Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Citation | 271 N.W.2d 598,86 Wis.2d 1 |
Decision Date | 28 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 76-288,76-288 |
Parties | , 4 A.L.R.4th 495 T. L. HARTRIDGE, assignee of Jackson Clinic, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Insurance Company, and Harold Coakley, Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
The judgment dismissing the complaint followed an order granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to sec. 802.06(2), Stats. The plaintiff appeals.
William E. Johnson, Madison, argued, Daniel G. Sandell and Johnson, Bieber & Swingen, Madison, on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bradway A. Liddle, Jr., Madison, argued, Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison, on brief, for defendants-respondents.
This is an action to recover lost profits brought by Dr. T. L. Hartridge, assignee of Jackson Clinic, a medical clinic located in Madison, Wisconsin. The claim arises out of a two-car automobile accident on April 23, 1973. The plaintiff Hartridge, then a working member of the clinic, was injured in this accident.
An initial action was brought on September 27, 1974, by plaintiff and others against the driver of the second automobile, Harold Coakley. Liability of the defendant Coakley was conceded. Jury trial as to damages resulted in an award of $35,525.34, which amount included an $8,000 award for Dr. Hartridge's loss of earnings up to the time of his retirement.
On July 31, 1975, the Jackson Clinic assigned to Hartridge any claim it might have against Coakley as a result of the accident. Sometime thereafter and subsequent to the jury verdict in the first action, Hartridge, as assignee of his former employer, commenced this action against Harold Coakley and his insurer, co-respondents in this appeal.
Summons and complaint were timely served on the parties. The complaint alleged that the Jackson Clinic, which derives its income solely from a percentage contribution drawn from the earnings of its member physicians, sustained an income loss as a result of defendant's negligent conduct because Dr. Hartridge's injuries prevented him from contributing to the clinic to the same extent as before the accident. The amount of the loss or damage claimed was $8,000.
The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiff-appellant failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. This procedural question in turn is answered by the question of whether an employer has a claim for relief for loss of earnings suffered by it due to a negligent injury to its employee.
Defendants' motion to dismiss this action was brought under sec. 802.06(2), Stats. The Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, on the statute declared that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under this section replaced the demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under sec. 263.06(6). See sec. 802.06, Wis.Stats.Annot. (1977), p. 597.
The standards a trial court is to apply in ruling on demurrers is firmly established. The rules were recently summarized by this court in International Found. Emp. Benefit Plans v. Brookfield, 74 Wis.2d 544, 548, 247 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1976):
In State v. Ross, 73 Wis.2d 1, 3, 4, 242 N.W.2d 210, 211 (1976), we stated:
Since motions to dismiss under sec. 802.06(2), Stats., serve basically the same purpose as demurrers, the preceding rules on demurrers are equally relevant to matters involving sec. 802.06(2) motions and should be held to apply to them. It is not the function of this court on review to consider whether the $8,000 lost profits can be proved or whether the assignment to Dr. Hartridge is valid under the circumstances, but rather whether the facts alleged, if they were proved, state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We conclude that the complaint does not state facts or a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, and affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint.
The plaintiff equates the Jackson Clinic's claim for recovery of lost income due to Dr. Hartridge's injury with the right of a master at common law to maintain an action against a tortfeasor for damages sustained on account of loss of services of an injured servant. For support he points to other situations where one person standing in certain special legal relationships parent/child, husband/wife, for example has a right created by common law to seek recovery for loss of the benefit of the relation due to negligent injury of the other party to the relation. Cf., Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967), allowing recovery to both husbands and wives for injury to their spouses which interfered with the marital relationship; and Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), allowing parents to recover damages for loss of the benefit of their relationship with an injured child.
The roots of the English common-law rule which permitted an action by a master for loss of a servant's services extend deep into legal history. Its origin was probably the principle of Roman law which allowed the head of a family to sue for physical harm done to one of his household, either family member or slave. Cf., Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968).
We have found no Wisconsin cases which reveal to what extent Wisconsin has followed the early common-law rule. The plaintiff advances isolated cases from other jurisdictions in which the rule was applied and allegedly extended to a more traditional employer-employee situation. The cases are few, unpersuasive in their reasoning, and were they binding on this court distinguishable from the present case on their facts.
The plaintiff's claim for recovery of lost income rests on a common-law foundation. The genius of the common law is its ability to adapt to changing economic and social conditions. Shockley, supra, 66 Wis.2d at 399, 225 N.W.2d 495. The original social value of an action, however worthy and significant, cannot operate to justify its continued existence in different times and under changed social circumstances. For this reason the historical pedigree, albeit old and long, of the action by a master for loss of his servant's services is insufficient authority on which to base a decision affirming its continued viability in the context of modern employment relations. The critical question is not whether the cause of action for which plaintiff argues once existed, but rather whether present circumstances and progressive social policy recommend its continued existence. This precise question was the subject of a recent law review article. The author's analysis is persuasive:
Warren A. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956 Wash.U.L.Q. 309,...
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