Hart v. Hart

• Decision Date: 31 July 1896
• Parties: HART v. HART.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

39 A. 430

68 N.H. 478

HART

v. HART.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Belknap.

July 31, 1896.

Exceptions from Belknap county. Libel by William Hart against Emma L. Hart for divorce. There was a judgment dismissing the libel, and libelant excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Facts found by the court: The libel alleges personal violence; but, so far as this charge was sustained by the libelant's evidence, it appeared to have been condoned. The libel also alleged, and the libelant's evidence tended to prove, that the libelee has so conducted and behaved herself towards the libelant as wholly to destroy his marital peace and happiness; that on divers occasions she has addressed him in language both offensive and vexatious, and the use of such language towards him has been her customary and habitual practice; that at different times she has accused him of marital infidelity, and of having contracted and imparted to her a certain venereal disease, which accusations she knew were false and without foundation; that she has told him she hated him, that she wished he was dead, that she would poison him, and that she would take his life. There was no allegation or evidence that the conduct complained of injured the libelant's health or endangered his reason, or that he had any fear of injury from the libelee. At the close of the libelant's evidence, the court, on motion of the libelee, dismissed the libel on the ground that the facts proved did not, as matter of law, constitute extreme cruelty, and the libelant excepted.

Jewell. Stone, Owen & Martin, for libelant.

Jewett & Plummer, for libellee.

BLODGETT, J. To constitute extreme cruelty, as a cause of divorce, there must be, as matter of law, direct bodily injury, either actual, or threatened and reasonably to be apprehended. Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600, 607, 608, 23 Atl. 362. In the present case these essentials are wholly lacking. The only act of personal violence alleged is found to have been condoned, and there is no reasonable apprehension of its repetition, or of any other bodily harm. In a word, giving the most favorable construction for the plaintiff, such of the acts and conduct complained of as are open to consideration fall far short of establishing legal cruelty, within the statutory meaning as construed in this jurisdiction. Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 607, 608, 23 Atl. 362; Jenness v. Jenness, 60 N. H. 211. Exceptions overruled.

PARSONS, J., did not sit The others concurred.