Harvey v. F-B Truck Line Co.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1987
• Docket Number: F-B,No. 16060,16060
• Citation: 115 Idaho 411,767 P.2d 254
• Parties: Leonard HARVEY and Vesta Harvey, husband and wife; Donald Wells and Charlene Wells, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v.TRUCK LINE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Charles MacGuinnis, Defendant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 254

767 P.2d 254

115 Idaho 411

Leonard HARVEY and Vesta Harvey, husband and wife; Donald Wells and Charlene Wells, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. F-B TRUCK LINE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Charles MacGuinnis, Defendant.

No. 16060.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 16, 1987.

On Denial of Rehearing June 9, 1988.

On Rehearing Feb. 9, 1989.

Westberg & McCabe, Chtd., Boise, for defendant-appellant. Paul Larry Westberg, argued.

James A. Bevis, of the firm Manweiler, Bevis & Cameron, Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents.

BISTLINE, Justice.

The underlying facts and procedural background of this lawsuit were well stated by the district court, the Honorable Ray Durtschi, in a memorandum decision written to formalize a verbal ruling from the bench. The ruling came after hearing argument on the Harveys' motion for a judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, for grant of a new trial:

A brief outline of the nature of the action and its history will serve to clarify the issues posed by the Motion.

The action arose out of a collision between an automobile in which plaintiffs were riding and a truck-trailer combination which defendant Charles MacGuinnis was operating at the time of the collision.

Plaintiffs joined F-B Truck Line Company as a defendant on the theory that before the collision, F-B had acquired the use of the truck and trailer under lease terms that required the truck and trailer to be operated for F-B by Charles MacGuinnis. In a pretrial summary judgment motion I determined that F-B could not be held liable under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior. I determined, however, that genuine and material issues of fact existed as to whether F-B could be held liable as a statutory employer under I.C.C. regulations governing the leasing of transportation equipment to perform transportation under a regulated carrier's I.C.C. permit (49 CFR Parts 1057 and 1058). Since the issues as to F-B's potential liability under this theory were almost entirely unrelated to the facts of the accident, I bifurcated the trial as to fault Since at best the issues under the statutory employer theory were somewhat complex for a jury trial, and it appearing to me that it was not a proper function of the jury to interpret the applicable I.C.C. regulations, the case was submitted to the jury under special interrogatories which required the jury to determine the basic facts which would enable the Court to apply the regulations to those facts as a matter of law. This approach avoided burdening the jury with a long recitation of the applicable regulations. As the basis for this approach I accepted as a threshold proposition that as a matter of law the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish through the jury's findings basic facts from which the Court could conclude as a matter of law that F-B, as a regulated carrier, had leased the equipment involved in the accident and engaged Charles MacGuinnis as a driver. I also accepted as a correlative principle of law that the burden was on F-B as a regulated carrier, once it undertook to lease equipment, to comply with the regulations governing the leasing of equipment and the termination of such lease unless it could establish that it was exempt from the regulations. It was my conclusion that F-B did not attempt to establish that it was exempt from the pertinent regulations; therefore no issue was submitted to the jury as to possible exemptions. It followed as a matter of law from the foregoing propositions that if the equipment in question was leased by F-B it was no defense that F-B did not enforce compliance with the regulations either as to the formalities required for the leasing of the equipment or as to the termination of the lease (Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 249 A.2d 579 (N.J.1969); Schedler v. Rowley Interstate Transp. Co., [68 Ill.2d 7, 11 Ill.Dec. 541] 368 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill.1977); Rodriguez v. Ager, 705 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir.1983); Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.1973)). R., pp. 199-201.

[115 Idaho 413] and damages from the trial as to F-B's status as a statutory employer. The latter issue has been tried, and the judgment rendered on the jury verdict is the basis of the subject motion.

F-B's appeal requires us to address the following issues:

(1) Whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the findings of the jury that

(a) James Barnes was an agent of F-B on March 28, 1980, and

(b) It was within the scope of James Barnes' authority as an agent of F-B to acquire the use of equipment and an operator to haul freight under F-B's ICC permit.

(2) Whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting the Harveys' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

(3) Whether the trial court committed reversible error in concluding that the applicable ICC regulations fix financial responsibility, as a matter of law, upon F-B for accidents occurring during trips conducted under F-B's ICC permit.

