Hartwell v. Jackson, Civ. A. No. 75-0819.

• Decision Date: 24 September 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-0819.
• Citation: 403 F. Supp. 1229
• Parties: Lewis H. HARTWELL, Petitioner, v. Delbert JACKSON, Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and Leon Keenan, Superintendent, Youth Center No. 1, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

403 F. Supp. 1229

Lewis H. HARTWELL, Petitioner, v. Delbert JACKSON, Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and Leon Keenan, Superintendent, Youth Center No. 1, Respondents.

Civ. A. No. 75-0819.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 24, 1975.

Kirby S. Howlett, III, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

John L. Kern, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GESELL, District Judge.

In this action petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus to gain his release from Youth Center No. 1 in Lorton, Virginia. The pertinent facts are undisputed. On July 18, 1969, petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), and thereupon committed to the custody of the Attorney General. On March 21, 1971, petitioner was transferred to a Community Treatment Center in anticipation of the effective date of parole, but on July 11, 1971, he left that facility without permission and was absent for a period of 44 days. Although petitioner's parole was consequently rescinded on September 24, 1971, he was again granted parole on November 13, 1972. Once again, however, petitioner failed to return to the Community Treatment Center where he was confined while awaiting the parole release date and was gone for 777 days before being apprehended. In both instances a bench warrant issued; upon being apprehended, petitioner was prosecuted for escape and acquitted in the first instance and placed on probation in the second.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c), petitioner was originally scheduled to be unconditionally discharged six years after the imposition of the FYCA sentence. The date of release was advanced to February 26, 1975, as a result of credit for petitioner's pretrial incarceration, 18 U.S.C. § 3568. However, the Department of Corrections has now postponed the release date by the total time that petitioner was not in custody, thereby extending confinement to May 30, 1977.^*

Petitioner contends that he was statutorily entitled to be unconditionally discharged upon the passage of six years from the date of sentencing, reduced by credit received for pretrial detention. This claim is based on the literal language of 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c), which provides:

A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or before six years from the date of his conviction. (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner asserts that the statute is clear and unambiguous, and that by its terms he cannot be confined in excess of six years even though he was absent from custody for more than two years during that period. The Government opposes this view, arguing that the words of the statute do not compel such a result and that it is unreasonable to presume a congressional intent to allow credit against a FYCA sentence for time spent on escape status.

It is true, as petitioner argues, that the statutory language is mandatory and unequivocal. Section 5017(c) of 18 U.S.C. directs that a youth offender "shall be discharged unconditionally" no later than six years after conviction, and no exceptions or qualifications are explicitly provided. See Fish v. United States, 254 F.Supp. 906, 906-07 (D.Md. 1966). However, although the FYCA was a carefully considered and comprehensive statute, Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), there is no specific legislative history indicating the congressional intent on the problem here at issue.

The general rule in the federal system in that an escape tolls the running of an adult sentence. See Theriault v. Peek, 406 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1021, 89 S. Ct. 1644, 23 L.Ed.2d 47 (1969) (federal prisoner); cf. Vaughn v. Virginia, 307 F.Supp. 688 (W.D.Va.1969) (state prisoner); Woods v. Steiner, 207 F.Supp. 945, 953 (D.Md.1962) (state prisoner). The federal statutory foundation for this rule is broad in scope, and does not...