Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Town of Wethersfield

• Decision Date: 29 June 1973
• Citation: 332 A.2d 83,165 Conn. 211
• Parties: HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY v. TOWN OF WETHERSFIELD.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 83

332 A.2d 83

165 Conn. 211

HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY v. TOWN OF WETHERSFIELD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

June 29, 1973.

William J. Butler, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Paul W. Orth, Hartford, with whom was David L. Grogins, Danbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD, DANNEHY and BRACKEN, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, the Hartford Electric Light Company, hereinafter called HELCO, brought an action pursuant to § 12-119 of the General Statutes against the defendant, the town of Wethersfield. In its complaint, HELCO asserted that the town had unlawfully assessed rights-of-way belonging to HELCO for the reason that these rights-of-way are not taxable property under Connecticut law. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether its rights-of-way were taxable. There being no substantial issue of fact, the court granted the motion and rendered judgment in favor of HELCO. On appeal, the only claim of the defendant town ¹ concerns the taxability of HELCO's interests under General Statutes § 12-64. The relevant provisions of the statute are set out in the footnote. ²

This litigation arose shortly after the assessor of the town notified HELCO in January, 1971, of the disputed assessments. The assessments were laid on nine real estate interests, some being in the form of an easement and some in the form of a lease, by which HELCOpossesses certain rights in various lands of others, situated in the town of Wethersfield, to use portions of said lands for utility purposes. By the notice of assessment, the town informed HELCO that it had valued the nine separate interests at a total assessment value of $262,400. A tax based on that assessment was levied by the town on HELCO's rights-of-way on or about May 15, 1971, and was due and payable July 1, 1971. The attorneys for the parties submitted to the court three separate documents and stipulated that these instruments fairly represent the documents creating the nine rights-of-way which the town has assessed. It was further stipulated that the submission of all documents creating HELCO's rights-of-way would be repetitious and burdensome, and that a proper adjudication could be obtained by an examination of the grants set forth in the three instruments submitted. These documents were made a part of the finding and have been reproduced in the record. Two of these documents evidence easements which basically give to the grantee, HELCO, the right to erect and maintain electric power lines, together with incidental rights to trim hazardous trees and obstructions. The third and earliest of the documents, executed in 1914, evidences a 'lease for right of way' for ninety-nine years; by its terms, this 'lease' gives HELCO the identical but limited privileges of the first two documents and expressly reserves to the grantor all of his orignal rights except such as interfere with the enumerated rights for utility purposes of the grantee.

I

Is is the town's contention that the plaintiff's rights-of-way are taxable under § 12-64 of the General Statutes. ³ Its first argument is based on an erroneous interpretation of one part of the statute which this court has corrected on more than one occasion. The third sentence of § 12-64 begins: 'Any interest in real estate shall be set by the assessors in the list of the person in whose name the title to such interest stands on the land records . . ..' Since the easements in question are indisputably interests in real estate, ⁴ the defendant asserts that this provision of § 12-64 emphatically makes the ownership interests of the plaintiff taxable in the town of Wethersfield.

In Sanford's Appeal, 75 Conn. 590, 592, 54 A. 739, 740, decided in 1903, this court disposed of an identical argument aimed at the taxation of a mining lease in stating the following: 'Section 2299 of the General Statutes of 1902, provides that 'any interest in real estate listed for taxation shall be set by the assessors in the list of the party in whose name the title to such interest stands on the land records of the town in which such real estate is situated.' This section is part of an act passed in 1887, entitled 'An act concerning the taxation and record of title of real estate.' Pub. Acts 1887, p. 749, c. 127, . . . It means that any separately taxable (emphasis added) interest in real estate shall be set in the list in the name of the owner of record of such interest. An estate for years in land is a mere chattel interest. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 33 Conn. 314, 318; Flannery v. Rohrmayer, 49 Conn. 27, 28. Such an interest, unless otherwise provided by statute, is generally not taxable separately from the freehold; although there may be exceptional cases where an interest in real estate, conveyed by an instrument in the form of a lease for a term of years, may for certain purposes be regarded as a fee, as in the case of Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407, 411, in which it was held that a lease in real estate for a gross sum for 999 years was to be considered, for the purposes, of that case, as practically a conveyance of a fee. Such a chattel interest is not named either in section 2322 or section 2323 ((Rev.1902) now § 12-64 and 12-71), which enumerate the kinds of real and personal property liable to taxation . . . The Interest in real estate which section 2299 (Rev.1902) requires to be listed in the name of the record owner, is not a mere chattel interest in land, but a freehold interest properly termed 'real estate."

