Hart v. Sec'y, Case No. 8:16-cv-770-T-36AAS
Decision Date | 30 January 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 8:16-cv-770-T-36AAS |
Parties | LORETHA HART, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Loretha Hart timely filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1) challenging her Pinellas County convictions. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 21) and Hart filed a reply (Dkt. 27). Upon consideration, Hart's petition will be DENIED.
The State charged Hart with armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. (Dkt. 25, Ex. 1, pp. 9-10). Hart entered open guilty pleas to both charges. (Id., pp. 89-90). She was sentenced to concurrent terms of 25 years in prison, with 10 years suspended and to be served on probation. (Dkt. 25, Ex. 3, pp. 253-54). The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Dkt. 25, Ex. 7). The state appellate court also per curiam affirmed the denial of Hart's motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Dkt. 25, Exs. 9, 11).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.
The AEDPA was meant "to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Id. at 694. See also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) ().
The state appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences and the denial of postconviction relief without discussion. These decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (). When a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, "the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale" and "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. To show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. A court must consider whether, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. However, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. Because Hart entered a plea, her counsel owed her a "lesser duty" than he would have had she gone to trial. Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984). Counsel was onlyrequired to provide Hart "with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts" to enable her to make an informed choice between pleading and going to trial. Id.
Hart must demonstrate that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691-92. To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate Id. at 694. Because Hart entered a plea, the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether counsel's alleged deficient performance Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Obtaining relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult on federal habeas review because "[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). See also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013) ( ).
Hart claims that the trial court violated her due process rights by holding her "protestation of innocence" and "lack of remorse" against her at sentencing. (Dkt. 1, p. 5). Hart does not clearly raise a federal claim in Ground One. A claim that does not allege a federal constitutional violationis not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir.1988) (). Even liberally construing Ground One as alleging a federal due process violation, however, it is barred from review. A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust her claims by presenting them in state court before raising them in her habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) ().
Hart did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because she did not present the federal nature of the claim on direct appeal. (Dkt. 25, Ex. 5). See Pearson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 273 Fed. App'x 847, 849-50 (11th Cir. 2008) (); Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) .1
State procedural rules do not provide for successive direct appeals. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) ( ). Because Hart is prohibited from returning to state court to present the federal due process argument, her claim is procedurally defaulted. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The claim is barred from review unless Hart establishes the applicability of either the cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. See id.
Hart does not establish that an exception applies to overcome the default. In her reply, Hart states that "[a] 'fundamental miscarriage of justice' was in fact established once the Petitioner's right to due process was violated." (Dkt. 27, p. 1). To the extent Hart contends that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies, her argument fails. A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). This exception requires a petitioner's "actu...
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