Hart v. Washington Park Club
Decision Date | 01 April 1895 |
Citation | 41 N.E. 620,157 Ill. 9 |
Parties | HART v. WASHINGTON PARK CLUB. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to appellate court, First district.
Action on the case by David M. Hart against the Washington Park Club. Defendant obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. 54 Ill. App. 480. Plaintiff bring error. Affirmed.
Rosenthal, Kurz & Hirschl, for plaintiff in error.
Cratty Bros. and MacLaren, Jarivs & Cleveland, for defendant in error.
The action below was trespass on the case, brought by plaintiff in error against defendant in error. The declaration avers as follows: etc. The declaration was demurred to. The demurrer was sustained. Plaintiff stood by his declaration. Judgment was rendered for defendant, and has been affirmed by the appellate court. The present writ of error is sued out for the purpose of reviewing the judgment of the appellate court.
The question is whether the declaration was good on general demurrer. It is urged, in favor of the sufficiency of the declaration, that proof of the injury as alleged will give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant, and so establish a prima facie case, under the application of the maxim, ‘Res ipsa loquitur.’ It is claimed that the declaration avers all that is necessary, by stating that defendant invited plaintiff into its racing course, and accepted an admission fee from him, and that plaintiff was lawfully upon the ground set apart by the defendant for spectators, and, while there, was in the exercise of ordinary care, and that it was the duty of defendant to exercise reasonable care to keep the space set apart reasonably safe, and that plaintiff was struck by a horse and vehicle running unattended through such space. It is contended that the space reserved for spectators was not safe when a horse and vehicle thus ran through it, and that the fact of such running indicated negligence, and devolved upon the defendant the burden of showing how the accident happened, and that it had used all reasonable care to prevent such an occurrence. On the other hand, it is urged, against the sufficiency of the declaration, that it does not state facts sufficient, if proven, to create a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant, or to justify an allegation that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, or to support an averment that the defendant had knowledge of the cause or causes of the running away of the horse. It is claimed that the declaration is objectionable as not stating whether or not the plaintiff was in the grand stand, or in the space occupied by visitors in carriages or other vehicles drawn by horses, or in that occupied exclusively by pedestrians, and in not stating whether or not the horse which ran away belonged to the defendant, or was in the keeping of the defendant. It is contended, by the defendant in error, that the running away of a horse creates no presumption of negligence, except as against those whose duty it is to guard against such an occurrence, and that no fact is alleged in the declaration showing the duty of the defendant in this respect.
If an owner or occupier of land either directly or by implication induces persons to come upon his premises, he thereby assumes an obligation that such premises are in a reasonably safe condition, so that the persons there by his invitation shall not be injured by them, or in their use for the purpose for which the invitation was extended. Railway Co. v. Bodemer, 139 Ill. 596, 29 N. E. 692; Camp. Neg. § 43; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 413; Davis v. Society, 129 Mass. 367. In Currier v. Association, 135 Mass. 414, it was held that the proprietor of a hall to which the public is invited in bound to use ordinary care and diligence to put and keep the hall in a reasonably safe condition for persons attending in pursuance of such invitation, and if he neglects his duty in this respect, so that the hall is in fact unsafe, his knowledge or ignorance of the defect is immaterial. In the case at bar, the declaration avers that the defendant was in possession of the rece course, and conducted an exhibition of horse racing thereon, and invited the public at large to attend, and charged an admission fee, and that plaintiff paid the fee and attended the exhibition. These facts are sufficient to impose the same obligation upon defendant which rests upon any other owner or occupier of premises who invites people to come upon the same. Out of these facts necessarily arises the duty of the defendant to keep the grounds in a reasonably safe and suitable condition for the spectators. Counsel for defendant in error refer to a number of authorities in support of the proposition that a mere general allegation in the declaration, that it became the duty of the defendant to do that which the plaintiff complains of his omitting to do, is not sufficient, and that the sufficiency of the declaration in this regard will depend upon whether the facts stated show that the defendant was bound in law to do that which he is charged with having omitted to do. No fault can be found with the doctrine of the authorities thus referred to. Tested by the rule laid down in them, the declaration here, by averring defendant's occupancy of the grounds, and its invitation to the plaintiff to come thereon, states such facts as give rise to the general duty which the defendant is charged with failing to perform.
The question next arises whether the declaration makes such averments as show a breach of the duty arising out of the facts stated; or, in other words, whether negligence can be presumed from the running away of the house within the space reserved for...
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