Hart v. Carruthers
Citation | 823 A.2d 1284,77 Conn. App. 610 |
Decision Date | 24 June 2003 |
Docket Number | (AC 22825). |
Parties | CHARLES HART ET AL. v. THERESA CARRUTHERS. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Barry T. Pontolillo, for the appellant (defendant).
Max F. Brunswick, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
The defendant landlord, Theresa Carruthers, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of the plaintiff tenants, Charles Hart and Annette Housley Hart (Annette Hart). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the agreement between the parties violated the terms of the rental assistance program, (2) concluded that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and (3) violated the parties' constitutional rights by impairing their contractual obligations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's appeal. On December 1, 1993, the plaintiffs, as tenants, entered into a written lease with the defendant for a dwelling at 39 Blakeslee Avenue in North Haven. The term of the lease was one year, and, after its expiration, the plaintiffs remained on the premises, on a month-to-month basis, through December, 1998. The plaintiffs qualified for the state department of housing's rental assistance program. Pursuant to that program, the Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., as designated agent for the state department of housing, paid a portion of the plaintiffs' rent. Also pursuant to that program, the defendant entered into a state department of housing rental assistance contract (rental assistance contract), the purpose of which was to assist the plaintiffs to lease a dwelling unit from the defendant, and the parties entered into a state department of housing rental assistance program lease (rental assistance lease).
In 1999, the plaintiffs brought the present action, claiming, inter alia, that by charging the plaintiffs $200 more per month in rent than was permitted by the terms of the rental assistance contract, the defendant breached her contract with the plaintiffs and the rental assistance program.1 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that under the rental assistance contract, the defendant agreed that the rent for the premises would be $700 per month and that she would not charge more than that amount, but that she breached that contract by charging $900 per month in rent. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant's conduct of charging $900 per month rent, when she had agreed not to charge more than $700, constituted a violation of CUTPA.
After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims that the defendant had breached the rental assistance contract and that the defendant's actions constituted an unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA.2 This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
We first set forth our standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Verna v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 261 Conn. 102, 107, 801 A.2d 769 (2002).
The defendant first claims that the court improperly determined that the agreement between the parties violated the terms of the rental assistance program by prohibiting the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of a garage. The defendant asserts that the parties had agreed that the rent for the dwelling unit at 39 Blakeslee Avenue would be $700 per month, but that they had entered into a separate agreement for the rental of a garage on the same premises for $200 per month, which brought the plaintiffs' total monthly rent to $900. She argues that the rental assistance program provided rental assistance to the plaintiffs for the dwelling unit only and that the parties were free to contract for other services, such as the rental of the garage, which were not covered by the rental assistance program.
We begin our analysis by noting that the defendant has presumed incorrectly that the court determined, as a matter of law, that the rental assistance contract prohibited the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of the garage.
The court, in its memorandum of decision, found the following: "When the parties entered into the state rental assistance contract, they agreed, in relevant part, to the following: . . . The defendant testified that the parties made a separate agreement concerning the attached, two car garage, which, she claims, was rented for an additional $200 per month. According to her testimony, since the garage was not part of the `dwelling unit,' the administrators of the [rental assistance] lease were not concerned about how much the plaintiffs were required to pay. The plaintiffs, however, testified that the agreement was divided into a house-garage only to allow the defendant to collect an additional $200 that would otherwise be disallowed by the terms of the [rental assistance] contract. They further testified that they had very little use for the garage space since their family vehicle, a converted school bus, was too large to fit in the garage.
After reviewing the court's memorandum of decision, it is clear that the court did not determine that the rental assistance contract prohibited the parties from entering into a separate agreement for the rental of the garage. Rather, the court simply did not believe the defendant's version of events and found that there was no actual agreement for the rental of a garage and that, in fact, the defendant's explanation of the $200 discrepancy between what the rental assistance program permitted her to collect and what she actually collected was merely a pretext to justify her having collected more in rent than was permitted under the rental assistance program.
Because the court made its determination on a factual basis, we must determine whether the court's determination that the defendant demanded and accepted $200 more per month than was permitted under the terms of the rental assistance contract was clearly erroneous. We conclude that it was not.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Tobias, 262 Conn. 844, 849, 817 A.2d 683 (2003).
After reviewing the record before the court, we are persuaded that the court's finding was not clearly erroneous. It is clear that there is evidence in the record supporting the court's determination that the defendant demanded and accepted $200 more per month in rent than was permitted by the terms of the rental assistance contract.
During the trial, the plaintiffs both testified that at the time they moved into the house at 39 Blakeslee Avenue, the only lease they had signed was the rental assistance lease, which listed the rent as being $700. They testified that the month after they had moved in, the defendant came to their house with a new lease, which listed a rent of $900, and told them that if they wanted to stay in the house, they would have to sign the new lease.3 Annette Hart testified that she signed the new lease because she already had given up her previous home and had nowhere else to go. She and Charles Hart both testified that the defendant kept several items in the garage. There also was testimony, by Charles Hart, that the defendant never said anything about any additional rent for the garage.
Although the defendant may have claimed that there was an agreement between the parties whereby the plaintiffs paid the extra $200 as rental for the garage, her testimony and the evidence she submitted was in plain contradiction to the plaintiffs' testimony and evidence.4 The fact that there was conflicting testimony does not equate to a conclusion that the court's finding was clearly erroneous. See Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 210, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996). "The weight to be given to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within the determination of...
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