Hartford Fire Ins. v. McCain
| Decision Date | 04 January 1926 |
| Docket Number | 25134 |
| Citation | 106 So. 529,141 Miss. 394 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | HARTFORD FIRE INS. v. MCCAIN. [*] |
(Division A.).
1 INSURANCE. Sole and unconditional ownership in fee clause valid. Sole and unconditional ownership in fee clause is reasonable and valid.
2 INSURANCE. Deed of life estate to insured's grantor prima-facie
showing of breach of sole and unconditional ownership clause. Deed conveying to insured's grantor life estate only is prima-facie showing of breach of sole and unconditional ownership in fee clause, though deed to insured purported to convey unconditional fee.
APPEAL from circuit court of Webster county, HON. T. L. LAMB, Judge.
Action by John F. McCain against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and judgment rendered.
Reversed, and judgment for appellant.
R. L. McLaurin, for appellant.
There was no issue of facts in this case and no contradictions, and we submit that the warranties found in the said application were by the appellee's own evidence and by the record made on the trial shown to be materially false and misleading. We think it is established beyond all dispute that the property did not belong to the plaintiff; that the title to said property, as shown by the deed introduced and which is not contradicted, belong to plaintiff's wife and children. The deed was signed November 21, 1905, and was in effect an effort to convey by a warranty deed to John F. McCain property deeded to Mrs. McCain for life only, and at her death to her children in equal parts.
Plaintiff below represented in his application, that he was the sole and absolute owner of the property in question, that the title to the land on which the buildings were situated was in his name, and these questions were made warranties by the contract. So we say, that if Mr. McCain was not the owner in fee of the property and the policy was issued to him based on his representations that he was the owner in fee, then the policy was void, and that a peremptory instruction for the defendant should have been granted.
This policy under this proof and under the application upon which it was issued was clearly void, void from its inception. This very question, we think, was settled by the supreme court of this state in Home Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pittman, 111 Miss. 420, 71 So. 720. It cannot be argued that the assured was the sole beneficial owner of the property and, therefore, entitled to recover, because the fact is that he was not the sole beneficial owner. It is clear that he only had the life estate of his wife and he had no title whatever and no greater right whatever than his wife could convey, neither did his wife have any right to interfere with the title of subsequently born children who were at the time of the fire minors.
In the Bowdre case, 67 Miss. 635, it was specifically held that in that case the truth was that the plaintiffs were the only persons on earth having any sort of interest in, or claim to, beneficial ownership to the premises, and there was simply a naked outstanding legal title which could have been divested by any court of chancery. A very different proposition indeed, we submit, from the case at bar. We could multiply cases on this question of title and ownership and could cite the text-books, but we see no necessity or advantage in same. The Pittman case settles this question.
A. T. Patterson and E. O. Sykes, for appellee.
Counsel contends that the record shows the plaintiff was only the owner of the property for life with remainder in fee to the children of his wife, and that this is a breach of the unconditional ownership clause. We take issue with counsel that the testimony shows plaintiff only the owner of a life estate. We say, however, that even if this be true, it is no breach of this condition.
The testimony of the plaintiff shows that he has been in possession of this land for seventeen or eighteen years, that his wife made him a deed to the land in fee simple. The appellant then attempts to show that the wife had only a life interest in the land, and, therefore, could convey only this life interest to her husband. This they attempt to show by introducing a deed to the wife from her father and mother. If the niceties of land titles could be tried in a suit of this kind, then the appellant would have to fail because he has not shown that the father and mother of Mrs. McCain were the owners of the land when they conveyed to her. It would have been incumbent on him to show that there was no other outstanding paramount title in some one else than the father and mother, and that Mrs. McCain did not become the owner in fee in some other way of the land. The plaintiff proved his possession for eighteen years, coupled with the fee simple deed. To rebut this presumption the appellant should have been shown the above facts.
However, this is all beside the mark in this case. This court has repeatedly held that these questions of title are not to be gone into in suits of this kind. This exact question was settled by this court in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bowdre, 67 Miss. 620.
Even though McCain owned only a life estate, yet he is the sole and unconditional owner within the terms of the policy. McCain built this tenant house number one, as well as all the other houses on this property which were the subject of this insurance. He was, and is, the sole and unconditional owner of this property during his life. The purpose of this clause is to prevent an insured from getting insurance on more than his interest which would enable the insured to collect more from loss than his interest in the property is worth. In this case the loss falls entirely upon McCain. This question is discussed in 14 R. C. L., page 1052, sec. 229. The Pittman case, 111 Miss. 420, cited by counsel is not in point upon this question for the reason that Pittman's wife was the owner in that case and Pittman was only her tenant.
R. L. McLaurin, in reply, for appellant.
Our courts have repeatedly held that this clause as to sole and unconditional ownership was valid and enforcible. Bacot v. Ins. Co., 96 Miss. 238; Groce v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 94 Miss. 201, 48 So. 298; Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 162 F. 447, 89 C. C. A. 333.
Can this court in the case at bar say that the title or interest of the insured in the property was truly stated or that the assured in the light of this definition had an interest sole and unconditional? Can it be said that no one else had an interest, that his children were not interested? Can it be said that the quality of the estate was not limited or effected by any condition? See Bacot case, 96 Miss. 240.
Appellee represented that he was the sole owner of the property and as sole owner the Insurance Company, appellant, might have been willing to indemnify him, but on the contrary might have been entirely unwilling to indemnify where his interest was limited. It is not a question as to whether or not appellee had an insurable interest in the property destroyed by fire. Certainly, he had an insurable interest, but he was under obligations to advise the company fully of his interest when his interest was limited. The terms of the policy were not limited to such limited interest as he had. This very question was settled in the Pittman case, 111 Miss. 420.
The appellee, John F. McCain, instituted this suit against the appellant in the circuit court of Webster county for the loss by fire of a tenant house, which was covered by a policy of insurance issued by the appellant company, and, from a verdict for the sum sued for, this appeal was prosecuted.
The appellant filed a plea of the general issue, and also four special pleas, but the conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary to consider the several very interesting questions which arose under the first, second, and fourth of these pleas, and which are so ably and exhaustively argued by counsel for the...
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United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Parsons, 25685
...(2 Ed.), page 831; Elliott on Contracts (last edition), section 2377; Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 111 Miss. 420; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. McCain, 106 So. 529; Bostwich v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. Graham v. Berryman, etc., 19 N. J. 29; Bainfield v. Bainfield, 24 Ore. 571. See, a......
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