Hartman v. Harrison Sch. Dist. Two & Harrison Sch. Dist. Two Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-cv-01133-PAB-SKC |
| Parties | PATTI A. HARTMAN, Plaintiff, v. HARRISON SCHOOL DISTRICT TWO and HARRISON SCHOOL DISTRICT TWO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 39] and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 44]. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Defendant Harrison School District Two ("District") employed plaintiff as an assistant principal at Sierra High School ("Sierra") in El Paso County, Colorado in the 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years. Docket No. 39 at 4, ¶ 1; Docket No. 40 at 7, ¶ 1. Dr. Aaron Griffen ("Griffen") was Sierra's principal and plaintiff's direct supervisor during the 2014-15 school year, replacing her previous supervisor, Zach Craddock. Docket No. 39 at 4, ¶ 2; Docket No. 40 at 7, ¶ 1. During that school year, plaintiff worked on aone-year contract running from July 22, 2014 until June 26, 2015. Docket No. 39 at 4, ¶ 1.
On November 4, 2014, plaintiff suffered injuries to her head, right ankle, and left shoulder when she responded to a physical altercation involving two students and a security officer. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 9-10. As a result of her injuries, plaintiff missed work intermittently in November 2014. Id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 11, 13. She also missed some days in January 2015. Id. at 7, ¶ 17.2
On January 14, 2015, Griffen met with plaintiff to discuss his intent to place her on a "Growth Improvement Plan." Id., ¶ 16. The two met again on February 9, 2015, at which point plaintiff signed the plan. Id., ¶ 18. At this meeting, plaintiff informed Griffen that she would be submitting a formal application for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and consequently would not be able to attend some of the meetings scheduled in the Growth Improvement Plan. Id., ¶ 19.3
On February 9, 2015, plaintiff formally requested FMLA leave, to run from February 11 to April 9, 2015. Docket No. 39 at 8, ¶ 20.4 The District and Griffen approved her request on February 13, 2015. Id. As plaintiff did not have enough paiddays of medical leave available to cover her entire FMLA leave, she requested ten days of "Compassionate Leave" from defendants. Docket No. 40 at 7-8, ¶¶ 4, 7. Compassionate Leave is a District program that allows other employees to donate their paid leave days to an employee who is out of paid leave days. Id. at 8, ¶ 6. On March 9, 2015, the District informed plaintiff that her request for ten Compassionate Leave days was granted and that requests for Compassionate Leave donations on plaintiff's behalf would go out to Sierra and, by March 20, 2015, to the entire District. Id., ¶ 8. Griffen did not send a request for donations to Sierra or the District. Id. at 9, ¶¶ 10-11. On March 20, 2015, plaintiff returned from FMLA leave early because she had run out of paid leave days and could not take unpaid leave for financial reasons. Docket No. 39 at 9, ¶¶ 25-26; Docket No. 40 at 9, ¶ 12.
On May 1, 2015, the District informed plaintiff that it would not renew her contract for the upcoming year. Docket No. 39 at 10, ¶ 33. The District later transferred plaintiff to an elementary school for the remainder of her contract. Id., ¶ 34.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 8, 2017. Docket No. 1. Plaintiff asserts causes of action under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., for interference with substantive rights and for retaliation. Id. at 7-9, ¶¶ 38-53.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" ifunder the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & Cty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
Where "the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998)). "Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter." Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case." Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for interference and retaliation under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Docket No. 39 at 11-17.5
In her first claim, plaintiff alleges that Griffen and District-level administrators interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave by failing to forward her request for Compassionate Leave donations to Sierra and District employees. Docket No. 50 at 2-3. As a result, plaintiff states that she was "fac[ing] the unsettling possibility of spending weeks on unpaid medical leave." Id. at 2.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to "up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave . . . for serious health conditions and reinstatement to the former position or an equivalent one upon return from that leave." Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1180 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (). An employer is prohibited from "interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided" under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). An employer is not, however, required "to provide paid sick leave or paid medical leave in any situation in which such employer would not normally provide any such paid leave." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(B). To prevail on a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff mustshow "(1) that he or she was entitled to FMLA leave, (2) that some adverse action by the employer interfered with his or her right to take FMLA leave, and (3) that the employer's action was related to the exercise or attempted exercise of his FMLA rights." Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff cannot show that defendants interfered with her right to take FMLA leave. See Docket No. 39 at 12-13. To demonstrate interference, plaintiff "must show that she was prevented from taking the full 12 weeks[] of leave guaranteed by the FMLA, denied reinstatement following leave, or denied initial permission to take leave." Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007). The undisputed facts show that the District approved plaintiff's application for FMLA leave and that Griffen approved plaintiff's absence from Sierra. Docket No. 39 at 8, ¶ 20. Plaintiff did not take the full leave that she had requested and been approved for; she returned early because she had run out of paid leave. Id. at 9, ¶ 26. There is no showing, and plaintiff does not argue, that defendants prevented plaintiff from taking leave or denied her permission to take FMLA leave.
Instead, plaintiff argues that defendants interfered with her right to take FMLA leave by not sending out requests for "Compassionate Leave" to defendants' employees. See Docket No. 40 at 11-12. It is undisputed that plaintiff requested ten days of Compassionate Leave in her initial FMLA application on February 9, that defendants informed plaintiff that her request would be granted on March 9, and that defendants failed to send an email to either Sierra or District employees asking forCompassionate Leave donations before plaintiff returned to work early on March 20. Id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 7-11. A claim for interference, however, requires plaintiff to show that defendants interfered with the "substantive rights" guaranteed by the FMLA. See Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180 (emphasis added); see also Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (). The core of plaintiff's claim is that defendants interfered with her right to "tak[e] the full leave she needed." See Docket No. 40 at 12; Docket No. 50 at 2-3. However, under the FMLA, plaintiff only has the right to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in the event of a serious health condition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Even though defendants did not request Compassionate Leave on her behalf, defendants nevertheless gave plaintiff permission to take the 12 weeks of unpaid sick leave that the FMLA guarantees. See Docket No. 39 at...
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