Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 April 1997
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-95-3779.
• Parties: Mona HARVEY, Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., d/b/a Chevron U.S.A. Production Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

961 F.Supp. 1017

Mona HARVEY, Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., d/b/a Chevron U.S.A. Production Company, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. H-95-3779.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

April 23, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fritz Barnett, Barnett & Craddock, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for plaintiff.

Holly H. Williamson and Stewart Hoffer, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, Houston, TX, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc. d/b/a Chevron U.S.A. Production Company's ("Chevron") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 35). Chevron seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Mona Harvey's ("Harvey") claims alleging gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Having reviewed the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that Chevron's motion should be granted.

I. Background

Harvey, an attorney, began her employment with Chevron on January 4, 1982, as a land representative in the Contract and Lease Maintenance Division of Chevron's Land Business Unit in New Orleans, Louisiana. While working as a land representative from 1982 until 1987, Harvey's immediate supervisor was Walter Heuer ("Heuer"), who in turn, reported to Edward J. Guise ("Guise"), the Manager of Lease Maintenance.

In 1985, Harvey began requesting a transfer to "Division" because the jobs allegedly entailed more responsibility, exposure, marketability, and opportunity. Harvey claims that for two years, from 1985 to 1987, she remained in Property Administration, while others were being shifted around the Land Department. In 1987, Harvey informed Guise that she would go to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") if she was not transferred into Division. Guise directed her to his supervisor, Howard Dearing ("Dearing"). Harvey spoke with Dearing about why she had not been moved to Division. Subsequently, in late 1987 or early 1988, Harvey was assigned to the Onshore Division as a land representative.

In 1990, Chevron reorganized its Land Business Unit and consolidated all property administration functions that were being performed in New Orleans, Houston, and San Ramon, California, into a new Property Administration Group located in Houston. This reorganization did not involve Harvey's position with the Onshore Division in New Orleans. Rather, the reorganization affected the Contract and Lease Maintenance Group from which Harvey had voluntarily transferred in 1987. Hence, Harvey was not automatically entitled to a transfer to Houston. Due to her desire to return to her home state of Texas, however, Harvey requested that she be permitted to rejoin the Contract and Lease Maintenance Group so that she could be transferred to Houston.¹ The transfer, a voluntary demotion, was approved.

In August 1990, the Contract and Lease Maintenance Group transferred to Houston and was thereafter known as the Property Administration Group. Guise became the Manager of Property Administration and transferred to Houston, as well. Harvey offered to stay and finish a project in New Orleans; thus, her transfer to Houston was delayed until December 1990. In Houston, Harvey's immediate supervisor was Rebecca Wagstaff ("Wagstaff"), who reported to Guise.

Within a few months of Harvey's arrival in Houston, she began expressing dissatisfaction with her job, complaining that her work was too clerical. According to Chevron, it was during this time period that Harvey reported to Wagstaff that Guise was demonstrating work-related favoritism toward Colleen Naff ("Naff"), an employee in another unit of the Property Administration Group. Naff's immediate supervisor was Heuer, who in turn, reported to Guise. In April 1991, Harvey reported to Wagstaff that Guise gave Naff high profile assignments, a lighter workload, and special perquisites, such as work-related trips out of town. Harvey requested, however, that Wagstaff keep this information confidential. Wagstaff complied with Harvey's request and never told anyone about Harvey's report. Therefore, no formal complaint was ever made against Guise as a result of Harvey's allegations. In July 1991, Harvey again reported to Wagstaff that she felt her career was being harmed because of special treatment being given to Naff by Guise. Harvey, however, did not request, nor did Wagstaff file, a formal complaint against Guise.

In October and November 1991, Chevron formed a separate legal department for the Upstream Production Division.² The formation of this separate legal department, the Upstream Law Unit, created some new openings in the Legal Department for attorneys who were members of the Land Business Unit. On January 1, 1992, Guise transferred to the Law Unit, and Chevron promoted Wagstaff to replace Guise as the Manager of Property Administration. Carl Rewerts ("Rewerts") was selected to fill Wagstaff's former position. Thus, Rewerts became Harvey's direct supervisor and Wagstaff her indirect supervisor.

Because some of its mineral properties had been sold, Chevron reduced its workforce in August 1992. The company-wide reduction-in-force became effective on August 31, 1992. During the reduction-in-force, Chevron reduced its workforce from 8,117 employees to 5,899 employees — a 27% decrease. Chevron terminated Harvey's employment as part of the reduction-in-force. After the 1992 reduction-in-force, 126 employees remained in the Land Business Unit, a reduction of approximately 55%. Harvey's assigned section of the Land Business Unit, the Property Administration Group, was reduced from over fifty employees to less than twenty. Before the reduction-in-force, the Property Administration Group had 22 land representatives, fourteen of whom were females and eight were males. After the reduction-in-force, of the seven persons occupying positions similar to that Harvey had held, six were female and one was male. Property Administration suffered a 65% reduction. The only person in Harvey's immediate work group to survive the 1992 reduction-in-force was Debra Wright, a female. In April 1996, Chevron further reduced its workforce to 5,126 employees. After the April 1996 reduction, the Land Business Unit was further reduced in size to only 96 employees.

On September 3, 1992, Harvey filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Texas Commission on Human Rights, alleging claims of sexual harassment and sexual discrimination. She filed this action in the 269th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, on May 30, 1995, and the defendants subsequently removed it to this court. In her original petition, Harvey brought claims against Chevron and Guise, alleging sexual discrimination and sexual harassment under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

By order dated September 29, 1995, Harvey's claims against Guise were dismissed. On December 22, 1995, Harvey sought leave to amend her complaint to add a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. On January 23, 1996, this court issued its Memorandum and Order granting summary judgment on Harvey's state law claims, as they were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Harvey was granted leave to file an amended complaint setting forth her Title VII claim on February 13, 1996.

II. Analysis

A. The Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) provides that "[summary] judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.1988). The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the non-movant's case. See Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994).

Once a proper motion has been made, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little, 37 F.3d at 1069, 1075. The controverted evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and all reasonable doubts must be resolved against the moving party. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 401, 402 n. 5, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14; Judwin Properties, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden." See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994)); Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Summary judgment is mandated if the non-movant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case on which she bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex...