Hart v. Darwish

Citation218 Cal.Rptr.3d 757,12 Cal.App.5th 218
Decision Date01 June 2017
Docket NumberB270513
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Parties Wayne HART et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Barbara DARWISH et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Certified for Partial Publication.*

Mesisca Riley & Kreitenberg, Dennis P. Riley and Rena E. Kreitenberg, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Roy G. Weatherup, Bartley L. Becker and Caroline E. Chan, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents Barbara Darwish, David Darwish, Gingko Rose Ltd. and Logerm LLC.

The Law Offices of Rosenthal & Associates, Lisa F. Rosenthal, Canoga Park, for Defendant and Respondent Lisa F. Rosenthal.

HOFFSTADT, J.

Where a plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a defendant, and the trial court denies a motion by the defendant for summary judgment or for nonsuit made after the plaintiff's case-in-chief, or the trier of fact returns a verdict for the plaintiff, that ruling or verdict—if decided on the merits and not procured by fraud—establishes as a matter of law that the plaintiff had probable cause to bring its lawsuit and precludes a subsequent claim against the plaintiff for maliciously prosecuting that lawsuit, even if the trier of fact later rules for the defendant or the verdict is later overturned. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 823-824, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733 (Wilson ).) Does this rule apply—and is a subsequent malicious prosecution claim barred—when the trial court in the prior lawsuit denied the defendant's motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.81 but went on to rule in the defendant's favor? We conclude that it does. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing this malicious prosecution action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts

In 2010, defendant Gingko Rose Ltd. (Gingko Rose) acquired a house occupied by six tenants, including plaintiffs Wayne Hart (Hart) and Carlos Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Defendants David and Barbara Darwish own part of Gingko Rose, and defendant Logerm LLC is Gingko Rose's general partner. Defendants Lisa Rosenthal and her law firm, Rosenthal & Associates, represented Gingko Rose.

In May 2012, Gingko Rose filed six unlawful detainer lawsuits, one against each tenant, for not paying rent. The cases against Hart and Rodriguez proceeded to a bench trial first, with the remaining cases trailing behind. After Gingko Rose rested its case-in-chief, Hart and Rodriguez moved for a "directed verdict" on several grounds, including that (1) the house was not properly registered with the rent-control authorities, (2) Gingko Rose was trying to collect rent for periods when the house was not registered, (3) the notices preceding the lawsuits did not spell out the alleged breaches of the rental agreement, and (4) the dilapidated condition of the house vitiated any duty to pay rent. The unlawful detainer court pointed out that the proper procedural vehicle was a motion for judgment under section 631.8. It then denied that motion in two stages: It immediately denied the motion on the third ground and took the remainder of the motion under submission; after Hart and Rodriguez put on their case, the court denied the remainder. After receiving written closing arguments, the unlawful detainer court issued a statement of decision ruling for Hart and Rodriguez. Four months later, Gingko Rose dismissed the unlawful detainer lawsuits still pending against the other four tenants.

II. Procedural Background

All six tenants sued Gingko Rose, the Darwishes, Logerm LLC, Rosenthal and her law firm (collectively, defendants) for malicious prosecution of the unlawful detainer lawsuit. They sought compensatory damages, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the unlawful detainer court's denial of the motion for judgment in Hart and Rodriguez's trial mandated a finding that defendants had probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer lawsuit, thereby dictating dismissal of the malicious prosecution action.

The trial court granted the motion as to Hart and Rodriguez. The court found that the unlawful detainer court had "weighed the evidence and denied the [section 631.8 ] motion," which in its view dictated a finding that "the evidence for [defendants' unlawful detainer] claim must at least be tenable under the lenient ... standard" for evaluating probable cause to bring and maintain a lawsuit. The court rejected the tenants' argument that the unlawful detainer court's ruling was a product of defendants' fraud, finding no "evidence to back up [that] argument." The court accordingly granted defendants judgment on the pleadings as to Hart and Rodriguez, the only two tenants before the unlawful detainer court when it denied the section 631.8 motion. The trial court later denied Hart and Rodriguez's motion for a new trial.

Hart and Rodriguez filed timely notices of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Hart and Rodriguez challenge the trial court's dismissal of their malicious prosecution lawsuit through its grant of judgment on the pleadings and its subsequent denial of a new trial. We generally review the grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 626, 329 P.3d 180 (Harris )), and the denial of a new trial for an abuse of discretion (Minnegren v. Nozar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500, 514, fn. 7, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 (Minnegren )).

Our review of these rulings requires us to resolve three specific questions: (1) Did the trial court err in taking judicial notice of the minute orders and transcript in the unlawful detainer lawsuit to evaluate whether and on what basis the unlawful detainer court granted the motion for judgment?; (2) Does the rule equating certain actions in a prior lawsuit in favor of the prior plaintiff—namely, a summary judgment ruling, a nonsuit ruling following the presentation of evidence, or a verdict—with a finding that the prior plaintiff had probable cause to prosecute the prior lawsuit apply to the denial of a motion for judgment under section 631.8 ?; and (3) Is there any impediment to applying this rule to the denial of the section 631.8 motion in this case, either (a) because the denial was procured by fraud, or (b) because this court, in affirming the denial of defendants' anti-SLAPP2 motion, already found that defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute the unlawful detainer lawsuit and that finding is "law of the case"?

We review the first question for an abuse of discretion (CREED-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 520, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 128 ), and review the remaining two questions de novo to the extent they turn on legal questions (City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2015) 61 Cal.4th 945, 956, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 352 P.3d 883 ) and for substantial evidence to the extent they turn on the trial court's factual findings (Minnegren , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 514, fn. 7, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 ).

I. Judicial Notice

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer. (Harris , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 777, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 626, 329 P.3d 180.) As with a demurrer, a court ruling on such a motion is tasked with evaluating whether the "complaint ... state[s] facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action" (§ 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)), and in that task, may only look to "the face of the complaint" and "facts capable of judicial notice" and must accept as true all of the complaint's factual allegations (§ 438, subd. (d)).

As a general matter, courts may take judicial notice of the "[r]ecords of ... any court of this state" (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) ), although their ability to do so may be limited by the hearsay rule. (North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 762, 778, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ["The hearsay rule applies to statements contained in judicially noticed documents"].) The hearsay rule generally precludes courts from considering out-of-court statements for their truth (ibid. ; see generally Evid. Code, § 1200 ), but does not apply if the statements are not considered for their truth (e.g., People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1315, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 195, 355 P.3d 384 ) or if any of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule applies (Evid. Code, §§ 1220 -1390 ).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the unlawful detainer court's denial of Hart and Rodriguez's section 631.8 motion and the basis for that denial. Those facts were contained in the unlawful detainer court's minute orders and in its statements from the bench as reflected in the reporter's transcript; the minute orders and transcripts are "records" of a "court of this state." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) ; Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 65, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 [minute orders]; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 116, fn. 2, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461 [transcripts].) More to the point, the hearsay rule does not bar judicial notice of a state court's ruling or its stated basis for that ruling. (Kumaraperu , at p. 65, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 [taking judicial notice of court's ruling]; In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 471, 295 P.3d 863 (Vicks ) [taking judicial notice of " ‘the truth of results reached’ " in court documents]; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1565, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 552 (Sosinsky ) [taking judicial notice of the fact that court made "particular findings"].) That is because a court's ruling and the basis for that ruling constitute official records excepted from the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1280 ; People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 459, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85 ) and because they are being considered, as our Supreme Court has noted, "for the nonhearsay purpose of determining the basis" for the prior court's...

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