Hartland Sportsmen's Club, Inc. v. City of Delafield

Decision Date17 June 2020
Docket NumberAppeal No. 2019AP740
Citation2020 WI App 44,947 N.W.2d 214,393 Wis.2d 496
Parties HARTLAND SPORTSMEN'S CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF DELAFIELD, City of Delafield Common Council and City of Delafield Plan Commission, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

On behalf of the defendants-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of James W. Hammes of Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Jeremy P. Levinson, Stacie H. Rosenzweig, and Scott N. Burns of Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee.

Before Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Davis, J.

NEUBAUER, C.J.

¶1 The City of Delafield, the City of Delafield Common Council, and the City of Delafield Plan Commission (collectively, the City) appeal from an order granting the motion of Hartland Sportsmen's Club, Inc. (HSC) for a writ of mandamus ordering the City to issue HSC's conditional use permit (CUP) based on HSC's 2011 application and under applicable law to operate a sport shooting range. The City contends the circuit court erred in determining that prior court decisions set forth a plain legal duty to issue the CUP. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The sport shooting range has a long history dating back to 1948, largely described in a prior appeal, Hartland Sportsmen's Club, Inc. v. City of Delafield (HSC I ), No. 2016AP666, 2017 WL 3741466 (WI App Aug. 30, 2017), review denied , 2018 WI 20, 380 Wis. 2d 106, 909 N.W.2d 175. At issue is the import of our decision in that appeal affirming the circuit court's certiorari order under applicable certiorari law.

¶3 The circuit court found that the City's 2013 denial of HSC's 2011 application for a CUP was arbitrary and capricious, reflecting its will and not its judgment, and thus was invalid. As we recounted in HSC I , the circuit court found:

The City ... changed its analysis and standards, creating new standards and requirements. For example, the City insisted on DOE standards for military shooting ranges and misinterpreted the NRA Range Sourcebook. At every stage of the application, HSC responded proactively, presenting engineering plans, NRA and other experts, agreeing to no blue sky protocol and even to fencing. HSC showed that its shooting range enhanced the surrounding property value. But the City ignored "all of the additional, costly and all-inclusive safety proposals" and chose to focus on a single, stray bullet [in 2010].
The court noted that while it could not substitute its judgment for that of the City, the City had not set forth its decision, either in writing or orally. The City simply made no findings. This was another basis, the court said, upon which to rule the City's decision invalid. In short, the City's decision to deny the CUP was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by the record, without explanation, and reflected the will of the City, not its judgment.

HSC I , No. 2016AP666, ¶¶29-30. The circuit court granted HSC's motion for certiorari relief. That motion included a request that it be able to "implement[ ] its proposal and resum[e] operations of its ranges." (Alterations in original.)

¶4 In the prior appeal, we noted that the certiorari review involved "whether [the municipality's] action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment." HSC I , No. 2016AP666, ¶50 (alteration in original) (quoting Ottman v. Town of Primrose , 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411 ).1

¶5 We affirmed the circuit court's decision on this ground, explaining:

The City's denial was based on safety concerns, but it never articulated what exactly in HSC's application it found did not satisfy its concerns. Since there is no explanation for the City's denial, we assume that it was concerned that a bullet might leave the property, as it had when a pregnant woman was grazed with a bullet on April 29, 2010. HSC took steps to make it impossible for a bullet to leave the range, implementing, among other things, no blue sky technology, NRA guidelines, and a revamped range officer program. These recommendations, particularly implementing no blue sky technology and following NRA guidelines, were suggested by Dupler, the city planner, and HSC proceeded on these recommendations for over two years until Dupler said that they were not sufficient.
After years of planning, in which HSC undisputedly responded to each of the City's stated requirements , Dupler then recommended to the Plan Commission that, until HSC complied with the NRA Range Sourcebook or DOE security criteria, the Plan Commission deny the CUP application. Dupler provided no explanation for why his prior recommendations were "not fully sufficient to ensure public safety." Subsequently, HSC explained to the Plan Commission that the NRA Range Sourcebook was merely suggested practices, not standards, and that the failure to follow any of those suggestions did not imply that a range was being operated negligently. HSC also explained that the DOE criteria applied to "security force and quasi-military training" for DOE facilities, which did not apply to a sport shooting range. The City had no response to these explanations.
As HSC persuasively argues, the City "imposed ever-changing standards, issued new demands when the previous demands were met, and failed to make any findings of fact other than ‘no.’ " Indeed, even now on appeal, the City, instead of offering us any facts whatsoever, i.e., some "rational basis" upon which to conclude that its decision was not "arbitrary," gives us its feelings, i.e., that it "did not feel the design provided adequate safety." Feelings are no substitute for reason, and reason is what we seek. Since the City gives us no rational basis upon which to conclude that its decision was not arbitrary, we can only conclude that its decision was so.

