Harvard v. Inch

• Decision Date: 24 October 2019
• Docket Number: CASE NO.: 4:19cv212-MW/CAS
• Citation: 411 F.Supp.3d 1220
• Parties: Jac'Quann (Admire) HARVARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mark INCH, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

411 F.Supp.3d 1220

Jac'Quann (Admire) HARVARD, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Mark INCH, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO.: 4:19cv212-MW/CAS

United States District Court, N.D. Florida.

Signed October 24, 2019

Christopher Michael Jones, Andrea Costello, Florida Legal Services Inc., Newberry, FL, Jennifer Morrissey Painter, Florida Legal Services, Orlando, FL, Shalini Goel Agarwal, Sumayya Saleh, Southern Poverty Law Center, Tallahassee, FL, Dante Pasquale Trevisani, Laura Anne Ferro, Florida Justice Institute Inc., Kelly Jean Knapp, Southern Poverty Law Center, Miami, FL, Lisa S. Graybill, Southern Poverty Law Center, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel J. Gerber, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell PA, Orlando, FL, Nicole Sieb Smith, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Mark E. Walker, Chief United States District Judge This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendant Florida Department of Corrections ("FDC") and Defendant Mark Inch's (collectively, "Defendants") motion to dismiss. ECF No. 28. Defendants request this Court to 1) dismiss with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a) all claims asserted by Plaintiffs J.H., Angel Meddler, Jerome Burgess, and James Kendrick, Jr., b) all of Plaintiff Admire Harvard's claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, c) Plaintiff Admire Harvard's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excepting only any such claims that are based on visitations and phone privileges, d) all of Plaintiff Juan Espinosa's claims, excepting only any such claims that are based on his alleged need for more programs to help with his recovery and communication, and e) all of Plaintiff Johnny Hill's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and 2) dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims without prejudice and require any second amended complaint to a) eliminate unnecessary and inflammatory allegations, b) include claims of only one Plaintiff, c) include only those claims that the named Plaintiff has standing to pursue, d) clearly identify which factual allegations support each of the named Plaintiff's claims, and e) clearly allege facts to support the claims, including the specific policies and practices at issue (and identifying which are policies and which are practices), how those policies and practices have affected the Plaintiff, and what the Plaintiff's claimed disability is, and what accommodation the Plaintiff is requesting. See ECF No. 28, at 2–4.

Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs' amended complaint because 1) it does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), 2 ) it fails to address each Plaintiff's limited standing, 3) it improperly joins all Plaintiffs in this lawsuit in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1), 4) it fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and 5) some Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust certain claims. See ECF No. 28, at 1–2. For the reasons provided below, Defendants' motion is DENIED .

I

This is a civil rights case about statewide policies and practices related to isolation promulgated and enforced by Defendants in Tallahassee. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants promulgated a statewide policy and practice of isolating over 10,000 people for at least 22 hours a day in tiny, cramped cells. See ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 2, 59, 75. Plaintiffs further allege that this statewide policy and practice exposes all persons in isolation to a substantial risk of serious harm to their mental and physical health in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that policymakers in Tallahassee have exhibited deliberate indifference towards these risks. See ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 5, 7, 54, 59, 75, 83. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminate against people with disabilities through this same policy and practice. ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 8, 151–60.

II

This Court accepts the allegations in the amended complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P. , 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). "To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A ‘claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). "Plaintiff's allegations must amount to ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III

First, Defendants argue that the amended complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because it 1) is a shotgun pleading, 2) contains unnecessary and inflammatory allegations, 3) pleads non-specific allegations, and 4) contains unsupported conclusory statements. See ECF No. 28-1, at 5–8. This Court tackles each of these issues in turn.

A. Shotgun Pleading

Plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, incorporate all the general allegations into each of the three causes of action. See ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 176, 182, 192. Defendants take issue with this format and, therefore, ask this Court to dismiss the amended complaint or force Plaintiffs to replead. See ECF No. 28-1, at 5.

A pleading must comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b) "so that, [the pleader's] adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings because they fail to accomplish these goals. Id. at 1321.

"Shotgun pleadings are characterized by: (1) multiple counts that each adopt the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts that do not clearly connect to a particular cause of action; (3) failing to separate each cause of action or claim for relief into distinct counts; or (4) combining multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act." McDonough v. City of Homestead , 771 F. App'x. 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1321–23 ). The key feature of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to give defendants "adequate notice" of the claims being bought against them and the supporting factual allegations for each claim. Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1323.

Here, Plaintiffs' amended complaint is not a shotgun pleading within the meaning of McDonough. The amended complaint does not adopt each allegation of all the preceding counts. Plaintiffs' amended complaint is the type of complaint the Eleventh Circuit in Weiland did not find to be a shotgun pleading. Id. at 1324 (noting that re-alleging paragraphs 1 through 49 at the beginning of each count is not the most common type shotgun pleading). And while the Eleventh Circuit has held that incorporating all the factual allegations into each claim constitutes shotgun pleading, it has done so when it is nearly impossible for Defendants and the Court to determine with any certainty which factual allegations give rise to which claims for relief. See Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A. , 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018) ; see also Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1325 (holding that dismissal is appropriate only "where it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of facts are intended to support which claim(s) for relief."). This is not the case here.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint is separated into distinct sections corresponding with each element of Plaintiffs' claims. See Sections V.B–G (alleging various forms of deprivation that prisoners are subjected to which results in substantial psychological and physical harm); H (alleging Defendants' deliberate indifference to the conditions of confinement); I (alleging that no legitimate penological purpose); J (alleging discrimination based on disability due to failure to accommodate); and IV.A. (alleging the disability suffered by each named Plaintiff). These divisions provide this Court and Defendants with sufficient roadmap to determine which factual allegations give rise to which claims for relief. For example, Sections IV.A. and V.J. provide factual allegations that are relevant to Plaintiffs' claim under the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"). See infra Section VI.B. Similarly, Sections V.B–I. provide factual allegations that are relevant to Plaintiffs' claim under the Eighth Amendment. See infra Section VI.A. Therefore, while the practice of including all factual allegations in each count is frowned upon, it does not require dismissal, especially when it is possible to discern which factual allegations give rise to each claim for relief.

B. Unnecessary and Inflammatory Allegations

Defendants argue that Section V.A. of the amended complaint contains allegations that are "unnecessary and inflammatory" and, therefore, violate Rule 8(a)(2). ECF No. 28-1, at 6. It appears that Defendants are requesting this Court to strike these paragraphs from the amended complaint. "The court may strike from a pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "[A] motion to strike will usually be denied, unless, the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties." Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. , Case...