Hartford Principals' and Supervisors' Ass'n v. Shedd

• Decision Date: 10 March 1987
• Citation: 522 A.2d 264,202 Conn. 492
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2633, 38 Ed. Law Rep. 214 HARTFORD PRINCIPALS' AND SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION v. Mark R. SHEDD, Commissioner of the Department of Education, et al.

Page 264

522 A.2d 264

202 Conn. 492, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2633,

38 Ed. Law Rep. 214

HARTFORD PRINCIPALS' AND SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION v. Mark R. SHEDD, Commissioner of the Department of Education, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 9, 1986.

Decided March 10, 1987.

William S. Zeman, West Hartford, with whom was Joel M. Ellis, West Hartford for appellant (plaintiff).

Laurie Adler, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Garvey Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, for appellee (named defendant).

H. Maria Cone, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Richard H. Goldstein, Corp. Counsel, Hartford, and Anna V. Crawford, Legal Intern, for appellee (defendant City of Hartford).

Patrice A. McCarthy, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and FREDRICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether mediation and binding arbitration procedures under the Teacher Negotiation Act are available to resolve contractual disputes between a school board and an employees' union arising during the term of an existing contract. The plaintiff, Hartford Principals' and Supervisors' Association, unsuccessfully appealed to the Superior Court a declaratory ruling on two petitions it had filed with the commissioner of education in which the commissioner held that the mediation and arbitration provisions of the act apply only to the process of bargaining for a new contract. The plaintiff has filed a combined appeal from the judgments of the trial court affirming the ruling on each petition. We find no error.

The defendant Hartford Board of Education (board) and the plaintiff Hartford Principals' and Supervisors' Association (union) entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective July 1, 1975, to June 30, 1978. During the term of the agreement, David Mulholland, a Hartford school principal, complained that the board had unilaterally assigned him additional duties on a long-term basis that modified his basic job responsibilities. The union sought to negotiate additional pay for Mulholland under article IV, § 12, of the collective bargaining agreement, which provided that "[w]henever the Superintendent or the Board of Education modifies the basic job responsibilities and duties of a unit position on a regular, long-term basis, in excess of 10 consecutive working days, the [union] shall have the right to negotiate and re-evaluate the grid placement of that position." The board declined this request. On August 15, 1978, the state board of labor relations termed the board's refusal to negotiate a breach of contract and ordered collective bargaining to begin immediately in accordance with the contract. The parties then negotiated for approximately one month without reaching agreement. Early in the term of the subsequent collective bargaining agreement in effect from July 1, 1978, to June 30, 1982, the same parties again engaged in mid-term bargaining without resolution concerning a list of nine matters that allegedly involved changes in the conditions of employment of school administrators.

In an attempt to resolve both bargaining impasses, the union, in October, 1979, and again in November, 1979, requested the defendant state department of education to begin the process of mediation and binding arbitration, invoking General Statutes § 10-153f ¹ of the Teacher Negotiation Act. General Statutes §§ 10-153a through 10-153n. A designee of the defendant commissioner of education (commissioner) refused, asserting that the impasse resolution procedures available under § 10-153f do not apply to mid-term disputes. The union then filed for each mid-term dispute a petition for a declaratory ruling with the state department of education, seeking a contrary determination. Following the commissioner's declaratory ruling on both disputes that "midstream" negotiations are not within the purview of the mediation and arbitration provisions of § 10-153f the union appealed the ruling in each instance separately to the Superior Court, which, on February 5, 1985, upheld both rulings. A combined appeal from the judgments was filed.

I

A

Before reaching the merits of the union's appeal from the judgments of the trial court, we note that the collective bargaining agreements under which both mid-term disputes arose have since expired and have been succeeded, in 1982 and again in 1985, by new contracts. Hence, we consider, at the outset, the threshold question of whether the present appeal is moot. See Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979). "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. Connecticut State Employees Assn. v. AFSCME, 188 Conn. 196, 199, 448 A.2d 1341 (1982); Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 440 A.2d 310 (1982)." State v. Macri, 189 Conn. 568, 569, 456 A.2d 1203 (1983); see also Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, 197 Conn. 566, 571-74, 499 A.2d 1158 (1985). Although not raised by any party to this appeal, the issue of jurisdiction may be examined by this court on its own motion. ² Practice Book § 3110 (now § 4056); Kulmacz v. Kulmacz, 177 Conn. 410, 412, 418 A.2d 76 (1979); LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 494, 264 A.2d 576 (1969).

"The law recognizes that the actions of parties themselves, by settling their differences, can cause a case to become moot." Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, supra, 186 Conn. at 251, 440 A.2d 310. "The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect.... It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court ... to grant [the plaintiff] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal." Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895); see Kulmacz v. Kulmacz, supra; Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 130 Conn. 494, 498, 35 A.2d 837 (1944); cf. D. Kates & W. Barker, "Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory," 62 Calif.L.Rev. 1385, 1403 (1974).

It might have been possible for the union to seek a resolution of its claim for mid-term dispute negotiations by seeking a provision specifically allowing negotiation and ultimate arbitration of mid-term disputes in contracts following those that have expired under which the disputes presently involved have arisen. We were assured at oral argument however that no such provision has been included in successor contracts. The failure of a party to pursue alternative means of dispute resolution does not render moot the issues raised in a legal action, though it may be of concern in deciding whether he is entitled to pursue that action. In any event, the issue of the construction of General Statutes § 10-153f, under which the union claims a statutory right to mediation and arbitration of mid-term disputes, would not have been resolved during such bargaining.

We conclude that even if we were to regard the viability of the present claim as having been affected by the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, this case presents a situation "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, supra, 186 Conn. at 253, 440 A.2d 310; Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 437, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981). In Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), the United States Supreme Court, citing its review of the historical development of the mootness doctrine in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403, 95 S.Ct. 553, 556-559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), concluded that "in the absence of a class action, the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine was limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." See Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, supra, 177 Conn. at 20-21, 411 A.2d 1.

The present case satisfies both elements. That mid-term disputes between the union and the board are likely to arise again is not an unreasonable assumption. See, e.g., L. Bingham, "Mid-Term Bargaining Disputes and Binding Interest Arbitration For Public Sector Employees," 17 Conn.L.Rev. 365, 366 n. 7 (1985); but cf. Connecticut State Employees Assn. v. AFSCME, supra 188 Conn. at 200-201, 448 A.2d 1341; Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, supra, 186 Conn. at 253-55, 440 A.2d 310. A bargaining agreement of the usual two or three year duration would probably expire before any claims engendered by such mid-term disputes had been fully litigated. Because the question before this court is therefore not "purely academic"; Delevieleuse v. Manson, supra, 184 Conn. at 436, 439 A.2d 1055; Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, supra, 177 Conn. at 19, 411 A.2d 1; we decline to dismiss the present appeal because of mootness.

B

A further issue that we similarly consider sua sponte; Practice Book § 3110 (now § 4056); is whether the union's failure to exhaust available remedies under the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement deprives us...