Harvey By and Through Harvey v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-2593,87-2593
• Citation: 873 F.2d 1343
• Parties: 27 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 912 Gregory Allen HARVEY, By and Through his legal guardian, Lyle Dean HARVEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1343

873 F.2d 1343

27 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 912

Gregory Allen HARVEY, By and Through his legal guardian, Lyle Dean HARVEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-2593.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 25, 1989.

Jack R. Gage of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, Cheyenne, Wyo. (Michael B. Moore of Cartwright, Slobodin, Bokelman, Borowsky, Wartnick, Moore & Harris, Inc., San Francisco, Cal., with him, on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant.

Andrew Langan, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Ill. (Thomas G. Gorman of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyo., and John T. Hickey, Jr. of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Ill., with him, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS, ^* District Judge.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

This product liability case involves claims for enhanced personal injuries suffered by Gregory Allen Harvey (Harvey) when the 1979 Chevrolet Corvette in which he was riding crashed on a rural Wyoming road. Harvey sued General Motors Corporation (GM), claiming that the "T-Top" latch of the vehicle was defective and caused Harvey's ejection from the vehicle and consequent injuries. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332 (1966 & Supp.1988). The case was tried to a jury on theories of strict liability and negligence. The jury awarded no damages. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), Harvey filed a Motion for a New Trial on damages. The trial court denied the motion. Harvey appeals the Judgment entered on the verdict and the Order Denying the Motion for a New Trial. Our jurisdiction vests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (Supp.1988). We AFFIRM.

Facts

On July 6, 1985, Harvey and a friend, Christopher Schade, drove Harvey's 1979 Chevrolet Corvette on a road south of Hanna, Wyoming. Harvey and Schade had been drinking and Schade had been smoking marijuana sometime during the day. Traveling at an excessive rate of speed, they came upon sheep in the road. Schade swerved, and lost control of the vehicle. The Corvette rolled off the road and was "totaled." During the rollover, the Corvette's T-Top roof panels separated from the vehicle. Harvey, who was not wearing a seat belt, was ejected from the vehicle. He sustained severe bodily injuries that resulted in an amputated leg and brain damage. At trial, Harvey presented unchallenged evidence that his medical bills were $185,140. His unchallenged lost wages for 1985, 1986 and 1987 were $76,196. His expert economist, although challenged, testified that the present value of Harvey's future lost earnings and fringe benefits was $1,537,634, and that the present value of Harvey's future cost of attendant care was $1,017,693. Additionally, the record presents evidence of loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, and permanent debilitation.

The trial court instructed the jury on Harvey's theory of enhanced injuries: that a design defect which does not cause an accident does not subject a manufacturer

to liability for the entire damage, but subjects it to liability only for injuries caused over and above those which would have occurred without the defective design. The jury found: the vehicle was manufactured in a defective condition, was unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user, and reached Harvey without substantial change in condition; and the defective condition was a proximate cause of Harvey's injuries. The jury further found that GM was negligent and its negligence was a proximate cause of Harvey's injuries. The jury found Harvey negligent as well, and found that his negligence also was a proximate cause of the injuries. The jury apportioned total fault to Harvey and GM at fifty percent each and awarded no damages.

I. New Trial

Harvey contends that the jury verdict was inconsistent in that the jury found multiple liability and proximate causation against GM, and yet awarded Harvey zero damages. He argues that the jury should have returned a dollar damage figure, even if it found Harvey 100 percent at fault and 100 percent negligent, and that the result demonstrates the jury was confused or consciously disregarded the instructions of the trial court. The trial court viewed the verdict as consistent with the proposition that Harvey did not establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design of the Corvette. We affirm the trial court's ruling.

We review the trial court's denial of Harvey's Motion for a New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for a new trial. Patty Precision Products Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Whiteley v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir.1983)). Review is limited to whether the district court's refusal to set aside the jury's verdict constituted a manifest abuse of its discretion. Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th Cir.1987). See also Suggs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 833 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1732, 100 L.Ed.2d 196 (1988) ("[t]he decision of a trial court to grant or deny a motion for a new trial will only be overturned on appeal upon a showing of a 'clear abuse of discretion,' " quoting Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453, 1461 (10th Cir.1987)).

Although Harvey cites Hopkins v. Coen, 431 F.2d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir.1970), for the proposition that where a verdict is inconsistent the granting of a timely motion for a new trial is not discretionary but is mandatory, the case does not alter our review, particularly in view of our holding that the verdict is consistent. Hopkins dictates a result on given facts. In applying the proper standard of review, we look to the nature of the ruling appealed rather than the nature of the contentions raised. We will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion.

Harvey contends on appeal, as he did at the trial level unsuccessfully, that the verdict is inconsistent with the jury's answers to the special interrogatories. ¹ It is the duty of the court to attempt to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them. "Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way." In determining whether there is inconsistency in the jury's findings, the findings are to be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances and in connection with the pleadings, instructions, and issues submitted.

The general rule regarding a court's role in evaluating the jury's verdict is the same under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a) (special verdict) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) (general verdict with interrogatories). In either instance, the trial court has a duty to try to reconcile the answers to the case to avoid retrial. Regarding Rule 49(a), Wright and Miller explain as follows:

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil Sec. 2510, at 515-17 (1971) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)).

Likewise, when submitting a general verdict and interrogatories under Rule 49(b), both the trial and appellate courts have a duty to reconcile the two if any seeming conflict arises. "It is the duty of the court to reconcile the two if reconciliation is possible." Wright & Miller, Sec. 2513, at 528-29. In Schaafsma v. Morin Vermont Corp., 802 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir.1986), the Second Circuit elaborated on this principle as follows:

In fairness to trial courts and in order to preserve parties' Seventh Amendment rights, appellate courts "struggle" to find a way of reconciling seemingly inconsistent interrogatory answers and verdicts: " 'Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.' " [Julien J.] Studley, [Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 407 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir.1969) ] (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)); see Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, New York, 783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir.1986); Davis v. West Community Hospital, 755 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir.1985); Cote v. Estate of Butler, 518 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.1975); cf. Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 88-92 (1st Cir.1984) (discussing reconciliation of inconsistent general verdicts). Only when jury verdicts are logically incompatible is it error for the district court not to grant a new trial. Bernardini v. Rederi A/B Saturnus, 512 F.2d 660, 662-64 (2d Cir.1975); see Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir.1984).

There is no question that the trial and appellate courts must attempt to reconcile The reconciliation of the jury's responses, however, is not merely to one another, but to the entire case. "Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way." Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, 369 U.S. at 364, 82 S.Ct. at 786 (emphasis added). But see Bass v. Dehner, 103 F.2d 28, 34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580, 60 S.Ct. 100, 84 L.Ed. 486 (1939) (" 'Presumptions and intendments will not be indulged to establish a contradiction, it being the duty of the court to reconcile or harmonize the special findings or answers to special interrogatories with each other, if it can reasonably be done,' " (quoting 64 C.J. Sec. 964, at 1176) (emphasis added)). More recently, in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 F.2d 1416, 1425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 647, 93 L.Ed.2d 702 (1986), we reconciled the jury's verdict on each separate cause of action to the case rather than to one another.

rather than look for inconsistency in verdicts when such a question arises.

In denying Harvey's Motion...