Harvard v. Inch

• Decision Date: 11 October 2019
• Docket Number: CASE NO.: 4:19cv212-MW/CAS
• Citation: 408 F.Supp.3d 1255
• Parties: Jac'Quann (Admire) HARVARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mark INCH, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

408 F.Supp.3d 1255

Jac'Quann (Admire) HARVARD, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Mark INCH, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO.: 4:19cv212-MW/CAS

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

Signed October 11, 2019

Christopher Michael Jones, Andrea Costello, Florida Legal Services Inc., Newberry, FL, Jennifer Morrissey Painter, Florida Legal Services, Orlando, FL, Shalini Goel Agarwal, Sumayya Saleh, Southern Poverty Law Center, Tallahassee, FL, Dante Pasquale Trevisani, Laura Anne Ferro, Florida Justice Institute Inc., Miami, FL, Lisa S. Graybill, Southern Poverty Law Center, New Orleans, LA, Kelly Jean Knapp, Southern Poverty Law Center, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel J. Gerber, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell Pa, Orlando, FL, Nicole Sieb Smith, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell Pa, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER

Mark E. Walker, Chief United States District Judge

This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendants Mark Inch and Florida Department of Corrections' ("FDC") motions to transfer venue to the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville or Ocala Division. ECF No. 26. For the reasons provided below, Defendants' motion is DENIED.

I

This case is about statewide policies and practices related to isolation promulgated and enforced by Defendants in Tallahassee. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants promulgated a statewide policy and practice of isolating over 10,000 people for at least 22 hours a day in tiny, cramped cells. See ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 2, 59, 75. Plaintiffs further allege that this statewide policy and practice exposes all persons in isolation to a substantial risk of serious harm to their mental and physical health in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that policymakers in Tallahassee have exhibited deliberate indifference towards these risks. See ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 5, 7, 54, 59, 75, 83. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminate against people with disabilities through this same policy and practice. ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 8, 151–160.

Defendants request this Court transfer venue to the Middle District of Florida because the "individual acts" of isolation Plaintiffs complain about occurred in prisons located within the Middle District of Florida. See ECF No. 26, at 1–7. In support of their request, Defendants argue that most of the alleged events of isolation occurred in the Middle District of Florida and, therefore, the Middle District is the more convenient forum. See ECF No. 26. This Court disagrees.

While a majority of the isolations that give rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in the Middle District of Florida, these isolations were merely an implementation of the policy and practice promulgated by Defendants in Tallahassee. Contrary to Defendants' assertion that this case is about "individual acts," Plaintiffs' claims arise primarily from the policy and practice of isolation promulgated in Tallahassee. The fact that Plaintiffs allege specific facts showing implementation of the policy and practice of isolation does not convert Plaintiffs' theory of the case from a statewide policy and practice of isolation to individual acts of isolation.

II

"The decision to transfer a case to another district is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. , 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). A district court may transfer civil actions to any other district or division where the case may have been brought "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). "It is the movant's burden to persuade the court that a transfer should be granted." Perlman v. Delisfort-Theodule , 451 Fed. Appx. 846, 848 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the movant must make two showings to justify transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. As a threshold matter, the movant must establish that the plaintiff could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("a district may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought .... ") (emphasis added). That is to say, "the moving party must demonstrate that venue, personal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction would have been proper in the proposed transferee district." Baker v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. , Case No. 3:08cv114/MCR, 2009 WL 1098482, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski , 363 U.S. 335, 343–44, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) ).

Second, the movant must show that the "convenience of parties and witnesses" and the "interest of justice" would be served by transferring the action to the proposed district. In short, "[t]he burden is on the movant to establish that the suggested forum is more convenient." In re Ricoh Corp. , 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, "[i]n determining the propriety of transfer, the Court must give considerable weight to Plaintiff's choice of forum." Nat'l Tr. Ins. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. , 223 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C. , 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other considerations") (citation omitted).

III

As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that Defendants have not alleged that Plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Middle District of Florida. While Defendants properly state the standard for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), see ECF No. 26, at 7, and allege certain facts that might lead this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs could have brought the action in the Middle District of Florida, see ECF No. 26, at 3–7, Defendants do not argue that the Middle District of Florida would be an appropriate forum.¹ Defendants have, therefore, failed to meet their threshold burden of showing that Plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Middle District of Florida. However, for the sake of completeness, this Court will undertake the required analysis.

The Middle District of Florida has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because FDC is headquartered with its principal place of business in Florida and Defendant Mark Inch is the Secretary of the FDC. Further, upon review of Plaintiffs' claims, it is readily apparent to this Court that subject matter jurisdiction properly lies in the proposed transferee district. On the other hand, whether venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida is a closer question.

Venue in a civil suit is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Venue is proper in a judicial district where 1) any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located, or 2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If there is no district in which action may be brought pursuant the above two provisions, then venue is proper in any district in which "any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

First, venue is proper in the Norther District of Florida because all Defendants reside in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). For the same reason, the Middle District of Florida would be improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). The remaining issue, then, is whether "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" in the Middle District of Florida. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). In a class action, "the analysis of where a substantial part of the events took place ... looks to the evens concerning the named plaintiffs' claims, not all of the class members' claims." 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 6:36 (5th ed.). "Substantial part" does not mean venue is only proper where most of the inciting events occurred. Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer , 321 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2003). Only those acts within the forum that bear a close nexus to the claims are deemed substantial. Id.

Here, the substantial parts of the events that give rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in multiple districts.² Plaintiffs allege that a statewide policy and practice of isolation, which was promulgated and enforced in Tallahassee by Defendants, exposed over 10,000 people to a substantial risk of serious harm to their mental and physical health. ECF No. 13, ¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 54, 57, 75, 83. The named Plaintiffs are part of the class of 10,000 people that were allegedly exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm to their mental and physical health. The promulgation and enforcement of FDC policy and practice related to isolation does constitute a substantial part of the acts or omission giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims because the development and promulgation of the policies and practices were an inciting event, which had a close nexus to the harm Plaintiffs suffered. Venue is, therefore, proper in the Northern District of Florida.

However, the acts of solitary confinement, i.e. , the manifestation of the policies and practices promulgated in Tallahassee, are also a substantial part of the events that give rise to Plaintiffs' claims. The implementation of the policy and practice of isolation occurred in the Middle District of Florida. See ECF No. 26, at 3–7. Plaintiffs would have no claims to bring suit but for their solitary confinement in their respective correctional facilities. Therefore, venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida.

IV

Next, this Court considers whether the "convenience of parties" and the "interest of justice" is served by transferring the case to the Middle District of Florida. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The following factors guide this Court's decision:

(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process

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