Hart v. State
| Decision Date | 21 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 59A01-1607-CR-1655 |
| Citation | 79 N.E.3d 936 |
| Parties | James A. HART, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant : Jeffrey K. Branstetter, Blanton, Branstetter & Pierce, LLC, Jeffersonville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Statement of the Case
[1] James Hart ("Hart") appeals his conviction by jury of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Prior to trial, Hart told the trial court that he did not want court-appointed counsel, but then he failed to obtain his own counsel in the months that followed. A week prior to trial, Hart filed a motion for a continuance, requesting additional time to obtain counsel. The trial court denied the motion, and Hart subsequently represented himself at trial. On appeal, Hart argues that the trial court erred by trying him without counsel because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The State argues that, even though Hart did not verbally waive his right to counsel, he waived his right through his conduct of failing to obtain a lawyer in a timely manner. Because we find that the trial court did not properly advise Hart of the dangers of representing himself, we agree with Hart that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel verbally or through his conduct. Accordingly, we reverse Hart's conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial.
[2] We reverse and remand.
Whether Hart knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
[3] On July 30, 2015, Hart was charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy for violating a protective order that prohibited him from visiting the French Lick Resort, his wife's place of employment.
[4] On September 14, 2016, the trial court held an initial hearing on Hart's charge. At the hearing, Hart appeared and executed a document entitled "Waiver of Appearance and Written Report of Initial Hearing." (App. 110). The waiver provided:
(App. 110). Hart signed another section of the waiver that provided: "I, the defendant herein, do hereby certify and state that I have read and understand this Appearance and Written Report of Initial Hearing...." (App. 111). The trial court acknowledged that Hart had signed the waiver but did not ask whether Hart intended to retain an attorney or was indigent.
[5] At the next pre-trial conference, on January 19, 2016, Hart and the trial court engaged in the following exchange:
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 6-7). The trial court then asked Hart how many days were necessary for his jury trial. Hart and the court agreed on the number of days, and the trial court set the trial for June 8, 2016. The court also asked Hart if he wanted a final pre-trial conference, and Hart responded (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12).
[6] Subsequently, one week before the scheduled jury trial, Hart filed, among other motions, a motion to continue the trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motions the day before the scheduled trial. At that hearing, Hart requested a continuance because two of his witnesses were unable to appear on the originally scheduled trial date due to medical complications and because the trial conflicted with a work assignment he had received. In addition, Hart said (Tr. Vol. 3 at 12). As a result, Hart requested more time to obtain counsel. The trial court denied the motion, noting that it was the day before the trial, and the court had already summoned the seventy-five potential jurors. The trial court also noted that Hart had received notice of the trial almost six months previously and could have requested a continuance at any point before May 27 when the court had summoned the jurors.
[7] Over the next three days, the trial court conducted the jury trial. Hart appeared pro se, and the trial court never questioned his lack of representation. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Hart guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Hart to one (1) year with all but sixty (60) days suspended to probation. Hart now appeals.
[8] On appeal, Hart argues that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel and, accordingly, the trial court violated that right by conducting his trial before he could obtain counsel. In response, the State argues that even if Hart did not verbally waive his right to counsel, he implicitly waived that right through his conduct of failing to obtain counsel during the six months after he received notice of his charges and his trial date.
[9] A criminal defendant's right to counsel is a fundamental individual right protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Leonard v. State , 73 N.E.3d 155 (Ind. 2017). " ‘Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.’ " Poynter v. State , 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1125-26 (Ind. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) ). Accordingly, it is well-settled that when a defendant proceeds to trial without the benefit of counsel, the record must reflect that the right to counsel was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived. Brickert v. State , 673 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh'g denied , trans. denied . Whether there has been an intelligent waiver depends on the " ‘particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ " Poynter , 749 N.E.2d at 1127 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ). It is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver, and it is " ‘fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear on the record.’ " Id. (quoting Johnson , 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 ). There are no prescribed "talking points" the court is required to use; however, making a defendant aware of his constitutional right to counsel is insufficient. See id. at 1126 (); Eaton v. State , 894 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The trial court must also tell the defendant of the " ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’ " Poynter , 749 N.E.2d at 1126 (quoting Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ).
[10] We review the trial court's conclusion that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel de novo. R.W. v. State , 901 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We also note that a "strong presumption exists against waiver of the constitutional rights to counsel." Eaton , 894 N.E.2d at 217 (quoting Mitchell v. State , 417 N.E.2d 364, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ).
[11] The complicating factor here is that Hart never asserted his right to self-representation, which would have raised the question of whether he intended to waive his right to counsel. He denied the trial court's offer of court-appointed counsel when he said "I don't need your monkeys," but he never stated that he intended to represent himself instead. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7). To the contrary, at his hearing on his motion to continue, Hart told the court that he had tried to obtain a lawyer and wanted more time to do so because all the lawyers he had spoken to had been booked. Then, later at the hearing, he reiterated (Tr. Vol. 3 at 43). Accordingly, Hart never verbally asserted his right to self-representation or said that he did not want counsel.
[12] Nevertheless, the State argues that Hart implicitly waived his right to counsel by failing to obtain counsel even though he had received notice of his trial date several months prior to trial. In support of this argument, the State cites Brickert v. State , 673 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh'g denied , trans. denied , in which we held that Brickert had waived his right to counsel by failing to obtain counsel after the trial court had granted him a continuance to do so. We do not find our holding in Brickert relevant because our supreme court later recognized in Poynter that Brickert conflicted with other precedent and clarified the issue of waiver of the right to counsel. See Poynter , 749 N.E.2d at 1126-27 ().
[13] In Poynter , Poynter had told the trial court that he...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wilson v. State
...of self-representation or that he might have independently understood those dangers and disadvantages); Hart v. State , 79 N.E.3d 936, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing judgment against the defendant after finding that the defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his ri......
- Paquette v. State
- Paquette v. State, Supreme Court Case No. 63S04–1709–CR–570