Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor

Decision Date17 October 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11 C 5421.,11 C 5421.
Citation903 F.Supp.2d 623
PartiesHARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Larry TAYLOR, Todd Gagliano, American Fidelity Assurance Company, and Jeffrey Mattsson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael John Duffy, Ashley L. Conaghan, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Richard Ira Levin, Levin, Riback Law Group, P.C., Alvin R. Becker, Mark Louis Evans, Stefania Pialis, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) brings this action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., against Defendants Larry Taylor, Todd Gagliano, American Fire Assurance Company, and Jeffrey Mattsson, seeking a declaration that Hartford owes no coverage under the insurance policy that it issued to American Fidelity with respect to any liability that Taylor may have for a hit-and-run accident and claim by the injured pedestrian, Gagliano. Presently before the Court is Hartford's motion for summary judgment against Gagliano pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 43, Pl.'s Mot.) Also before the Court is Hartford's motion to strike portions of Gagliano's Response to Hartford's Statement of Facts and Gagliano's Statement of Additional Facts. (R. 66, Pl.'s Mot. to Strike.) For the reasons set forth herein, Hartford's motion to strike portions of Gagliano's Response to Hartford's Statement of Facts and Gagliano's Statement of Additional Facts is granted in part and denied in part, and its motion for summary judgment is denied.

RELEVANT FACTS1

The material facts are largely undisputed and follow this Court's ruling on the motion to strike, which directly follows this section for the benefit of the reader of this opinion. Hartford is a Connecticut insurance company with its principal place of business in Connecticut. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. 11.) Defendant Todd Gagliano is an individual, and a resident and citizen of Cook County, Illinois. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Gagliano was injured in a hit-and-run accident near the intersection of Clark Street and Ridge Avenue in Chicago, Illinois on November 21, 2010 at around 3:30 a.m. ( Id. ¶ 8.) On November 20, 2010, Jeffrey Mattsson, an employee of American Fidelity, drove a company car to the River Park Hotel (“Hotel”) located at 6060 N. Lincoln Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, after a week of working in South Bend, Indiana. ( Id. ¶ 9.) The company car is a four-door sedan; specifically, it is a red Ford Fusion. ( Id. ¶ 10.)

Mattsson was scheduled for another work related obligation in Milwaukee the week after the accident, but he told his wife that it would be better to stay in Chicago the weekend of November 20, 2010, rather than to drive home to Springfield, Illinois. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1, 2) Mattsson also told American Fidelity that he needed to pass through Chicago the weekend of November 20, 2010, in order to give materials to another employee. ( Id. ¶ 3.) American Fidelity assented to Mattsson's travel plans and agreed to pay for Mattsson's expenses, including his hotel stay at the Hotel on the night of November 20, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Contrary to what he told his wife and employer, Mattssonactually planned to stop in Chicago to meet several men he had connected with on various social networking sites, such as Adam4Adam.com and bbrts.com, including Larry Taylor and Gregory Toomer. ( Id. ¶ 5.)

Mattsson arrived at the Hotel at around 2:30 p.m. on November 21, 2010. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11.) Mattsson checked in and stayed in Room 205 on the second floor of the Hotel. ( Id. ¶ 12.) After Mattsson checked in to the Hotel, he moved the company car closer to his hotel room. ( Id. ¶ 13.) Gagliano disputes that the surveillance camera can accurately identify either Mattsson or Room 205, or that the still images depicting the same are decipherable. ( Id.) This was the last time Mattsson ever operated the company car. ( Id.) Gagliano also disputes that Mattsson never operated the company car again. ( Id.) The Hotel maintains a surveillance camera in its parking lot. ( Id. ¶ 14.) On the surveillance video from November 20 and 21, 2010, the time indicator on the video equipment had not yet been adjusted from Daylight Savings Time to Standard Time. ( Id.) Consequently, the time stamp on the video is one hour ahead of actual time. ( Id.) Gagliano states that the surveillance video consists of black-and-white footage that is dark and grainy, and that it is not clear or detailed enough to allow for personal identification of individuals recorded by the surveillance cameras. ( Id.)

