Harvey v. Brouilette

• Decision Date: 22 April 1889
• Citation: 17 A. 722,61 Vt. 525
• Parties: HARVEY v. BROUILETTE.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

17 A. 722

61 Vt. 525

HARVEY

v. BROUILETTE.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor.

April 22, 1889.

Exceptions from Windsor county court; POWERS, Judge.

Action in general assumpsit by James G. Harvey against Alexander Brouilette to recover the amount of a promissory note for $250, signed by the defendant, and payable to Ella Faneuf or bearer on demand. The general issue was pleaded, and a verdict given for plaintiff. Exceptions by the defendant. It appeared that the defendant was the brother of one Prosper Brouilette, who previously to the date of the note in suit had been arrested under bastardy proceedings begun at the instance of the said Ella Faneuf, who then claimed to be pregnant by the said Prosper. These proceedings were finally discontinued by the payment of $250 in cash and the giving of this note. The defendant claimed that the note was to be enforced only upon the contingency that the said Ella should be actually confined; that in fact she never was confined, but miscarried; whereupon she had written to the plaintiff, who had previously become the owner of the note, notifying him of this fact, and directing him to surrender it to the defendant.

D. C. Dennison, S. M. Pingree, and J. G. Harvey, for plaintiff. Davis & Enright, for defendant.

TYLER, J. The defendant insists upon three exceptions to the rulings and charge of the court below.

1. As to the limitation of the defendant in cross-examination of the plaintiff. It appears that the defendant had, without objection of the plaintiff, offered evidence in defense tending to show that the note in suit was given on condition that the girl, Ella Faneuf, should be confined, and require the money The plaintiff in rebuttal testified that wher Prosper Brouilette, went to his office under arrest, he read the complaint to him and advised him to procure counsel; that Prosper replied ho desired no counsel, and inquired what he could do; and that plaintiff informed him that he could do one of three things,—settle with the girl, marry her, or go to jail. The exceptions state that in cross-examination of the plaintiff the defendant's counsel inquired at some length about what was said about obtaining counsel and giving bail, and that after spending some time upon this subject the court said to counsel that all preliminary talk was immaterial, and the only question in issue was as to the alleged conditional character of the note, and limited the cross-examination to the subject of the settlement and its terms, in which ruling the defendant claims there was error. It is true that when a party becomes a witness in his own behalf he subjects himself to cross-examination by the adverse party. It is also true that the length of cross-examination is within the control of the presiding Judge. We think the limitation in this case was a matter of proper judicial discretion, and was not a deprivation of defendant's legal right. The exceptions state that there was nothing in the preliminary conversation that had...