HSC I , No. 2016AP666, ¶¶52-54 (first and second emphasis added; citation omitted). We held that the circuit court "correctly invalidated the City's denial of HSC's CUP application," because the denial was arbitrary and capricious. Id. , ¶55.2 We also stated: "[T]he application is clearly the basis for the City to provide a CUP pursuant to the applicable ordinances." Id. , ¶54 n.11. As HSC correctly argues, both courts found that the record did not support denial, as it was undisputed that HSC had established that its application met each of the City's requirements and stated concerns.3

¶6 HSC did not request, and the circuit court did not, remand to the municipality for further proceedings, and neither did we. The supreme court denied review.

¶7 Subsequently, rather than issuing the CUP based on the 2011 application, the City reconsidered, holding new hearings, taking new evidence, issuing new findings, and denying the CUP.

¶8 HSC then brought a new action for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the prior court rulings required the City to issue the CUP based on HSC's application. The circuit court agreed with HSC and directed the City to issue a CUP based on the 2011 application, "pursuant to applicable statutes, ordinances and law, including the circuit court and court appeals [prior] rulings." The City appeals.4

DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Applicable Law of Mandamus

¶9 This appeal involves our review of the circuit court's grant of a writ of mandamus. We will uphold a circuit court's grant or denial of a writ of mandamus unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Lake Bluff Hous. Partners v. City of S. Milwaukee , 197 Wis. 2d 157, 170, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995). A circuit court's "discretion in issuing a writ of mandamus is erroneously exercised if based on an erroneous understanding of the law." Id. (citing State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison , 79 Wis. 2d 97, 106, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977) ). We apply de novo review to the interpretation of a prior order of judgment, including here. See Schultz v. Schultz , 194 Wis. 2d 799, 805-06, 535 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1995) ; LeMere v. LeMere , 2003 WI 67, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789 (we decide any questions of law which may arise during our review of an exercise of discretion independently of the circuit court).

¶10 The writ "may be used to compel public officers ‘to perform duties arising out of their office and presently due to be performed.’ " Pasko v. City of Milwaukee , 2002 WI 33, ¶24, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72 (citations omitted). Mandamus relief is warranted when these prerequisites are present: "(1) a clear legal right; (2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no other adequate remedy at law." Law Enf't Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon Station , 101 Wis. 2d 472, 494, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Granting Mandamus

¶11 The City contends the prior decisions permit further hearings and reconsideration of the 2011 CUP application. HSC contends that, because supplementing the record on remand from the certiorari court would not be permitted here, the circuit court's reversal, which we affirmed, requires the City to issue the CUP pursuant to the 2011 application. The circuit court agreed with HSC, as do we.

¶12 The purpose of certiorari judicial review of municipal and administrative decisions is to ensure procedural due process. Guerrero v. City of Kenosha Hous. Auth. , 2011 WI App 138, ¶8, 337 Wis. 2d 484, 805 N.W.2d 127. After review, a certiorari court has three options—affirm, reverse, or remand for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. Id. ; see also WIS. STAT. § 68.13(1) ("The court may affirm or reverse the final determination, or remand to the decision maker for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision.").

¶13 Both parties point to Guerrero , and we agree that it sets forth the case law and four guiding principles at issue here.

¶14 Remand to the municipality or administrative tribunal for further hearings is appropriate...

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