Harvest Church of Our Lord v. the City of East St. Louis

• Decision Date: 15 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 5–09–0675.,5–09–0675.
• Citation: 348 Ill.Dec. 320,943 N.E.2d 1230,407 Ill.App.3d 649
• Parties: HARVEST CHURCH OF OUR LORD, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.The CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

407 Ill.App.3d 649
943 N.E.2d 1230
348 Ill.Dec. 320

HARVEST CHURCH OF OUR LORD, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
The CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 5–09–0675.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Feb. 10, 2011.Rehearing Denied March 15, 2011.

[943 N.E.2d 1231]

William P. Hardy, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Springfield, IL; Chad A. Jennings, Kathryn E. Crossley, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Belleville, IL, for Appellant.George R. Ripplinger, Ripplinger & Zimmer, LLC, Belleville, IL, for Appellee.

[348 Ill.Dec. 321 , 407 Ill.App.3d 650] OPINION Justice WEXSTTEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

The plaintiff, Harvest Church of Our Lord, filed an action against the defendant, the City of East St. Louis, Illinois (the City), for the wrongful demolition of property, pursuant to section 1–4–7 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/1–4–7 (West 2006)). The City filed a motion for a summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 8–101(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2006)). The circuit court denied the City's motion for a summary judgment but certified three questions for appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). We conclude that the one-year statute of limitations found in section 8–101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to bar the plaintiff's wrongful-demolition action against the City.

FACTS

On February 13, 2007, the plaintiff filed its complaint against the City, alleging that the City improperly demolished its church building located at 1101 State Street in East St. Louis and failed to account for the proceeds of the sale of property, which included bricks, hardwood, oak floors, and

[348 Ill.Dec. 322 , 943 N.E.2d 1232]

other materials. The City filed a motion for a summary judgment, arguing that because the demolition had occurred prior to January 15, 2005, and the plaintiff did not file its claim until February 13, 2007, the plaintiff was barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 8–101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The plaintiff responded to the City's motion for a summary judgment, arguing that its complaint set forth an action based upon the City's [407 Ill.App.3d 651] wrongful demolition of its property, pursuant to section 1–4–7 of the Municipal Code, an action excluded from the Tort Immunity Act, and that therefore the Tort Immunity Act's statute of limitations did not apply. On May 27, 2009, the circuit court concluded that a five-year statute of limitations found in section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13–205 (West 2006)), as opposed to the one-year limitations period contained in the Tort Immunity Act, applied to the plaintiff's action, and the court denied the City's motion for a summary judgment.

On June 25, 2009, the City filed a motion to certify three questions of law for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). On November 30, 2009, the circuit court found that the questions of law involved substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court granted the City's motion and certified the following questions of law:

“A. Does the one year statute of limitations contained in 745 ILCS 10/8–101 apply to a cause of action for damages brought pursuant to Section 1–4–7 of the Illinois Municipal Code?

B. Does the language contained in 745 ILCS 10/2–101 stating that ‘[n]othing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on: ... Section 1–4–7 of the “Illinois Municipal Code” ....’ alter or eliminate the application of the one year statute of limitations contained in 745 ILCS 10/8–101 to Plaintiff's Complaint[?]

C. Is Plaintiff's cause of action alleged in the complaint barred by the one-year limitations period contained in 745 ILCS 10/8–101[?]”

On December 14, 2009, the City filed an application for leave to appeal, which this court granted on January 8, 2010.

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff argues that because this action is brought pursuant to section 1–4–7 of the Municipal Code, it is exempt from the immunities provided by the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2–101(e) (West 2006)) and that, therefore, it is also exempted from the one-year statute of limitations provision found in section 8–101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The plaintiff argues that because its action seeks to recover damages for an injury done to property, the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. 735 ILCS 5/13–205 (West 2006) (“[A]ctions * * * to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention[407 Ill.App.3d 652] or conversion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.”).

The City counters that although section 2–101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2–101 (West 2006)) creates an exemption from provisions of the Tort Immunity Act that would eliminate the “liability” of a public entity for a wrongful demolition under section 1–4–7 of the Municipal Code,

[348 Ill.Dec. 323 , 943 N.E.2d 1233]

the one-year statute of limitations found in section 8–101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act still applies because it affects only the time within which a suit may be filed and not the underlying liability. The City argues that because the exemption from governmental immunity provided for in section 2–101 of the Tort Immunity Act does not affect the one-year statute of limitations period applicable to suits brought under section 1–4–7 of the Municipal Code, the plaintiff's claim is time-barred.

The scope of review for an interlocutory appeal brought under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 is strictly limited to the certified question. In re Estate of Williams, 366 Ill.App.3d 746, 748, 304 Ill.Dec. 547, 853 N.E.2d 79 (2006). Because the question certified by the trial court must be a question of law, the applicable standard of review is de novo. Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill.2d 45, 58, 316 Ill.Dec. 522, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007).

“The cardinal rule of interpreting statutes, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature.” Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill.2d 304, 311, 269 Ill.Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660 (2001). “The starting point is always the language of the...