Harvel v. City of Johnston City

• Decision Date: 23 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 71290,71290
• Parties: , 166 Ill.Dec. 888 James HARVEL et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF JOHNSTON CITY et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1217

586 N.E.2d 1217

146 Ill.2d 277, 166 Ill.Dec. 888

James HARVEL et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF JOHNSTON CITY et al., Appellees.

No. 71290.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 23, 1992.

Thomas F. Crosby, Winters, Brewster, Murphy, Crosby & Patchett, Marion, for appellants.

Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, Chicago (Timothy J. Ashe, and Michael M. Tannen, of counsel), for Edward Gray Corp., et al.

Anesi, Ozmon, Lewin & Associates, Ltd., Chicago (Nat P. Ozmon, Curt N. Rodin and Richard A. Kimnach, of counsel), for Ill. Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Bruce L. Carmen, and Brian K. McBrearty, of counsel), for Lawrence A. Lipe & Associates.

Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, James and Barbara Harvel, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Williamson County against the defendants, the City of Johnston City (City) and Lawrence A. Lipe & Associates (Lipe), to recover damages sustained when James Harvel was injured at the construction site where he was working. The complaint alleged that James' injuries were the proximate result of the defendants' willful failure to comply with certain safety provisions of the Structural Work Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.). Counts I and II sought recovery for James' injuries, while counts III and IV sought recovery for Barbara's resulting loss of consortium. The defendants filed motions to dismiss counts III and IV of the complaint on the grounds that the Structural Work Act does not grant a cause of action for loss of consortium to the spouse of an injured worker and that the complaint failed to otherwise state a cause of action under which Barbara could recover. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-619). The appellate court affirmed, holding that the spouse of an injured worker does not have a cause of action for loss of consortium under the Structural Work Act and that any common law consortium claim had been waived. (205 Ill.App.3d 661, 151 Ill.Dec. 51, 563 N.E.2d 1157.) This court granted Barbara Harvel's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). While this appeal was pending, the Harvels entered into a settlement agreement with the City and a third-party defendant. Accordingly, defendant Lipe is the sole appellee in this court. Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of both the appellee and the appellant.

According to the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, the City was in charge of the construction of a water treatment plant and had erected an elevated water retention tank as part of this project. The City had hired Lipe as its agent to direct, supervise and inspect the erection of the water treatment plant. On August 26, 1988, James was on the elevated water retention tank in the performance of his duties when he fell onto the concrete at the bottom of the tank, thereby sustaining permanent injuries.

Two issues are presented for review: (1) whether the Structural Work Act grants the spouse of an injured worker a cause of action for loss of consortium; and alternatively, (2) whether the spouse of an injured worker has a common law cause of action for loss of consortium. We first consider the plaintiff's claim that the Structural Work Act allows a right of action for loss of consortium to the spouse of an injured worker.

I.

Plaintiff Barbara Harvel premises her right to recover for loss of consortium on section 9 of the Structural Work Act. That section provides:

"For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this Act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby; and in case of loss of life by reason of such wilful violation or wilful failure as aforesaid, a right of action shall accrue to the surviving spouse of the person so killed, the lineal heirs or adopted children of such person, or to any other person or persons who were, before such loss of life, dependent for support on the person or persons so killed, for a like recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by reason of such loss of life or lives." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 69.)

The plain language of section 9 grants a cause of action to a "party injured" by wilful violations of the Act for any "direct damages" sustained thereby. Although this language does not expressly grant or deny a cause of action for loss of consortium, the appellate court construed it to bar the spouse of an injured worker from bringing a loss of consortium action. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the term "party injured" was limited to those persons delineated in section 1 of the Act. That section provides:

"All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct or other structure, shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 60.)

The appellate court determined that the phrase "party injured" used in section 9 was restricted to those " 'persons employed or engaged [on a structural device], or passing under or by the same.' " (205 Ill.App.3d at 665, 151 Ill.Dec. 51, 563 N.E.2d 1157, quoting Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 60.) Applying this restricted interpretation of the term "party injured," the court determined that Barbara Harvel had no cause of action for loss of consortium, because she was not injured while employed or engaged on a structural device or while passing under or by the same. (205 Ill.App.3d 661, 151 Ill.Dec. 51, 563 N.E.2d 1157; see also Martin v. Kiendl Construction Co. (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 468, 63 Ill.Dec. 824, 438 N.E.2d 1187.) The court then defended the interpretation that it decided upon with the argument that "[i]f the legislature had meant for the spouse of an injured worker to have a cause of action, it would have inserted language permitting such an action." (205 Ill.App.3d at 665, 151 Ill.Dec. 51, 563 N.E.2d 1157.) We disagree with the appellate court's interpretation of the Act.

In this case, we are required to determine the scope of section 9 of the Structural Work Act, which creates a remedy for those injured as a result of wilful violation of the statute. Specifically, we must consider whether section 9 permits the spouse of an injured worker to bring a cause of action for loss of consortium. In construing a statute, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. (People v. Geever (1988), 122 Ill.2d 313, 324, 119 Ill.Dec. 341, 522 N.E.2d 1200; City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 340-41, 85 Ill.Dec. 508, 473 N.E.2d 1313.) An inquiry into legislative intent generally begins with the language of the statute. (First National Bank v. Mutual Trust Life Insurance Co. (1988), 122 Ill.2d 116, 121, 118 Ill.Dec. 615, 522 N.E.2d 70.) The language of section 9 specifies that the remedial provisions may be invoked whenever there is an injury "to person or property" occasioned by wilful violation of the Act. In such circumstances, the "party injured" is given a right of action for "direct damages sustained." We find nothing in the language of section 9 which suggests that the legislature intended to preclude the spouse of an injured worker from bringing a cause of action under the statute. The phrase "party injured" does not expressly refer solely to the structural worker who suffers the injury to his person or property. On the contrary, the phrase is broad enough to include an injured worker's spouse who suffers a loss of consortium as a result of a defendant's wilful violation of the Act. Had the legislature intended to grant a right of action solely to the injured worker, it could have clarified the statute by inserting express language to that effect. The legislature has not done so. Because nothing in the language of the statute prohibits an action by the spouse of an injured worker, it is appropriate for us to examine sources other than the language for evidence of the legislature's intent.

The policies underlying a statute are often regarded as a valuable source of legislative intent. (Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill.2d 305, 317, 175 N.E.2d 785; Brackett v. Osborne (1964), 44 Ill.App.2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 8.) Examination of the reason and necessity for the law, the evils which the legislature sought to remedy and the purposes intended to be accomplished is particularly important in cases such as this, where the statutory language is not clear. (American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxin (1989), 127 Ill.2d 230, 239, 130 Ill.Dec. 217, 537 N.E.2d 284; 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 45.09, at 40 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).) This court will presume that the legislature had a definite purpose in enacting the statute and drafted the statute so that each part would be in harmony with that purpose. (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 91 (Sands 4th ed. 1984); Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373, 389, 47 Ill.Dec. 721, 415 N.E.2d 1034.) From this presumption proceeds the rule that the general purpose of the whole act shall control and that all the parts shall be interpreted consistently with this purpose. If the language of a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which will carry out its purpose and another which will...