Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Citation271 N.W.2d 598,86 Wis.2d 1
Decision Date28 November 1978
Docket NumberNo. 76-288,76-288
Parties, 4 A.L.R.4th 495 T. L. HARTRIDGE, assignee of Jackson Clinic, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Insurance Company, and Harold Coakley, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

The judgment dismissing the complaint followed an order granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to sec. 802.06(2), Stats. The plaintiff appeals.

William E. Johnson, Madison, argued, Daniel G. Sandell and Johnson, Bieber & Swingen, Madison, on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bradway A. Liddle, Jr., Madison, argued, Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison, on brief, for defendants-respondents.

BEILFUSS, Chief Justice.

This is an action to recover lost profits brought by Dr. T. L. Hartridge, assignee of Jackson Clinic, a medical clinic located in Madison, Wisconsin. The claim arises out of a two-car automobile accident on April 23, 1973. The plaintiff Hartridge, then a working member of the clinic, was injured in this accident.

An initial action was brought on September 27, 1974, by plaintiff and others against the driver of the second automobile, Harold Coakley. Liability of the defendant Coakley was conceded. Jury trial as to damages resulted in an award of $35,525.34, which amount included an $8,000 award for Dr. Hartridge's loss of earnings up to the time of his retirement.

On July 31, 1975, the Jackson Clinic assigned to Hartridge any claim it might have against Coakley as a result of the accident. Sometime thereafter and subsequent to the jury verdict in the first action, Hartridge, as assignee of his former employer, commenced this action against Harold Coakley and his insurer, co-respondents in this appeal.

Summons and complaint were timely served on the parties. The complaint alleged that the Jackson Clinic, which derives its income solely from a percentage contribution drawn from the earnings of its member physicians, sustained an income loss as a result of defendant's negligent conduct because Dr. Hartridge's injuries prevented him from contributing to the clinic to the same extent as before the accident. The amount of the loss or damage claimed was $8,000.

The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiff-appellant failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. This procedural question in turn is answered by the question of whether an employer has a claim for relief for loss of earnings suffered by it due to a negligent injury to its employee.

Defendants' motion to dismiss this action was brought under sec. 802.06(2), Stats. The Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, on the statute declared that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under this section replaced the demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under sec. 263.06(6). See sec. 802.06, Wis.Stats.Annot. (1977), p. 597.

The standards a trial court is to apply in ruling on demurrers is firmly established. The rules were recently summarized by this court in International Found. Emp. Benefit Plans v. Brookfield, 74 Wis.2d 544, 548, 247 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1976):

"The demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. All material statements of fact well-pleaded are considered true while legal conclusions or erroneous conclusions from the facts as pleaded are not. Val-Lo-Will Farms v. I. Azoff & Asso., 71 Wis.2d 642, 238 N.W.2d 738 (1976); Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis.2d 977, 236 N.W.2d 204 (1975); De Bauche v. Knott, 69 Wis.2d 119, 230 N.W.2d 158 (1975); Scheeler v. Bahr, 41 Wis.2d 473, 164 N.W.2d 310 (1969). A demurrer to a complaint admits the facts which are well-pleaded but denies that they have the legal consequences asserted by the plaintiff. Scheeler, supra, 476, 164 N.W.2d 310.

" . . . The plaintiff is bound by the facts he alleges but not by his theory of recovery. Val-Lo-Will Farms, supra, 644; Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis.2d 445, 168 N.W.2d 559 (1969); Nelson v. La Crosse Trailer Corp., 254 Wis. 414, 37 N.W.2d 63 (1949)."

In State v. Ross, 73 Wis.2d 1, 3, 4, 242 N.W.2d 210, 211 (1976), we stated:

"The rules relating to review of orders overruling or sustaining demurrers were set forth by this court in Weiss v. Holman (1973), 58 Wis.2d 608, 614, 207 N.W.2d 660:

" ' . . . The following oft reiterated rules relating to review of orders overruling or sustaining demurrers are applicable: (1) Pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties and are entitled to all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleadings which may be drawn from the facts pleaded; (2) all material well-pleaded facts are to be taken as true; . . . ' "

Since motions to dismiss under sec. 802.06(2), Stats., serve basically the same purpose as demurrers, the preceding rules on demurrers are equally relevant to matters involving sec. 802.06(2) motions and should be held to apply to them. It is not the function of this court on review to consider whether the $8,000 lost profits can be proved or whether the assignment to Dr. Hartridge is valid under the circumstances, but rather whether the facts alleged, if they were proved, state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

