that the rent for the dwelling unit at 39 Blakeslee Avenue would be $700 per month, but that they had entered into a separate agreement for the rental of a garage on the same premises for $200 per month, which brought the plaintiffs' total monthly rent to $900. She argues that the rental assistance program provided rental assistance to the plaintiffs for the dwelling unit only and that the parties were free to contract for other services, such as the rental of the garage, which were not covered by the rental assistance program.

We begin our analysis by noting that the defendant has presumed incorrectly that the court determined, as a matter of law, that the rental assistance contract prohibited the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of the garage.

The court, in its memorandum of decision, found the following: "When the parties entered into the state rental assistance contract, they agreed, in relevant part, to the following: `The portion of the Contract Rent payable by the Family ("Family Contribution") will be an

77 Conn. App. 614

amount determined by the Designated Agent in accordance with [state department of housing] regulations and requirements. This amount is the maximum amount the Owner can require the Family to pay for rent of the dwelling unit, including all services, maintenance and utilities to be provided by the Owner in accordance with the Lease.' . . . The defendant testified that the parties made a separate agreement concerning the attached, two car garage, which, she claims, was rented for an additional $200 per month. According to her testimony, since the garage was not part of the `dwelling unit,' the administrators of the [rental assistance] lease were not concerned about how much the plaintiffs were required to pay. The plaintiffs, however, testified that the agreement was divided into a house-garage only to allow the defendant to collect an additional $200 that would otherwise be disallowed by the terms of the [rental assistance] contract. They further testified that they had very little use for the garage space since their family vehicle, a converted school bus, was too large to fit in the garage

"The court does not accept the defendant's explanation for the additional payment and finds that it was an attempt by her to circumvent the terms of the [rental assistance program] agreement. Accordingly, the court finds for the plaintiffs and awards them $12,000 on count one of their complaint.

"The court further finds that the defendant's actions — demanding and accepting an additional $200 per month from the plaintiffs in violation of the terms of the [rental assistance] contract — constitute an unfair trade practice in violation of . . . General Statutes § 42-110b and awards the plaintiffs $1 in compensatory damages on count two." (Emphasis added.)

After reviewing the court's memorandum of decision, it is clear that the court did not determine that the

77 Conn. App. 615

rental assistance contract prohibited the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of the garage. Rather, the court simply did not believe the defendant's version of events and found that there was no actual agreement for the rental of a garage and that, in fact, the defendant's explanation of the $200 discrepancy between what the rental assistance program permitted her to collect and what she actually collected was merely a pretext to justify her having collected more in rent than was permitted under the rental assistance program.

Because the court made its determination on a factual basis, we must determine whether the court's determination that the defendant demanded and accepted $200 more per month than was permitted under the terms of the rental assistance contract was clearly erroneous. We conclude that it was not.

"A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.. . . In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the...