One year later, in Middletown & Portland Bridge Co. v. Middletown, 77 Conn. 314, 59 A. 34, this court was confronted with the assertion that the statutory language subjected a bridge to taxation as real estate. Again, this court rejected the argument, observing that the municipality's construction would extend taxation to railroads and public utility equipment that may be attached to the soil. The plain answer to this contention was simply that the statute made no provision for the listing and valuation of such property as real estate liable to taxation. Id., 317, 59 A. 34; see also Comstock v. Waterford, 85 Conn. 6, 9-10, 81 A. 1059; Field v. Guilford Water Co., 79 Conn. 70, 71, 63 A. 723. In Montgomery v. Branford, 107 Conn. 697, 142 A. 574, where the defendant town sought to tax a lease for sixty-four years in reliance on the statutory language in question, the ruling in Sanford's Appeal, supra, was reasserted. 'Our decisions have interpreted the record owner to mean the freehold or fee owner. Leased land can only be assessed against the lessor, the freehold owner.' Montgomery v. Branford, supra, 701, 142 A. 575.

The provision in § 12-64 which requires the assessors to set '(a)ny interest in real estate' in the list of the record owner of such interest has thus been definitively interpreted to mean no more than that the assessor must list any taxable interest, previously defined as '(d)welling houses, garages, barns, sheds, . . . buildings, . . . house lots,' in the name of the record owner of the freehold. This interpretation accords with the rule of ejusdem generis, a rule implicitly recognized in our previously cited decisions and explained thus in Easterbrook v. Hebrew Ladies Orphan Society,85 Conn. 289, 296, 82 A. 561, 564: '(W)here a particular enumeration is followed by general descriptive words, the latter will be understood as limited in their scope to . . . things of the same general kind or character as those specified in the particular enumeration.' Cf. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson,129 Conn. 211, 221, 27 A.2d 166.

The contention of the defendant that the quoted provision opens up to taxation any conceivable, recorded interest in real estate ignores not only our previous decisions but the consequences, clearly unintended by the statute, to which it would lead. Under the defendant's theory, so long as the interest in land be recorded, the assessors might tax the interest of a beneficiary of real property held in trust, as well as a lessee and a holder of a right-of-way. Such interests, however, as are not expressly or by clear implication made taxable under the taxing statute are not to be included in the list. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Oxford, 101 Conn. 383, 396, 126 A. 1; Norwalk v. New Canaan, 85 Conn. 119, 127, 81 A. 1027.

Although none of the cited cases have so stated, the correctness of our settled interpretation would seem readily apparent in view of the introductory language of § 12-64: 'All the following-mentioned property, not exempted, shall be set in the list of the town where it is situated and shall be liable to taxation.' The subsequent enumeration recites only specific tangible property (buildings, lots, etc.) With the otherwise single exception of 'easements to use air space.' No mention is made of leaseholds or easements per se. Unquestionably this language gives tha assessors authority to impose a tax on any of the enumerated items situated in their respective towns. Since a municipality has no authority to tax except as granted by the General Statutes, the exercise of its taxing power, to be lawful, must strictly conform to the terms by which they were given. Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, 156 Conn. 33, 36, 238 A.2d 410; State ex rel. Bennett v. Glynn, 154 Conn. 237, 243, 224 A.2d 711; Chamberlain v. Bridgeport, 88 Conn. 480, 490, 91 A. 380. These considerations, together with the rule that ambiguities in taxing statutes are construed in favor of the taxpayer; Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Sullivan, 161 Conn. 145, 154,285 A.2d 325, Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, supra, 156 Conn. 36, 238 A.2d 410, Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 510, 72 A.2d 645; lead to no other conclusion than that the defendant's interpretation is untenable.

II

A related point to be drawn from the foregoing is clear. Even supposing that public utitlity easements...