HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSP. & INS. CO. v. White
| Decision Date | 25 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 46A05-0106-CV-257.,46A05-0106-CV-257. |
| Citation | 775 N.E.2d 1128 |
| Parties | The HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSPECTION AND INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant-Defendant, v. Robert WHITE, as Personal Representative Of the Estate of Linda White, and the Estate of Linda White, and Daniel Lee Erickson, Individually and as Father and Personal Representative of the Estate of Joan Roberta Erickson, Deceased, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Gene M. Jones, Mark Lienhoop, Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones, LaPorte, IN, R. Dennis Withers, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP Atlanta, GA, Attorneys for Appellant.
Edmond Foley, Foley & Small, R. Kent Rowe, III South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company ("Hartford") appeals from the trial court's entry of judgment on a jury verdict in favor of each of two plaintiffs in consolidated wrongful death actions, Robert White, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Linda White, and Daniel Lee Erickson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Joan Erickson.1 We affirm.
Hartford raises several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court properly permitted a plaintiffs' witness to testify as an expert;
2. Whether the trial court properly denied Hartford's motion for judgment on the evidence;
3. Whether the trial court properly prohibited Hartford from advancing an argument regarding the plaintiffs' institution of a lawsuit against another entity in its closing argument;
4. Whether the trial court properly refused Hartford's tendered instructions; and
5. Whether the trial court properly entered judgment on the jury's verdict.
On March 4, 1993, a boiler at American Rubber Products Corporation exploded, and American Rubber employees Joan Erickson and Linda White were killed. Hartford, an insurance company that writes boiler and machinery casualty insurance, insured American Rubber. The subsequent investigation determined that in 1988, the boiler had been retrofitted with a replacement burner. A separate support pipe was required to adequately support the burner and relieve the stress on the attachment bolts from the weight of the burner. Sometime after the installation of the replacement burner and before the explosion, the support pipe was removed, and the weight of the burner caused it to tilt and improperly heat the elements of the boiler, ultimately resulting in the explosion.
Pursuant to Indiana law, a boiler such as the one used at American Rubber must be inspected and certified for operation each year. Ind.Code § 22-15-6-2; 680 I.A.C. 1-2-9(a)(1).2 Hartford is designated an "inspection agency" by statute as "an insurance company engaged in insuring and inspecting regulated boilers and pressure vessels in Indiana. . . ." Ind.Code § 22-15-6-4(a)(1). Hartford employee Michael Nasatka is a "special inspector" under the administrative rules of the Indiana Boiler and Pressure Vessel Rules Board which defined a special inspector as "an Inspector other than a State Inspector who is in the regular employ of the authorized inspection agency named on his inspector's commission." 680 IAC 1-1-2(6).3 In his capacity as a special inspector for Hartford, Nasatka inspected American Rubber's boiler on the two occasions it underwent a certificate inspection prior to the explosion. He last inspected the boiler, both internally and externally, on July 29, 1992, while it was shut down. Standard procedure was for Nasatka to send the completed inspection report to Hartford's offices in Detroit, and if there were no problems with the inspection, they would send a copy to the State, which would in turn invoice the inspected company for the inspection certificate fee. Following Nasatka's July 1992 inspection, and after American Rubber paid the required fee, the State issued an inspection certificate for the year to American Rubber.
Following the explosion in March 1993, White and Erickson each instituted actions for wrongful death against Hartford, which were consolidated for trial by jury. Hartford designated Power Plant Service, Inc., which sold and installed the new burner on the boiler, as a non-party defendant. Hartford moved for judgment on the evidence at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, which motion was denied. Ultimately, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, in the amount of $1,400,000 each, apportioning 100% fault to Hartford and 0% to Power Plant. Hartford now appeals each judgment, and the two cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Hartford contends that the trial court erred in permitting a plaintiffs' witness to testify as an expert as to the scope of an Indiana certificate inspection.
Indiana Evidence Rule 702 governs expert testimony:
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Evid. R. 702(a). The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind.2000).
Hartford takes exception to the qualifications of the plaintiffs' expert, Keith Weibel, to speak to the scope of an Indiana certificate inspection because he is not licensed as an inspector in Indiana and has never been present during an Indiana state certificate inspection. Hartford made a motion to exclude Weibel as a witness, which motion was denied.
The plaintiffs concede that Weibel is not an Indiana-licensed boiler inspector but contend that he nonetheless demonstrated the experience and knowledge necessary to be qualified as an expert in the area and that any deficiencies in his Indiana experience go to the weight of his testimony. We agree. Weibel testified that he had been around boilers since he was nineteen years old (Weibel was seventy-eight at the time of trial). In 1951, he took a job with Travelers Insurance Company and was licensed in the state of Wisconsin as a boiler inspector. He was subsequently licensed in Michigan, Kentucky, and Ohio and conducted state-required safety inspections in those states. He saw no difference in conducting a qualified safety inspection in any of the states he was licensed in, because the National Board of Inspection Code establishes guidelines and procedures for the safe inspection of boilers nationwide. He estimated that he performed state-required safety inspections numbering "in the thousands" during his career as a boiler inspector. Tr. at 554. He never obtained an Indiana license only because he never had a need to conduct certificate inspections in Indiana. He was, however, involved in coordinating inspection services in Indiana through his employer in 1991 and 1992 and was familiar with Indiana's rules and regulations for certificate inspections. Tr. at 566.
Based upon Weibel's foundational testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that he was qualified as an expert and had specialized knowledge in the field of boiler inspections that could assist the trier of fact. The lack of specific experience in conducting Indiana safety inspections goes to the weight and credibility of his testimony and was for the trier of fact to resolve. The trial court properly allowed Weibel to testify as an expert.
Hartford contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the evidence. The plaintiffs counter that Hartford has waived this issue for our review.
The purpose of a motion for judgment on the evidence is to test the sufficiency of the evidence. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co., Ltd. v. AMAX Coal Co., 737 N.E.2d 460, 462 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. The grant or denial of a motion for judgment on the evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. Indiana Trial Rule 50 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Judgment on the Evidence—How Raised—Effect. Where all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury or an advisory jury are not supported by sufficient evidence . . ., the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon....
Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). As stated in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blakesley, 568 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind.Ct.App.1991):
On appeal, we use the same standard of review as the trial court in determining the propriety of a judgment on the evidence. When the trial court considers a motion for judgment on the evidence, it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Judgment may be entered only if there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom to support an essential element of the claim.
Id. at 1057. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, we examine the evidence and the reasonable inferences most favorable to the plaintiff from a quantitative as well as qualitative perspective. Hitachi, 737 N.E.2d at 463. Quantitatively, evidence may fail only where there is none at all; however, qualitatively, it fails when it cannot reasonably be said that the intended inference may logically be drawn therefrom. Id. The failure of inference may occur as a matter of law when the intended inference can rest on no more than speculation or conjecture. Id.
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence and outside the presence of the jury, Hartford made a motion for judgment on the evidence pursuant...
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