Harter v. Sorensen

• Decision Date: 07 March 1902
• Docket Number: 1308
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN HARTER and ELIZABETH HARTER, Respondents, v. P. A. SORENSEN, Appellant

67 P. 1062

24 Utah 342

JOHN HARTER and ELIZABETH HARTER, Respondents, v. P. A. SORENSEN, Appellant

No. 1308

Supreme Court of Utah

March 7, 1902

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.--Hon. Ogden Hiles, Judge.

Action to set aside a deed to certain premises. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant appealed.

AFFIRMED.

S. P Armstrong, Esq., for appellant.

This is an equitable action, and under section 9, article 8 of the Constitution, the appellate court has the same power as the trial court to examine anew all questions of fact involved to weigh the evidence. In fact it is the duty of the appellate court to do so.

This evidence is certainly conclusive that they were not incapacitated by intoxication. A man can not voluntarily become "slightly" or "partially" intoxicated, and afterward be heard, on that ground, to repudiate a contract which he made while in such condition. Courts are unwilling to assist an intoxicated party to get rid of his agreement. Willcox v. Jackson, 51 Iowa 210; Hall v. Moreman, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 477; 1 Story Eq. Jur., sec. 231, p. 245.

To avoid a contract, the drunkenness must be so excessive as utterly to deprive the party of his reason and understanding and to render him incapable of knowing the effect of what he was doing. Taylor v. Purcell, 60 Ark. 606-10; Caulkins v. Fry, 35 Conn. 170-1; Shackleton v Sebree, 86 Ill. 616-9; Loftus v. Maloney, 89 Va. 576-90; Wilcox v. Jackson, 51 Iowa 208-10; Duker v. Franz, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 273; Johns v. Fritchey, 39 Md. 258-66; Reynolds v. Dechaums, 76 Am. Dec. 101-2; 1 Story Eq. Jur., sec. 231.

The law fixes no particular standard of intelligence necessary to enable a person to contract. Harvey v. Chase, 52 Maine 304.

If he is not non compos mentis, it is sufficient. Harvey v. Chase, 52 Maine 314-7.

There must be an essential privation of the reasoning faculties, or an incapacity of understanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life, to render a man of unsound mind. Raymond v. Wathen, 142 Ind. 367-374.

Mere weakness or feebleness of mind, not amounting to inability to comprehend the contract, when unaccompanied by imposition or undue influence, furnishes no ground for the overthrow of the contract. Annen v. Stoutt, 42 Pa. St. 114-123; Buchey v. Buchey, 38 W.Va. 168; Wilkinson v. Shernan, 45 N.J. Eq. 413-21; Wright v. Jackson, 59 Wis. 569; Cain v. Warford, 33 Md. 23-9; Maddox v. Simons, 31 Ga. 12-28; Fornam v. Boston, 9 Pick. 212-222.

Frank Hoffman, Esq., for respondents.

BASKIN, J. MINER, C. J., and BARTCH, J., concur.

OPINION

BASKIN, J.

--This is an action to set aside a deed to the premises described in the complaint, executed by the plaintiffs to the defendant, who is the appellant. It is alleged in the complaint "that said premises were and are used and occupied by plaintiffs as a home; that the plaintiffs are old, infirm, and feeble in both mind and body, the plaintiff John Harter being eighty years of age, and the plaintiff Elizabeth Harter being seventy-five years of age; that neither of said plaintiffs are able to read writing, and are incompetent to attend to business matters; that neither of these plaintiffs, at the time of the alleged signing of said deed, had any knowledge or information that they were signing or executing a deed conveying their home, and were informed by the defendant that the signing of the deed or paper was a mere matter of form, and conveyed nothing; that plaintiffs relied on these representations when they signed the same; that, in addition to the age and feebleness of the plaintiffs, they were each slightly under the influence of liquor." The answer admits that said premises were and are used by plaintiffs as a home, and that they are old, but that defendant is not informed as to their age, and admits the execution and delivery of the deed to said premises, and denies all the other allegations of the complaint hereinbefore quoted, except as above admitted. The following findings of fact were made in the court below: "Third. That the actual amount of money received by plaintiffs and paid by defendant was the sum of $ 30, and no more. Fourth. That at the time of the making and the execution of said deed the plaintiffs in this action, the parties of the first part to said deed, were old and feeble in mind and body, and partially intoxicated, and unable to understand or transact ordinary business, and were incapacitated for transacting this business. Fifth. That on the same date of the signing and executing of said deed an agreement was executed by all of the parties to this action, and duly filed and recorded, the conditions of which said agreement were claimed by defendant to be in full satisfaction of the purchase price mentioned in the deed. Sixth. That the considerations named in said agreement were not adequate for the consideration of the purchase price of the property conveyed in the deed, and were not a sufficient consideration. Seventh. The plaintiffs in this action were not sufficiently advised of the terms and conditions of said agreement to enable them to understand the purport of the same, or to enable them to understand the consideration that they were receiving for the deed of conveyance they executed, and were deceived by the agent of the defendant who procured their signature to the same." As conclusions of law, the court found that the deed "is illegal and void," and decreed that the same be set aside and canceled. The substance of the errors assigned is that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decree, and that each of the foregoing findings of fact is not justified by the evidence. The evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the fourth and seventh findings of fact, and these findings alone justify the decree.

The plaintiffs testified in the case, and, being before the trial court, it had a better opportunity to judge of...