Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cutter

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Writing for the Court: LAMPRON
• Citation: 229 A.2d 173,108 N.H. 112
• Parties: HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO. v. Jackson G. CUTTER et al.
• Decision Date: 28 April 1967

Page 173

229 A.2d 173 108 N.H. 112 HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CO.
v.
Jackson G. CUTTER et al. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Argued Jan. 4, 1967.
Decided April 28, 1967.

Charles F. Hartnett, Dover, for plaintiff, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.

Flynn, Powell & McGuirk, Portsmouth, and Raymond P. Blanchard, New Market, for defendant Jackson G. Cutter.

LAMPRON, Justice.

The motion for discovery alleges that on June 7, 1963, when Dan Cutter was injured, Jackson Cutter was insured by the plaintiff and shortly thereafter he gave to an agent of the Company a signed statement containing details of Dan's accident. Jackson further alleges in his motion that he was not represented by counsel at the time and that he was not given a copy of his statement. He also alleges that a

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copy of this statement is assential to the preparation of his case and that the Company has 'arbitrarily, capriciously and wrongfully' refused to produce one for him.

Discovery, together with depositions, interrogatories, and pre-trial hearings, are important procedures for probing in advance of trial the adversary's claims and his possession or knowledge of information pertaining to the controversy between the parties. Their underlying purpose is to reach the truth and to reach it as early in the process as possible by narrowing the issues thus enhancing the chances for a fair and amicable settlement and, this failing, shortening the ensuing trial which will be decided 'on the basis of pertinent evidence rather than the rules of evidence.' State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 108, 111, 58 A.2d 749, 752; Reynolds v. Boston & Maine Transp. Company, 98 N.H. 251, 253, 98 A.2d 157, 37 A.L.R.2d 1149; Stimpert v. Abdnour, 30 Ill.App.2d 159, 166, 173 N.E.2d 817.

These pre-trial devices have supplanted the 'older notion which dominated trials at common law * * * the right of each party to keep from disclosure the facts which he intended to show at trial [108 N.H. 114] beyond the very limited disclosure he was required to make in his pleadings by an occasional order for particulars.' James, Civil Procedure, s. 6.2, p. 183 (1965). To permit these pre-trial procedures to accomplish their beneficial purposes the circumstances warranting their use have been given a liberal interpretation by our courts. McDuffey v. Boston & Maine R.R., 102 N.H. 179, 181, 152 A.2d 606, 74 A.L.R.2d 872. It has been recognized also that 'the process must be kept within reasonable limits.' Smith v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 535, 163 A.2d 564.

On the record before us we cannot hold the statement of the defendant assured, made to the plaintiff's agent shortly after the accident, exempt from discovery under the work product rule. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451; Therrien v. Public Service Company, 99 N.H. 197, 200, 108 A.2d 48; Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 274, 220 A.2d 751. An argument has been advanced that such...