Hartpence v. Grouleff

• Decision Date: 31 May 1954
• Docket Number: No. A--127,A--127
• Citation: 105 A.2d 514,15 N.J. 545
• Parties: HARTPENCE v. GROULEFF.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 545

15 N.J. 545

105 A.2d 514

HARTPENCE v. GROULEFF.

No. A--127.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 5, 1954.

Decided May 31, 1954.

Franklin W. Kielb, Flemington, for appellant.

Anthony M. Hauck, Jr., Clinton, for respondent (Hauck & Herrigel, Clinton, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OLIPHANT, J.

We granted certification on this appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court which set aside an order of the Hunterdon County Court granting a new trial in an action in negligence. The jury had returned a verdict of no cause of action.

The appellant was an invitee in an automobile owned and operated by the defendant-respondent. He was sitting with others in the rear seat of the car that was being driven in a westerly direction toward Frenchtown, New Jersey. A snow storm had occurred a few days prior to the date of the accident. In the defendant's language the road was 'pretty clear. It had a little ice spot once in a while.' This is reasonably consistent with the testimony of the appellant's witnesses that there were icy spots together with some snow on the road. The testimony varies but all agree that the car was traveling in excess of the established speed limits for this section of the road. The defendant admitted taking some alcoholic beverages some time prior to the accident. The car hit an icy spot and skidded down the road sidewise about two hundred feet and crashed into a tree. The defendant's testimony appears vague and uncertain when he fixed the distance of 60 or 75 feet. This fact of the distance of the skid is of the utmost importance and the trial judge who saw the witnesses and heard their testimony was in a better position to appraise its weight and credibility than the Appellate Division and this court which merely has seen the bare record and an obviously attenuated one.

The appellant's motion for the new trial was made on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The motion was granted and Judge Colie, sitting in the County Court, set forth the reasons which prompted him to grant the new trial, R.R. 4:61--1(d), and stated in conclusion that 'I feel the jury could have arrived at its verdict only as the result of passion, mistake or prejudice', R.R. 4:61--1(a).

The defendant then made a motion before the Appellate Division for leave to appeal, Rule 4:2--2(b), now R.R. 2:2-- 3(4)(b), and such leave was granted apparently on the theory that if a proper ground existed for the reversal of the trial court's order, the litigation would be terminated.

While there might be a difference of opinion among legal minds as to the propriety and reasonableness of the trial court's action, much more is required before such action by a trial court can be reversed.

In its opinion, 28 N.J.Super. 125, 100 A.2d 298, 299 (1953), the Appellate Division reviewed a number of decisions dealing with motions for a new trial and the review thereof. It pointed out that appellate courts have held that they will not reverse such action by a trial court unless they find there was 'an abuse of discretion,' 'a 'clear' abuse of discretion,' or the court 'acted unconscientiously,' or 'acted unconscionably,' or there was 'a 'manifest denial of justice. " All these words and phrases have the same general meaning and merely point up the rule which underlies such action by an appellate court. It is that the action of ...