Harvey v. Caesars Entm't Operating Co.
| Citation | 55 F.Supp.3d 901 |
| Decision Date | 24 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11CV194–NBB–SAA. |
| Parties | John HARVEY, Plaintiff, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT OPERATING COMPANY, INC., Caesars Entertainment Corporation, Harrah's Tunica Corporation, Horseshoe Gaming Holding, LLC, Horseshoe GP, LLC, Horseshoe Shreveport, LLC, Harrah's New Orleans Management Company, Harrah's Bossier City Management Company, LLC, Harrah's Bossier City Investment Company, LLC, Harrah's Shreveport/Bossier City Investment Company, LLC, Harrah's Shreveport/Bossier City Holding Company, LLC, Robinson Property Group Corporation d/b/a Horseshoe Tunica, Jazz Casino Company, LLC d/b/a Harrah's New Orleans, Horseshoe Entertainment, LP d/b/a/ Horseshoe Bossier City, Harrah's Las Vegas, LLC, Desert Palace, LLC d/b/a/ Caesars Palace, Harrah's Shreveport Management Company, LLC, d/b/a Harrah's Louisiana Downs, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Ken R. Adcock, William Christopher Ivison, Adcock and Morrison, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, for Plaintiff.
J. Cal Mayo, Jr., Pope S. Mallette, Paul Bowie Watkins, Jr., Kate Mauldin Embry, Mayo Mallette, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendants.
Presently before the court are several motions filed by Defendants and the Mississippi Attorney General in the above-styled matter. Upon due consideration of the motions, responses, exhibits, and supporting and opposing authority, the court is ready to rule.
On April 28, 2011, John Harvey visited the Horseshoe casino in Bossier City, Louisiana and executed markers1 in the amount of $500,00.00. Harvey next executed markers at Harrah's in New Orleans, Louisiana in the amount of $1,500,000.00 on May 26, 2011. Finally, Harvey traveled to the Horseshoe casino in Tunica, Mississippi on June 1, 2011, and executed markers totaling $1,000,000.00.2
Harvey represented to the casinos that he had sufficient funds on deposit in his bank account to cover the full value of the markers.
By June 30, 2011, Harvey had not made payment arrangements with the casinos to satisfy the markers. Therefore, on July 5, 2011, after notifying Harvey, Harrah's New Orleans placed the markers for collection at Harvey's bank. Harvey stopped payment on the markers. Horseshoe Bossier City deposited its markers on July 11, 2011, and Harvey stopped payment on these markers. On August 11, 2011, Harvey and Scott Barber, the general manager of Horseshoe Tunica, reached a conditional resolution agreement on the collection of all the markers whereby Harvey would make an initial payment of $150,000.00 and subsequent monthly payments of $100,000.00, with the entire balance due by the end of January 2012. Horseshoe required that Harvey agree not to play at any non-Caesars owned casino. Harvey could play at any Caesars-owned casino, but any winnings would be used to pay the outstanding balance on the markers. Barber agreed to write a letter to Harvey's bank concerning the resolution. Harvey made his first payment.
On August 21, 2011, Caesars employees learned that Harvey was gambling at the MGM-owned Aria Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. After Barber confronted Harvey, Harvey ultimately admitted to gambling. Barber notified Harvey that Harvey had breached the terms of the agreement and that the full amount owed was due immediately. Harvey refused to pay the balance. Horseshoe Tunica then deposited its markers, worth then $850,000.00, with Harvey's bank. Harvey stopped payment on these markers.
Harrah's New Orleans and Horseshoe Bossier City reported Harvey's markers and Harvey's refusal to honor them to their respective district attorneys in Louisiana. The prosecutors pursued prosecution against Harvey and restitution agreements were ultimately reached.3 Harvey repaid Horseshoe Bossier City and currently makes timely payments to repay Harrah's New Orleans.
Harvey initiated the instant action against the Caesars Defendants on September 12, 2011, alleging the following claims: breach of contract, malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, extortion, violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and actions to declare Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97–19–75 and 97–19–55 and La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14:71 and 16:15 unconstitutional. Defendants asserted a counter-claim against Harvey for breach of contract and subsequently moved for summary judgment on its counter-claim as well as Harvey's claims. The Mississippi Attorney General has entered an appearance to defend the constitutionality of the state statutes.4
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing the evidence, this court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and avoid credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In so doing, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Plaintiff's “burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
A judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is considered under the same standard as deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) ). The court “accepts all well pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
A. Defendant Robinson Property Group's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counter-claim
Defendant Robinson Property Group (“RPG”), doing business as the Horseshoe Casino in Tunica, Mississippi, moves the court for entry of summary judgment in its favor on the breach of contract claim alleged against Plaintiff Harvey. In support, Horseshoe Tunica argues that Harvey indisputably owes the casino the balance immediately on the markers he executed due to his material breach of the agreement for timely payments by gambling at a Caesars competitor, in violation of the parties' agreement. Harvey alleges that Horseshoe Tunica improperly terminated that agreement.
UHS–Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 756 (Miss.1987) (quoting Gulf South Capital Corp. v. Brown, 183 So.2d 802, 805 (Miss.1966) ; Matheney v. McClain, 248 Miss. 842, 161 So.2d 516, 520 (1964) ).
UHS–Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 756 (Miss.1987) ().
Harvey admits that he signed the markers and later agreed to the terms of the repayment plan, but argues that his participation in a blackjack tournament in August 2011 at the MGM-owned Aria in Las Vegas was not a material breach of the repayment agreement. Harvey contends that his actions should not be considered to be gambling, since he used another person's funds. Harvey relies on his interpretation that the term “play” used in the oral contract was ambiguous because it was not defined in the contract. He argues that while Defendant contends that the term prohibited Harvey from gambling at a rival casino, Harvey construes “play” to mean entering a game where he stands a chance to lose or win. Harvey concludes that by using someone else's money, he did not gamble or “play” at the Aria casino. The court finds the term “play” in the context of a casino is not vague, and that the generally accepted interpretation of the term is participating in games available at a casino.
During Harvey's time at the Aria casino, he presented $300,000 in cashier's checks in his name from his bank, received $15,000 in chips from his player's account and signed a $10,000 casino marker on his bank account. Regardless of whether he borrowed this money from another source, Harvey entered himself in the blackjack tournament, played in it, and therefore, stood a chance to lose or win money in the tournament.
Harvey...
To continue reading
Request your trial