During the evening of November 21, 2010, at around 3:30 p.m., one of Mattsson's acquaintances, identified as “Mike,” joined Mattsson at the Hotel. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Gagliano states that it is not possible to identify the individual who arrived at the Hotel at approximately 3:30 p.m. or what room he or she visited from the still images or surveillance video of the Hotel. ( Id.) During the evening, two other of Mattsson's acquaintances, Taylor and Toomer, joined Mattsson at the Hotel. ( Id. ¶ 16.) Taylor arrived at the Hotel at around 6:30 p.m. ( Id. ¶ 17.) There is nothing distinctive about Taylor's posture or gait other than the fact that he stands “pretty straight” and walks “quickly.” (R. 64, Pl.s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 7.) Gagliano disputes that the approximate time of Taylor's arrival can be determined and disputes Hartford's position that Taylor arrived at the Hotel at around 6:30 p.m. (R. 59. Def.'s Rule 56.1 ¶ 17.) Specifically, because there is nothing distinctive about Taylor's posture or gait it is not possible to identify Taylor as the individual who arrived at the Hotel at approximately 6:30 p.m. or what room he or she visited from the still images or surveillance video of the Hotel. ( Id.) Mattsson and Taylor had met once before, at some time prior to the weekend of the accident. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) On that occasion, Taylor and Mattsson drove around looking for drugs, smoked marijuana and crack cocaine, and had sex. ( Id.) At around 7:30 p.m., Mattsson and Mike left the Hotel in Mike's car to go to a local Jewel food store. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 18.) Mattsson and Mike left the Hotel to purchase party materials”—i.e., mathamphetamines. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 8.) However, Mattsson was unable to obtain any drugs, and Mike stole Mattsson's drug money and left him stranded. ( Id.) When Mattsson and Mike left the room to purchase drugs, Mattsson trusted Taylor enough to leave him in the hotel room that was paid for by his employer, with the room key, while Taylor waited for Toomer to arrive so he could let him in. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Toomer arrived at the Hotel shortly after 9:00 p.m. on November 20, 2010. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 19.) Gagliano disputes that it is possible to identify Toomer as the individual who arrived at the Hotel at approximately 9:00 p.m. or to determine what room he or she visited from the still images or surveillance video of the Hotel. ( Id.) Taylor let Toomer into the room. ( Id.) Mattsson returned to the Hotel in a taxi just before 10:00 p.m. ( Id. ¶ 20.) When he returned to the hotel room, Mattsson provided his guests with methamphetamines that he retrieved from his company car. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11.)

On the evening of November 20, 2010, and into the early morning of November 21, 2010, Mattsson, Taylor, and Toomer used crystal meth and had sex. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 14.) After midnight, Mattsson fell asleep. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. 121.) Mattsson was asleep the balance of the night. ( Id.) Toomer and Taylor were still in the hotel room. ( Id.) Mattsson did not leave the hotel room until around 12:00 p.m. on November 21, 2010. ( Id.) While in the hotel room, Mattsson repeatedly assured Toomer, who is visually impaired, that Toomer would be given a ride back to the train station that night. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 12.) Taylor was present in the room and within earshot of Mattsson during this conversation. ( Id.) Mattsson placed the keys to the company car conspicuously out in the open in the hotel room for Taylor and Toomer to see. ( Id. ¶ 13.)

At around 1:30 a.m. on November 21, 2010, after Mattsson was asleep, Taylor took Mattsson's keys to the company car to drive Toomer to the Bryn Mawr train station. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 22.) Gagliano argues that it is not possible to identify Toomer or Taylor as the individuals who went to the company car at around 1:30 a.m. from the still images or the surveillance video of the Hotel, as there is nothing distinctive about Taylor's posture or gait. ( Id.) At the time, Toomer actually believed that Taylor owned the Ford Fusion that he used to drive Toomer to the Bryn Mawr train station. ( Id.) Taylor felt that, based on his relationship and foundation of trust with Mattsson, he could use Mattsson's car to drive Toomer to the train station. (R. 64, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 17.) Taylor had no intention of stealing the company car and only intended to use the company car to take Toomer to the train station and come right back. ( Id.) On the way to the train station, Taylor's driving was erratic and he hit the curb at least twice. (R. 59, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Resp. ¶ 24.) Taylor returned the company car to the Hotel just before 2:00 a.m. on November 21, 2010, and returned to the hotel room. ( Id. ¶ 25.) Gagliano asserts that there is nothing distinctive about Taylor's gait or posture, and that it is not possible to identify Taylor as the individual returning to the hotel room just before 2:00 a.m. from the still images or the video surveillance of the Hotel. ( Id.) Mattsson did not hear or see Taylor return to the hotel room. ( Id. ¶ 26.)

Hartford contends that at 2:40 a.m., Taylor left the hotel room and drove the company car out of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Dugas-Filippi v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 4, 2014
    ...a car, on the basis that genuine disputes as to issues of material fact precluded the court from awarding summary judgment. 903 F.Supp.2d 623, 653–54 (N.D.Ill.2012). Hartford also provides no support for Chase's position.21 Chase's reliance on Bank of Joliet v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, in wh......
  • Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chi.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • October 26, 2016
    ...Finally, "the proponent of hearsay bears the burden of establishing that the statement is admissible." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 903 F.Supp.2d 623, 640 (N.D. Ill. 2012).II. BACKGROUND Because all four parties in this case have moved for summary judgment, the Court must do a Janus-li......
  • Brooks v. City of Carmel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • September 15, 2020
    ...is improper to establish facts because it is simply his opinion about the facts shown in the video. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 903 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("[A] party's own characterization of evidence is not permitted in a Local Rule 56.1 statement. . . . The actua......
  • Williams v. David
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • March 18, 2020
    ...of the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 903 F. Supp. 2d 623, 646 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). Instead, the Court must ascertain whether a genuine issue of triable fa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT