Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist.
| Decision Date | 24 November 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 38581,38581 |
| Citation | 203 N.E.2d 573,32 Ill.2d 60 |
| Parties | William HARVEY et al., Appellants, v. CLYDE PARK DISTRICT, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Rosenberg & Kosin, Chicago (Robert S. Kosin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
David S. Kerwin, Ralph Patterson, and Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago (Thomas M. Thomas and Thomas F. Scully, Chicago, of counsel), as amicus curiae.
Joseph I. Bulger, Chicago, for appellee.
This action was instituted on behalf of William Harvey, a minor, to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, Clyde Park District, in maintaining its playground facilities. The complaint alleged that as a result of defendant's negligence. the plaintiff was thrown to the ground while using a children's slide. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it was immune from liability by reason of section 12.1 of the Park District Code, which provides: 'Any park district shall not be liable for any injuries to person or property, or for the death of any person heretofore or hereafter caused by or resulting from the negligence of its agents, servants, officers or employees in the operation or maintenance of any property, equipment or facility under the jurisdiction, control or custody of the park district, or otherwise occasioned by the acts or conduct of such agents, servants, officers or employees.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 105, par. 12.1-1.
The circuit court sustained the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff has appealed directly to this court, contending that the statute is unconstitutional because it is special legislation in violation of section 22 of article IV of the Constitution of Illinois, S.H.A., and also because it violates section 19 of article II of the Constitution, which provides: 'Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; * * *.'
This court's decision in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 86 A.L.R.2d 469, held that the school district was liable for damages arising from the negligent operation of a school bus. The reasons that prompted the court to reject the school district's claim of immunity in that case, however, applied equally to other areas of municipal immunity, and before and after the Molitor decision became final in December of 1959, the General Assembly enacted numerous statutes relating no municipal tort liability.
The legislation thus adopted established the following pattern: Forest preserves, part districts and the Chicago Park District are not liable for negligence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 57 1/2, par. 3a, chap. 105, pars. 12.1-1, 333.2a). There is no general provision granting immunity to municipalities-cities, villages and incorporated towns. The substance of earlier provisions relating to liability in specific situations has, however, been retained. Municipalities are liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles by firemen and volunteer firemen. Municipalities having a population in excess of 500,000 must completely indemnify policemen for their nonwilful torts; other municipalities must indemnify then to the extent of $50,000. Municipalities are liable for damage to property caused by the removal, destruction or vacation of a building as unsafe or unsanitary under certain circumstances. In specified cases municipalities having a population in excess of 5,000 are liable for damage occasioned by mob violence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 24, pars. 1-4-1 to 1-4-8). The negligent tort liability of private schools and of school districts generally is limited to $10,000. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 122, pars. 821-831). The Board of Education of the City of Chicago, however, is required to insure its employees, thus apparently permitting unlimited recovery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 122, par. 34-18.1). Counties are not liable for negligence; however, they must indemnify sheriffs and deputy sheriffs to the extent of $50,000, for losses occasioned by nonwilful torts (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 34, par. 301.1). The liability of county superintendents of highways is limited to $10,000 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 121, pars. 381-387). But township and district highway commissioners are fully liable for neglect of duty (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 121, par. 6-402). Drainage districts are liable for negligent torts, but the district commissioners are absolved of personal liability (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 42, par. 4-40). Counties, township and district highway commissioners, school districts, and townships are authorized to purchase liability insurance for their agents, employees and officers (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 34, par. 429.7; chap. 121, par. 6-412.1; chap. 122, pars. 10-21.6, 10-22.3, 29-9; chap. 139, par. 39.24). These governmental units are thus apparently given unrestricted freedom to determine for themselves whether or not they will be liable for negligence.
While the common-law doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability, as it had existed prior to the Molitor case, was judicially created, the sovereign immunity of the State has a constitutional basis. Section 26 of article IV of the constitution provides that 'The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity.' Nevertheless the General Assembly has, for practical purposes, eliminated the sovereign immunity of the State by granting jurisdiction to the court of claims over Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 37, par. 439.8.
It is in the light of this statutory pattern that the plaintiff argues that the statute which purports to bar a recovery in this case violates the prohibition against special legislation contained in section 22 of article iV of the constitution of Illinois. That section provides: 'The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases * * * Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.'
The determinative question under section 22 of article IV is whether the statutory classification is rational. (See e.g. People ex rel. Adamowski v. Wilson, 20 Ill.2d 568, 170 N.E.2d 605.) The circumstance that the alleged arbitrary discrimination results from a statutory pattern rather than from a single statute has not barred consideration of claims of violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th...
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