Hartunian v. Sweeney
| Decision Date | 29 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 3:21-cv-30089-KAR |
| Parties | PAPKEN HARTUNIAN, Plaintiff, v. CONSTANCE M. SWEENEY, individually, and as a Judge of the Superior Court, KAREN L. GOODWIN, individually, and as a Judge of the Superior Court, MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, LAURA S. GENTILE, individually and as Clerk of Courts, LOIS A. CIGNOLI, individually and as an Assistant Clerk of Courts, DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT, MERCY MECIDAL CENTER [SO-NAMED]'S, MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DEFENDANT SWEENEY, GOODWIN, GENTILE, AND CIGNOLI'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Pro se plaintiff Papken Hartunian (“Plaintiff”) brings this action alleging claims under federal law, the United States Constitution, and Massachusetts law arising out of a medical malpractice proceeding he instituted in the Superior Court Department of the Massachusetts Trial Court in 2015. Defendants include two judges, two clerks of court, the medical facility where he sought treatment, and Does 1-10.
The defendants Constance M. Sweeney (“Judge Sweeney”), Karen L. Goodwin (“Judge Goodwin”), Laura S. Gentile (“Clerk Gentile”), and Lois A. Cignoli (“Clerk Cignoli”) (collectively, the “Commonwealth Defendants”) are judicial and quasi-judicial officers of the Superior Court Department of the Massachusetts Trial Court. Plaintiff alleges that their conduct in the medical malpractice proceedings violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant Mercy Medical Center (“Mercy”)[1] committed fraud on the court to obtain a judgment of dismissal in the underlying action. The Commonwealth Defendants and Mercy have moved separately to dismiss all claims against them under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and (b)(6) for failure to state a claim (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10). The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 16). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the Commonwealth Defendants' and Mercy's motions.
“When faced with motions to dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a district court, absent good reason to do otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) motion first.” Ayyadurai v. Galvin, 560 F.Supp.3d 406, 410 (D. Mass. 2021) .
“When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction [under Rule 12(b)(1)], ‘“the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.”'” Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1144 (1995)). “If the party fails to demonstrate a basis for jurisdiction, the district court must grant the motion to dismiss.” Id. The district court “must credit the plaintiffs well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor” when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001)). In evaluating whether the party has met its burden of proof, the court “may consider extrinsic materials and, to the extent it engages in jurisdictional factfinding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1977)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility requires factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555. In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “‘“factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.”'” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).
Because Plaintiff appears Pro se, the Court construes his pleadings more favorably than it would those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Notwithstanding his Pro se status, Plaintiff must comply with procedural and substantive law. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994)).
In late April 2012, Plaintiff sustained a laceration to his right hand, and he went to Mercy to obtain medical treatment (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 20-21). Approximately three years later, Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action in the Hampden County Superior Court against Mercy and a number of unnamed defendants arising from the allegedly negligent medical care he received (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 33-34). On May 10, 2016, with leave of court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to substitute certain named defendants for “Doe” defendants (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 46, 56, 58). On May 27, 2016, Mercy filed an application for final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 33(a), and that same day, the court entered judgment for Mercy against Plaintiff with statutory costs (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 55, 59-60).[3] Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal, which the Superior Court denied on August 17, 2016 (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶ 65; Dkt. 9-1 at 9). The Superior Court later entered judgments of dismissal in favor of each of the individual defendants as well, which Plaintiff appealed (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19-22). With leave of the Appeals Court, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment as to Mercy, as well as the other defendants, but it was denied (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 147, 150; Dkt. No. 9-1 at 22-24). While Plaintiff attempted to appeal the Superior Court's dismissal of Mercy, the Massachusetts Appeals Court determined that his efforts were not timely and, therefore, it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal against Mercy (Dkt. No. 9-11 at 6). The Appeals Court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment, as Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal from that order (Dkt. No. 9-11 at 6). The Appeals Court affirmed the judgments for the individual defendants on December 21, 2020 (Dkt. No. 9-11). On February 12, 2021, the Supreme Judicial Court denied Plaintiff's application for further appellate review (Dkt. No. 11-3 at 2). On June 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which the Superior Court denied that same day (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 26).
Plaintiff asserts a total of twenty-one causes of action including fraud against Judge Sweeney in connection with statements she made in memoranda of decision and court proceedings accusing Plaintiff of delay tactics, deliberately ignoring notice and disclosure requirements, and chronic non-compliance with the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and Superior Court rules, as well as allegedly fraudulently concealing a leave of absence she was taking (Counts I-VI); claims for denial of his right to procedural due process against Judge Sweeney for failing to comply with Superior Court Standing Order I-88 on Time Standards and for vacating a final pre-trial conference date while hearing other matters on the date the conference was to have been held (Counts VII, IX); a claim for violation of his first amendment right to petition against Clerks Gentile and Cignoli for entering the dismissal judgment in favor of Mercy (Count VIII); a claim for violation of his right to procedural due process against Clerks Gentile and Cignoli for failing to provide Plaintiff with certain notices (Count X); a claim for violation of his right to equal protection against Judge Sweeney for refusing to accept pleadings from Plaintiff while accepting them from a defendant and for not requiring the defendants to comply with Superior Court Rule 9A (Count XI); a claim for defamation against Judge Sweeney for statements made in a memorandum of decision (Count XII); claims for declaratory relief against Mercy “[f]or an order of this Court setting aside and vacating the alleged dismissal judgment entered on May 27, 2016, in the original Complaint on the grounds that said judgment is void on the grounds that it was procured due to Fraud on the Court or by mistake,” and for an order declaring “Defendant Mercy is in default by failing to file an answer to Hartunian's First Amended Complaint” (Counts XIII and XVI); a claim for injunctive relief against Clerks Gentile and Cignoli requiring them to remove the docket entry dismissing Mercy as a defendant (Count XIV); a claim for declaratory relief against Judge Sweeney that “the purported final judgment entered on March 8, 2019, is void” (Count XVII); a claim for declaratory judgment “that the purported final judgment entered on May 27, 2016 is void” (Count XV);...
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