We conclude that the complaint does not state facts or a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, and affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiff equates the Jackson Clinic's claim for recovery of lost income due to Dr. Hartridge's injury with the right of a master at common law to maintain an action against a tortfeasor for damages sustained on account of loss of services of an injured servant. For support he points to other situations where one person standing in certain special legal relationships parent/child, husband/wife, for example has a right created by common law to seek recovery for loss of the benefit of the relation due to negligent injury of the other party to the relation. Cf., Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967), allowing recovery to both husbands and wives for injury to their spouses which interfered with the marital relationship; and Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), allowing parents to recover damages for loss of the benefit of their relationship with an injured child.

The roots of the English common-law rule which permitted an action by a master for loss of a servant's services extend deep into legal history. Its origin was probably the principle of Roman law which allowed the head of a family to sue for physical harm done to one of his household, either family member or slave. Cf., Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968).

We have found no Wisconsin cases which reveal to what extent Wisconsin has followed the early common-law rule. The plaintiff advances isolated cases from other jurisdictions in which the rule was applied and allegedly extended to a more traditional employer-employee situation. The cases are few, unpersuasive in their reasoning, and were they binding on this court distinguishable from the present case on their facts.

The plaintiff's claim for recovery of lost income rests on a common-law foundation. The genius of the common law is its ability to adapt to changing economic and social conditions. Shockley, supra, 66 Wis.2d at 399, 225 N.W.2d 495. The original social value of an action, however worthy and significant, cannot operate to justify its continued existence in different times and under changed social circumstances. For this reason the historical pedigree, albeit old and long, of the action by a master for loss of his servant's services is insufficient authority on which to base a decision affirming its continued viability in the context of modern employment relations. The critical question is not whether the cause of action for which plaintiff argues once existed, but rather whether present circumstances and progressive social policy recommend its continued existence. This precise question was the subject of a recent law review article. The author's analysis is persuasive:

"Master and servant is one of the oldest of personal relations and, in the case of family relations, one who interfered with it intentionally or negligently without excuse, became subject to liability . . . In the days of the cottage industry when there were many servants in the home, the bonds between master and servant were strong and it was proper to regard the interests of the master and parent as property interests for which the action of trespass was proper.

"It is quite clear today that the relation of master and servant no longer represents the close bond which it once did. It is equally clear that a servant no longer regards himself as his master's man, but as an independent person who can bargain effectually. There is no longer anything which even remotely resembles what was formerly thought of as the status of a servant. Although there is still a fiduciary relation, the bond is primarily contractual with rights and duties in many cases spelled out in great detail. Bearing in mind, therefore, the great difference between the modern industrial servant and the servant in the early centuries of the English common law, the question arises whether the liability placed upon a person who negligently harms a servant should continue in view of the change in the relation.

"It is seldom that an interest which has been protected by the law loses its protection. But if the interests of the master in the services of the servant are different in kind from what they were centuries ago, it is not improper to withdraw the protection which was once afforded." Warren A. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956 Wash.U.L.Q. 309,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • Grams v. Boss
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 27 Junio 1980
    ...N.W.2d 660 (1979); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 683, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978); Hartridge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 86 Wis.2d 1, 4-5, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978); 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil sec. 1215, p. 113 (1969).14 See also, Associate......
  • Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • 12 Mayo 1980
    ...Wis.2d 310, 318, 274 N.W.2d 679, 683 (1979); Keller, supra n.2 at 35, 276 N.W.2d at 324; Hartridge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al., 86 Wis.2d 1, 10, 271 N.W.2d 598, 602 (1978).4 In an unprecedented case which incorporated the medical staff into the hospital corpora......
  • Denny v. Mertz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 30 Marzo 1982
    ...the act is a 'substantial factor' in causing the injury rests upon considerations of public policy." Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 86 Wis.2d 1, 11, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978).30 Polzin, 54 Wis.2d at 578-579, 196 N.W.2d 685; Flynn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 199 Wis. 124, 127, 225 N.......
  • Prah v. Maretti
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 2 Julio 1982
    ...the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, are accepted as true. Hartridge v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 86 Wis.2d 1, 4-5, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978). The pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice to the parties, sec. 802.0......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT