Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Co., No. 2000-CA-00470-SCT.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Writing for the Court: Before PITTMAN, C.J., MILLS and COBB, JJ.
• Citation: 826 So.2d 1206
• Parties: HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, A Connecticut Company, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY.
• Decision Date: 27 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00470-SCT.

826 So.2d 1206

HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, A Connecticut Company,
v.
HALLIBURTON COMPANY

No. 2000-CA-00470-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

September 27, 2001.

Rehearing Denied October 17, 2002.

826 So.2d 1208

Pat H. Scanlon, Jackson, Lawrence Cary Gunn, Jr., Hattiesburg, Attorneys for Appellants

Lem G. Adams, III, R. Web Heidelberg, David Ringer Charles R. "Chuck" Lane, Attorneys for Appellee.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., MILLS and COBB, JJ.

MILLS, J., For the Court:

FACTS

¶ 1. Tomlinson Interests, Inc. was the owner of a gas well at the Johns Field in Rankin County. Tomlinson filed for bankruptcy in 1984, but because the well became damaged, the bankruptcy court authorized the bankruptcy trustee, Gary Knotsman, to drill a replacement well. Dan Pierce was hired as the engineer for the construction of the replacement well. On July 15, 1985, the well "blew out" and sour gas escaped. Hundreds of plaintiffs who lived in the vicinity of the well filed lawsuits against Tomlinson, Halliburton,

826 So.2d 1209

and many others who were involved with drilling activities at the well. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., (collectively Hartford) insured Tomlinson, Dan Pierce, and others of their codefendants. Halliburton asserted that it was an insured of Hartford under Tomlinson's insurance policy, but Hartford denied this claim. Consequently, Halliburton undertook its own defense. Both Halliburton and Tomlinson settled with the plaintiffs before there was an adjudication of fault, except for one suit in Texas which Tomlinson settled after judgment but while an appeal was pending

TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

¶ 2. In 1991, Hartford filed a complaint against Halliburton asserting Halliburton's negligence was the primary cause for the well blowout and that it was entitled to indemnity for expenses incurred in settlement of the lawsuits against its insureds. The case was held in abeyance by court order until it was reactivated in 1997. Halliburton timely filed its response to Hartford's complaint. Halliburton next filed an amended answer and counterclaim alleging it was entitled to indemnity from Hartford. Shortly after responding to the counterclaim, Hartford moved the court to disqualify David Ringer, an attorney for Halliburton, based on his representation of Dan Pierce. This motion was denied. Ultimately, Halliburton filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted in the trial court and certified as a final judgment under M.R.C.P. 54(b).

¶ 3. Hartford moved the court to alter or amend the opinion and order to reflect that the judgment entered was a M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings. Pursuant to this motion, Hartford sought leave to amend its complaint. The judge initially granted the order and Hartford filed an amended complaint. However, the judge was operating under the impression that Hartford's proposed order was an agreed order, and promptly rescinded the order which allowed the amendment when Halliburton objected. Hartford alleges Halliburton engaged in several ex parte communications with the court during this period. The court denied Hartford's motion to amend its complaint and certified that denial as final under M.R.C.P. 54(b).

¶ 4. Aggrieved, Hartford has perfected this appeal.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. Standard of Review

A.

¶ 5. Hartford alleges the motion granted against it was not a motion for summary judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 56, but rather, a motion for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted or for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) or 12(c), respectively. The standards of review for all three are similar in that the non-moving party is favored in the review of the facts. Cook v. Children's Med. Group, P.A., 756 So.2d 734, 736 (Miss.1999).

¶ 6. We employ a de novo standard of review in analyzing a lower court's grant of a summary judgment. Baptiste v. Jitney Jungle Stores of America, Inc., 651 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Miss.1995) (citing Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988)). A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c). To prevent summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact by means allowable under the rule. Baptiste, 651 So.2d at 1065 (citing Lyle v. Mladinich 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss.1991)). "The Court cannot

826 So.2d 1210

try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion; it may only determine if there are issues to be tried." Id. (citing Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983))

¶ 7. Similarly, a motion to dismiss under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) raises an issue of law. Arnona v. Smith, 749 So.2d 63, 65 (Miss.1999) (citing Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869 (Miss.1990)). Consequently, this Court reviews such motions de novo. Id. (citing UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss.1987)). When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim. Id.

¶ 8. A motion for judgment on the pleadings under M.R.C.P. 12(c) serves a similar function to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 829 (Miss.1999) (citing Holland v. Kennedy 548 So.2d 982, 984 n. 3 (Miss.1989)). Therefore, it also raises an issue of law which we review de novo. Id.

B.

¶ 9. Hartford additionally urges this Court to apply strict scrutiny in reviewing three orders in particular entered against it by the trial court. Hartford alleges these three orders were written by counsel for Halliburton and adopted verbatim by the trial judge. As an initial matter, this assertion is without consequence. Regardless of whether this Court finds the motion was pursuant to Rule 12 or Rule 56, our standard of review will still be de novo.

¶ 10. In any event, the three orders Hartford complains of are: (1) the order granting Halliburton's motion for summary judgment; (2) the order denying Hartford's motion to amend the order of summary judgment entered against it to reflect that it was truly an order to dismiss or for a judgment on the pleadings; and (3) the order staying the running of time for Halliburton to file its response to Hartford's amended complaint, pending the court's ruling on Hartford's motion to amend its complaint. Halliburton does not dispute that it authored these orders or that the trial judge adopted them without change. Instead, Halliburton counters by asserting the trial judge also adopted orders written by Hartford without making any changes.

¶ 11. The standard of review as applied to these orders only encompasses the findings of fact in the order in question. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc., 2000 WL 1161055 (Miss.2000) (citing In re Bodman, 674 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 12. We have already given a detailed annunciation of the appropriate scope of review in Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So.2d 1259 (Miss.1987). We recognized that due to complex cases and immense caseloads trial judges will often have to rely on trial counsel to a great extent. Thus, we held that it was within the court's sound discretion to adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim from a party. Id. at 1266. Yet, we cautioned judges against taking the "Mc-Donald's" approach to the judicial process and enunciated that even with the case complexities and heavy caseloads in mind, "a judge is still a judge and not a rubber stamp." Id. We stated that we can, and will, intervene "where the trial judge wholly abdicates his judicial responsibilities— where, as it were, he abuses his discretion." Id. While we declined to review such findings of fact de novo, we recognized that "our appellate deference to such findings is necessarily lessened." Id.

826 So.2d 1211

II. Summary Judgment

A. Whether Halliburton's Motion for Summary Judgment Was Truly a Motion Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c)

¶ 13. Hartford alleges two points of error with the summary judgment granted against it. First, Hartford asserts summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to its indemnity claim. Second, Hartford alleges that the motion for summary judgment decided in the trial court was, in reality, a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c).

¶ 14. Through the eyes of Hartford, the distinction between the designation of the motion is crucial: if the motion was for summary judgment, then the hearing and ruling address the merits of the case and any further proceeding will be barred on the basis of res judicata. M.R.C.P. 56, cmt. However, if the lack of extrinsic evidence converts the summary judgment motion into a motion pursuant to Rule 12, res judicata will not bar any further course by Hartford and Hartford may potentially amend its complaint pursuant to Rule 15 (Hartford asserts it has an absolute right to amend pursuant to Rule 15).¹

¶ 15. First, we address the issue of the true nature of the motion filed by Halliburton. M.R.C.P. 56 provides for motions for summary judgment as follows:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) seek to establish that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, while motions pursuant to Rule 12(c) seek a judgment on the basis of the pleadings. Both Rule...