Hart v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 07 October 1903
• Parties: HART v. KNAPP.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

55 A. 1021

76 Conn. 135

HART

v. KNAPP.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 7, 1903.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Ralph Wheeler, Judge.

Action by Celia Hart against Anna C. Knapp. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Howard W. Taylor, for appellant.

Henry A. Turdy, for appellee.

TORRANCE, C. J. The complaint, among other things, alleges, in substance, that prior to its date the defendant had alienated the affections of Hart, the plaintiff's husband, committed adultery with him, caused him to abandon the plaintiff, and had ever since lived in adultery with him. All this the defendant denied. The evidence for the plaintiff tended to prove all the allegations of her complaint, and especially that the defendant had done all the things charged against her, "by her acts, blandishments, and seductions." The defendant herself did not testify in the case, but the evidence offered in her behalf tended to prove that, shortly after the marriage of the plaintiff to Hart, he remained away from the plaintiff for some time by reason of some disagreement; that prior to his acquaintance with the defendant he was of intemperate habits, and had taken the Keely cure in 1896; that he had on occasions remained away from home till late in the night, and had become neglectful of his wife, and failed to provide adequate support for her; that any affection that might exist on the part of the defendant for Hart was begun and prolonged by his advances and addresses; that there had been no criminal intercourse between the defendant and him; and that, after the plaintiff had separated from her husband, "she had met him and made some proposition looking towards his helping her get some money from the defendant." No exceptions to the evidence on either side appear to have been taken.

The only errors assigned relate to the action of the court in refusing to charge four certain requests made by the defendant. One of these relates to the claim that the plaintiff consented to and connived at the conduct of the husband with the defendant for the purpose of bringing an action against the defendant for damages, and the defendant says the court did not charge that this, if true, barred a recovery. This contention is not borne out by the record. The jury are distinctly and emphatically told, substantially in the language of the request, that, if the plaintiff "acquiesced and approved of her husband visiting the defendant with the Intended purpose" imputed in the request, she could not recover, and that, if she consented to the adulterous intercourse between the defendant and Hart, she could not recover. There is nothing in the charge upon the point of connivance of which the defendant can justly complain. Another of the requests asked the court to tell the jury that, "in considering whether the plaintiff connived at the alleged misconduct of her husband," they might take into account certain specific portions of the evidence upon that point. The court did not in terms so charge, but the jury were properly instructed to take into account all proper evidence bearing upon disputed points in the case; and this, under the circumstances, was enough. It was their duty to do so without being told, and they undoubtedly did so. There is nothing to show that the defendant was harmed by the failure of the court to call the attention of the jury to that portion of the evidence stated in the request.

The other two requests were, in substance, as follows: If the jury find "that the defendant did not seduce the plaintiff's husband, but, upon the contrary, that the plaintiffs husband seduced the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot recover." If the jury find that the defendant was not the "active or aggressive party who brought about the adulterous intercourse between herself and the plaintiff's husband," but that "the defendant was the victim of the wiles, blandishments, and intrigues of plaintiff's husband," the plaintiff cannot recover. These two requests cover substantially the same grounds, and may be considered together. The court did not charge these requests, but upon this point charged as follows: "The defendant, if she committed adultery with the husband of the plaintiff, is liable for damages in the action, whether the husband sought and solicited the defendant, or the defendant the husband of the plaintiff." The court further added that "if the defendant was an active, persuading party in the alienation of affection," that fact might be considered on the question of punitive damages. This part of the charge, although the defendant complains of it in the brief, is not assigned for error. Indeed, no part of the charge as actually given is assigned for error. The only errors assigned on this part of the case relate to the action of the court in refusing to charge the two requests last above mentioned. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether there was sufficient evidence in the case to justify the defendant in making these requests. Certainly the record discloses very little evidence of that kind. The evidence for the plaintiff tended strongly to show that the defendant "was an active or aggressive party" in bringing about the state of things complained of by the plaintiff, while apparently the only evidence to the contrary was that of the husband to the effect "that any affection that might exist on the part of the defendant" for him "was begun and...