Hartman v. Wick

• Decision Date: 16 February 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-2019.
• Citation: 678 F. Supp. 312
• Parties: Carolee Brady HARTMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles Z. WICK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

678 F. Supp. 312

Carolee Brady HARTMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles Z. WICK, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 77-2019.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

January 19, 1988.

As Amended January 29 and February 16, 1988.

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Bruce A. Fredrickson, Susan L. Brackshaw, and Bonnie A. Suchman, Webster & Fredrickson, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Robert E.L. Eaton, Jr. and Stuart H. Newberger, Asst. U.S. Attys., Lorie J. Nierenberg and Richard H. Swan, Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Information Agency (of counsel), on brief, Joseph E. DiGenova, U.S. Atty. and Royce C. Lamberth, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant.

                                                      Table of Contents
                INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________ page 319
                I.    THE NEW LAW SET FORTH BY THE UNITED STATES COURT
                      OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN PALMER
                      V. SHULTZ MAY NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS
                      CASE _______________________________________________________________________ 319
                II.   THE OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AT ISSUE IN THIS SUIT __________________________ 320
                      A. The job categories in which the Court found discrimination have
                         been reclassified _______________________________________________________ 320
                      B. Foreign Service Officer applicants are included in the plaintiff class
                         unless they actually sought relief under the consent decree in
                         Palmer v. Shultz ________________________________________________________ 321
                      C. Women who submitted multiple applications and were later hired
                         for one position are eligible for inclusion in the plaintiff class ______ 324
                

                      D. The plaintiff class includes women who were denied a position that
                         was allegedly filled by another woman ___________________________________ 324
                      E. The plaintiff class includes non-resident aliens who applied for USIA
                         jobs to be performed in the United States _______________________________ 324
                III.  TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASS, A WOMAN MUST
                      HAVE APPLIED FOR ONE OF THE POSITIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS
                      SUIT BETWEEN OCTOBER 8, 1974 AND NOVEMBER 16, 1984 _________________________ 325
                      A. The plaintiff class opens on October 8, 1974 ____________________________ 325
                      B. The plaintiff class closes on November 16, 1984 _________________________ 328
                IV.   EXCEPT FOR FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS, CLASS MEMBERS
                      WHO WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN CLASS RELIEF ARE ENTITLED
                      TO INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATIONS OF THEIR CLAIMS ___________________________ 328
                      A. The large majority of class members has not been identified _____________ 328
                      B. Notice will be mailed to identified class members and, because of
                         the large number of unidentified class members, notice by posting
                         publication, and memoranda will also be ordered. In addition
                         plaintiffs will be permitted to conduct limited discovery in order to
                         identify additional class members who may have been encouraged to
                         apply for the jobs at issue by word-of-mouth recruitment ________________ 329
                      C. The content of the notice must explain the basic facts about this
                         suit, including the definition of the plaintiff class, the Court's
                         finding of liability, the Court's remedial order, and what potential
                         class members must show in order to be eligible for a determination
                         of defendant's liability to each of them ________________________________ 331
                      D. The proof-of-claim forms must ask plaintiffs to show that they
                         applied for a job within one of the relevant job categories during the
                         relevant time period and that they were rejected ________________________ 332
                      E. The claims of class members who were not Foreign Service applicants
                         will be determined through individual Teamster hearings
                         unless the parties can agree on an alternative procedure ________________ 333
                      F. The Court will determine whether Teamster hearings should be
                         conducted by a United States Magistrate or by one or more Special
                         Masters once class members have submitted proof-of-claim forms __________ 334
                      G. Burden of proof at the Teamster hearings ________________________________ 335
                V.    REMEDIES FOR SUCCESSFUL INDIVIDUAL CLAIMANTS WHO
                      WERE NOT FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS ________________________________________ 335
                      A. Plaintiffs are entitled to back pay _____________________________________ 336
                      B. Plaintiffs who request employment with the Agency but cannot be
                         hired immediately are eligible for front pay as well ____________________ 337
                      C. Class members were obligated to make reasonable efforts to mitigate
                         damages, and the monetary awards must be reduced by the
                         mitigating earnings _____________________________________________________ 337
                      D. Plaintiffs who request positions with the Agency are eligible for
                         hiring priorities and retroactive promotions ____________________________ 338
                VI.   RELIEF FOR FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS TO THE UNITED
                      STATES INFORMATION AGENCY __________________________________________________ 338
                      A. The Court will model the relief for Foreign Service applicants to the
                         United States Information Agency on the consent decree in Palmer
                         v. Shultz _______________________________________________________________ 338
                VII.  THE COURT WILL NOT ORDER PROSPECTIVE RELIEF ________________________________ 340
                VIII. THE COURT WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST
                      FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ________________________________________________________ 341
                IX.   CONCLUSION _________________________________________________________________ 341
                

INTRODUCTION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

By Order of April 19, 1978, the Court conditionally certified this case as a class action. That class consisted of "all women who have applied for employment with or are currently employed by the United States Information Agency and who have been or continue to be adversely affected by the discriminatory employment practices of the defendant."¹ On November 16, 1984, this Court found that defendant had "discriminated against women as a class with regard to hiring" in six occupational categories at the defendant agency. Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. 361, 375 (D.D.C. 1984). That Opinion details the background of this long-lived litigation, as does De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1000-01 (D.C.Cir.1982), an appeal of an earlier decision in this case.

The Court's 1984 Opinion and Order dealt solely with the question of liability. From January 12, 1987, through January 14, 1987, the Court held a trial to determine appropriate remedies. At trial, and in their post-trial submissions, the parties clarified the areas of agreement and disagreement about the proper scope and contour of remedies in this case. The Court has carefully considered the testimony, the exhibits, the pre-trial and post-trial briefs of both parties, and the underlying law. On the basis of the record and the law, the Court has made the following determinations.²

I. THE NEW LAW SET FORTH BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN PALMER V. SHULTZ MAY NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE.

The Court must first note that the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has recently wrought a significant change in the law governing the use of statistics in a discrimination case. In Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C.Cir.1987), the D.C. Circuit distinguished between "one-tailed" and "two-tailed" statistical analyses.³ Ending its earlier silence on this issue, the Circuit stated that "although we by no means intend entirely to foreclose the use of one-tailed tests, we think that generally two-tailed tests are more appropriate in Title VII cases." Id. at 95.

If the Palmer decision were applied retroactively to the case at bar, the Court's 1984 finding of liability might be questioned, as it was based on a "one-tailed" statistical test that might no longer be deemed appropriate in this type of suit. See Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. 361, 369, 375 (D.D.C.1984). Consequently, the Court must consider whether Palmer's strong suggestion that courts should employ a "two-tailed" analysis should be applied retroactively in this case.

In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the seminal case on retroactive application of new case law, the Supreme Court noted that, although retroactive application is the usual rule, three factors may counsel against retroactivity:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was clearly foreshadowed.... Second, a court ... must `weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' ... Finally a court must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "(w)here a decision ... could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."

Id. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969)).

These factors suggest that retroactive application of Palmer would be inappropriate in this case. First, prior case law did not "foreshadow" Palmer's near-requirement of a two-tailed test; in fact, the ...