Hart v. Miller

• Decision Date: 19 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 20947.,20947.
• Citation: 609 N.W.2d 138,2000 SD 53
• Parties: Erin Colleen HART, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ronald MILLER, Jim Jones, Paul Christensen, Warren Anderson, Les Sterling, Tom Dravland, Gene Abdallah, and Various John Does, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

609 N.W.2d 138

2000 SD 53

Erin Colleen HART, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ronald MILLER, Jim Jones, Paul Christensen, Warren Anderson, Les Sterling, Tom Dravland, Gene Abdallah, and Various John Does, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20947.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued December 2, 1999.

Decided April 19, 2000.

Michael D. Bornitz and Timothy L. James of James & Associates, Yankton, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

Craig A. Kennedy and Alice L. Rokahr of Doyle and Kennedy, Yankton, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee Miller.

Brent A. Wilbur and Neil Fulton of May, Adam, Gerdes and Thompson, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees Jones, Cristensen, Anderson, Sterling, Dravland, Abdallah and various John Does.

GILBERTSON, Justice

[¶ 1.] Plaintiff Erin Colleen Hart (Hart) appeals an order granting the motions for summary judgment of Defendants Ronald Miller (Miller) and Miller's supervisors¹ (Supervisors) on Hart's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and other state claims.² Hart appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] On February 17, 1996, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Hart left the 8 th Street Pub in Yankton, South Dakota where she had been working. Hart was stopped and subsequently arrested by South Dakota Highway Patrolman Miller for running a stop sign, speeding, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under the influence of alcohol. Hart was then transported in Miller's patrol vehicle to the Yankton Police Department where she was processed and released.

[¶ 3.] Typically, after every physical arrest, Miller performed a search of his patrol car for contraband. However, on February 17, shortly after his contact with Hart, he was called to respond to a motor vehicle accident. Another officer sitting in Miller's patrol car discovered a baggie of marijuana in the passenger side door of the car. Miller believed the marijuana came from the person who was last in his patrol car prior to the officer's discovery. According to Miller, this would have been Hart.

[¶ 4.] On February 18, 1996, Miller attempted unsuccessfully to contact Hart several times through the Yankton Police Department as it is the officer's responsibility to follow-up and conduct an investigation during his or her own work shift. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Miller went to Hart's apartment complex to see if she was home, but got no response. A Yankton Police Department dispatcher subsequently made telephone contact with Hart around 11:30 p.m. or 11:40 p.m. The dispatcher informed Hart that Miller had something he had to give her.³ Hart replied she was in bed and would come to the police station in the morning to retrieve the item. Hart was then told Miller would come to her residence and speak with her there. When Miller arrived at Hart's apartment, he knocked and Hart consented to his entry into her apartment. Miller showed Hart the baggie of marijuana from his vehicle and inquired whether it belonged to her. Hart denied ownership of the marijuana. Miller did not accept her denial, and indicated he would turn the matter over to the State Division of Criminal Investigation. After approximately ten to fifteen minutes of hostile conversation and questioning, Miller left Hart's apartment when she told him to "get out of my apartment."

[¶ 5.] Hart claims Miller entered her apartment in an attempt to coerce her into having sex with him. Hart claims following her denial of ownership of the marijuana, Miller began advancing toward her and "backing her across the room." Hart testified at her deposition that as Miller was backing her across the room, he was continuously accusing her of being the owner of the marijuana and accusing her of lying. According to Hart, Miller backed her across the room until she was pushed against a television. She also claims that during this time Miller was looking her up and down in a sexually provocative manner, and asked her what they were going to do about the marijuana. Hart claims she was under the impression that Miller was suggesting if she engaged in sexual activity with him, any legal problems with the marijuana would disappear. Hart claims it was only after she made it clear she would not engage in any sexual activity that Miller left her apartment.

[¶ 6.] Miller strenuously denies any improper conduct towards Hart. It is undisputed that Miller never touched Hart, never specifically mentioned sex, and did not overtly threaten her in any way.

[¶ 7.] Hart further claims that approximately two weeks later, on March 2, 1996, Miller approached her in his patrol vehicle while she was walking home at 1:00 a.m. Hart alleges Miller approached her from behind, then did a U-turn and came back to ask her where she was going. Hart responded she was heading home and Miller then left the area. Miller also denies this incident.

[¶ 8.] Hart subsequently filed her complaint in the First Judicial Circuit against Miller alleging false imprisonment, assault, invasion of privacy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hart filed an action against Supervisors based upon conspiracy, negligent retention and supervision, and violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Miller made a motion for summary judgment, while Supervisors filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court gave a notice of intent to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b). The order granting summary judgment was entered on January 22, 1999.

[¶ 9.] Hart appeals raising the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Miller on Hart's § 1983 claim.

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Supervisors on Hart's § 1983 claim.

3. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Miller on Hart's state law claims.

4. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Supervisors on Hart's state law claims of conspiracy and negligent supervision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10.] Our standard of review for a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is well settled. As we recently stated in Mattson v. Rachetto:

Summary judgment is authorized "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SDCL 15-6-56(c). We will affirm only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the legal questions have been correctly decided. Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801, 804 (S.D.1987). All reasonable inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Morgan v. Baldwin, 450 N.W.2d 783, 785 (S.D.1990). The burden is on the moving party to clearly show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 212, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968).

1999 SD 51, ¶ 8, 591 N.W.2d 814, 817

(quoting Estate of Shuck v. Perkins County, 1998 SD 32, ¶ 6, 577 N.W.2d 584, 586). Summary judgment is a preferred process to dispose of meritless claims. Horne v. Crozier, 1997 SD 65, ¶ 5, 565 N.W.2d 50, 52.

[¶ 11.] Whether Miller and Supervisors are shielded by sovereign immunity is a question of law, reviewed de novo, with no deference given to the trial court's legal conclusions. Hansen v. S.D. Dept. of Transp., 1998 SD 109, ¶ 7, 584 N.W.2d 881, 883 (citing Wilson v. Hogan, 473 N.W.2d 492, 493 (S.D.1991)).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 12.] 1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Miller on Hart's § 1983 claim.

[¶ 13.] In its grant of summary judgment, the trial court found both Miller and Supervisors were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. This Court has recently addressed qualified immunity of a law enforcement officer under § 1983 claims, and the applicability of summary judgment to this type of case. In Horne, we stated:

Qualified immunity is a legal question to be decided by the court; thus, it is particularly amenable to summary judgment. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 595 (1991)(per curiam). The Supreme Court has emphasized that "because '[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,' Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526[, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411] (1985), we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Id. To find whether qualified immunity applies, the test is to ask if the officer's conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable officer would have known at the time. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 530 (1987)

; Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1382 (8th Cir.1992). This "objective legal reasonableness" standard means "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640,

107 S.Ct. at 3039,

97 L.Ed.2d at 531; Hafner v. Delano, 520 N.W.2d 587, 591 (S.D. 1994). Qualified immunity is a personal defense. Hafner, 520 N.W.2d at 591. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991).

1997 SD 65, ¶ 6, 565 N.W.2d at 52-53

.

[¶ 14.] This Court has also recently stated:

[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time

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