Hart v. State

• Decision Date: 29 July 2020
• Docket Number: SC: 159539,COA: 338171
• Citation: 946 N.W.2d 285 (Mem)
• Parties: Anthony HART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

946 N.W.2d 285 (Mem)

Anthony HART, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.STATE of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee.

SC: 159539

COA: 338171

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 29, 2020

Order

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we VACATE our order of September 25, 2019. The application for leave to appeal the February 7, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is DENIED, because we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Clement, J. (concurring).

I concur with the Court's disposition of this matter. I write separately to draw attention to an issue that the parties have not raised, and upon which I would therefore have been uncomfortable deciding this case, but that I think is important and needs clarification: whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue the opinion it did.

In defendant's motion for summary disposition in the trial court, it argued that this case should be resolved either on the basis of sovereign immunity or that plaintiff failed to plead a claim upon which relief could be granted. See MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). The trial court denied the motion on both grounds. Defendant then took a claim of appeal to the Court of Appeals. On appeal, that Court affirmed the trial court's (C)(7) holding to deny summary disposition on the basis of sovereign immunity, but reversed the trial court's (C)(8) holding and held that plaintiff had not made a claim upon which relief could be granted.

To understand my concern with whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction here, one must understand the bases of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction. "The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law ...."¹ Const. 1963, art. 6, § 10. As a result, "the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is entirely statutory." People v. Milton , 393 Mich. 234, 245, 224 N.W.2d 266 (1974). The principal statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals provides:

(1) The court of appeals has jurisdiction on appeals from all final judgments and final orders from the circuit court, court of claims, and probate court, as those terms are defined by law and supreme court rule, except final judgments and final orders described in subsections (2) and (3). A final judgment or final order described in this subsection is appealable as a matter of right.

(2) The court of appeals has jurisdiction on appeal from the following orders and judgments that are reviewable only on application for leave to appeal granted by the court of appeals:

(a) A final judgment or final order of the circuit court under any of the following circumstances:

(i ) In an appeal from a final judgment or final order of the district court ....

(ii ) In an appeal from a final judgment or final order of a municipal court.

(b) A final judgment or final order from the circuit court based on a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(c) Any other judgment or interlocutory order from the circuit court, court of claims, business court, or probate court as determined by supreme court rule.

(3) An order concerning the assignment of a case to the business court ... is not appealable to the court of appeals. [ MCL 600.308.]

In short, the scheme recognizes a dichotomy between appeals of right and appeals by leave. Appeals of right are available from "final orders" as this Court defines that term, except appeals of right are not available from circuit court orders reviewing lower court proceedings, guilty pleas, or orders assigning a case to the business court.² The statute allows appeals from these latter sorts of "final orders" (with the exception of business court assignments, which are not appealable at all), along with appeals from "[a]ny other judgment or interlocutory order," but "only on application for leave to appeal granted by the court of appeals."

We have adopted court rules that track with and implement this scheme.³ In MCR 7.203(A)(1), we have provided that the Court of Appeals "has jurisdiction of an appeal of right from" all final orders, but in MCR 7.203(A)(1)(a) and (b) we have carved out the same exceptions found in MCL 600.308(2)(a) and (b) (i.e., denying the Court of Appeals jurisdiction on a claim of appeal from an order resolving an appeal from a lower court to the circuit court, and from guilty and nolo contendere pleas). In MCR 7.203(B)(1) and (2), we have authorized the Court of Appeals to grant leave to appeal in those circumstances where an appeal of right is not available, which is consistent with MCL 600.308(2). We have defined a "final order" as: (1) "the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties," (2) an order designated as final in receivership and related proceedings, (3) "a postjudgment order that, as to a minor, grants or denies a motion to change legal custody, physical custody, or domicile" in domestic-relations actions, (4) "a postjudgment order awarding or denying attorney fees and costs," and (5) an order denying a motion for summary disposition⁴ on the basis of governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (10). MCR 7.202(6)(a).

Under this scheme, the Court of Appeals apparently had jurisdiction to review the trial court's sovereign-immunity ruling under MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Legislature has conferred upon the Court of Appeals authority to hear appeals of right from final orders as this Court has defined them. See MCL 600.308(1) ; MCR 7.203(A)(1). This Court has defined "final order" to include orders denying summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7). See MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v). Thus, defendant's claim of appeal gave the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review the trial court's sovereign-immunity holding.⁵

The question, however, is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's holding under MCR 2.116(C)(8) that plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The definition of "final order" in MCR 7.202(6)(a) does not include an order denying a (C)(8) motion. Moreover, MCR 7.203(A) makes clear that parties cannot bootstrap their way to appellate review. It provides that an appeal of right from an order denying summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity "is limited to the portion of the order with respect to which there is an appeal of right." MCR 7.203(A)(1). The trial court's (C)(7) decision was, undoubtedly, a different "portion of [its] order" than its (C)(8) decision, and MCR 7.203(A) makes clear that even though the claim of appeal gave the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over defendant's appeal of the (C)(7) sovereign-immunity decision, that did not then mean the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the (C)(8) decision.

Where the language of a court rule is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. We therefore conclude that in an appeal by right from an order denying a defendant's claim of governmental immunity, such as this one, [the Court of Appeals] does not have the authority to consider issues beyond the portion of the trial court's order denying the defendant's claim of governmental immunity. To conclude otherwise would render part of the court rule nugatory. [ Pierce v. City of Lansing , 265 Mich. App. 174, 182, 694 N.W.2d 65 (2005) (emphasis added; citation omitted).]

If the trial court's (C)(8) decision was not a "final order," and the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction over the (C)(7) decision did not extend to reviewing the (C)(8) decision as well, then the (C)(8) decision must be part of the group of "[a]ny other ... interlocutory order[s] from the ... court of claims" in MCL 600.308(2)(c), which are outside the definition of a "final order" in MCR 7.202(6)(a). Such orders are "reviewable only on application for leave to appeal granted by the court of appeals." MCL 600.308(2)(c) (emphasis added).

The jurisdictional difficulty here is that defendant never filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's (C)(8) ruling in the Court of Appeals under MCR 7.203(B)(1). As was noted in Pierce , the Court of Appeals "does not have the authority" to review a nonfinal order under MCR 7.202(6)(a) on an appeal of right. Nor is Pierce an anomaly. During the era when the Court of Appeals published all of its decisions,⁶ it held on many occasions that the failure to file an application for leave to appeal when one is required denies that Court jurisdiction to review questions presented in an improper claim of appeal.⁷ However, it thereafter began holding that it could treat an improper claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal and grant it, in order to reach important legal questions.⁸ Since then, the Court of Appeals has lived on both sides of this fence. It has held that without a proper application for leave to appeal having been filed and granted, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal,⁹ but it more often asserts discretion to treat an improper claim of appeal as an application, and then grants this constructive application in order to reach the legal questions presented in the name of judicial economy.¹⁰ Nowhere is this tension better demonstrated than in Pierce itself; immediately after concluding that it "[did] not have the authority" to entertain the appeal because to do so would "render part of the court rule nugatory," the Court of Appeals then said, in the very next sentence , that it would "[n]evertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, ... consider the [improper (C)(10) interlocutory appeal] as on leave granted." Pierce , 265 Mich. App. at 182-183, 694 N.W.2d 65. This Court has apparently endorsed this process, albeit without analysis and relying only on Court of Appeals authority, in a few recent family-law cases.¹¹

In my view, this situation presents a quandary. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals clearly has the authority to grant applications for leave to appeal, see...