We affirm on issues 1 and 3, reverse the grant of a judgment n.o.v., and remand for a new trial.

I.

Finding that the case presented somewhat complex issues for a jury trial, the district judge submitted the matter to the jury under special interrogatories. The interrogatories required the jury to determine basic facts enabling the court to apply the ICC regulations to those facts as a matter of law. The two interrogatories here at issue, Instructions Nos. 15 and 16, were framed as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 15

Question No. 1: Was James Barnes an agent of F-B Truck Line Company on March 28, 1980?

If you answered Question No. 1 "yes", then answer Question No. 2.

INSTRUCTION NO. 16

Question No. 2: Was it within the scope of James Barnes' authority as an If you answered Question No. 2 "yes", then answer the next Question. R., p. 159-60.

[115 Idaho 414] agent of F-B Truck Line Company to acquire the use of motor transportation equipment owned by another to transport property under F-B's I.C.C. permit and to engage the person from whom the equipment was acquired to operate such equipment for F-B?

F-B asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answers to the questions above. The standard of review of a jury verdict is well-settled:

Our function is to decide whether a jury reasonably could have found as did the jury in this case. We will not disturb jury verdicts supported by substantial and competent evidence, even though we entertain doubt as to which party's version of the conflicting facts is more probable. Challis Irrigation Co. v. State, 107 Idaho 338, 348, 689 P.2d 230, 240 (Ct.App.1984) (on rehearing).

The Harveys direct our attention to numerous portions of testimony which supplied substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Barnes was an agent of F-B acting within the scope of his authority. Barnes was employed by Robert Martin who managed the truck stop. F-B was in the business of trip-leasing trucks from 1300 independent owner/operators in 1979-80 and needed field agents such as Martin to sign leases on their behalf. Tr., pp. 44-45, 48.

In September, 1979, Fred Johnson, a commissioned agent for F-B, discussed with Martin and Barnes the possibility of arranging for Barnes to sign trip leases since Martin was not at the truck stop 24 hours a day. Tr., pp. 70-71. Johnson said it was necessary for Barnes to sign a signature sheet that would authorize Barnes to write and sign F-B trip lease. Tr., pp. 72, 208. A sheet was obtained from Salt Lake City, Utah, which Barnes signed and returned. Tr., p. 207 Barnes, in fact, wrote trip leases for F-B. Tr., p. 208.

Martin's agent's agreement with F-B required him to employ enough staff to properly operate and maintain the truck stop as, in part, a field office for F-B. F-B's agent and dispatcher, Paula Chamberlin, coordinated the load and assignment to MacGuinnis and provided company information to Barnes necessary to fill out the trip lease here at issue. Tr., pp. 123, 126, 129. Martin testified that Barnes was authorized to sign leases and that he instructed Barnes in the manner of filling out the lease paperwork. Tr., p. 166.

The above is by no means all the evidence which supports the jury's answers to interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 reproduced above. However, it is certainly sufficient to demonstrate that the jury had a reasonable basis for its findings.

II.

Issue No. 2 arises out of the jury's response to Special Interrogatory No. 3 reproduced below:

INSTRUCTION NO. 17

Question No. 3: Did James Barnes before the accident on March 28, 1980, acquire the use, for F-B Truck Line Company in transporting property under F-B's I.C.C. permit, of the truck and trailer operated by Charles MacGuinnis at the time of the accident and engage Charles MacGuinnis to operate such equipment for F-B?

If you answered Question No. 3 "yes", then answer Question No. 4. R., p. 161.

The jury answered this question "no." In his memorandum opinion, Judge Durtschi explored at length the jury's negative answer to Interrogatory No. 3:

But for one discrepancy in the evidence, affirmative answers to Interrogatories 1 and 2 should have almost automatically compelled an affirmative answer to Interrogatory No. 3. That discrepancy involved evidence of a difference in the make of trailer which was acquired for F-B's use in the transaction between Barnes and MacGuinnis and the make of trailer involved in the accident. Barnes identified the make of the trailer acquired for the use of F-B as a "1977 "Your Honor, Are we to accept the truck & trailer as one unit or consider that there is a discrepancy in the description of the trailer & the actual trailer involved at the time of the accident."

[115 Idaho 415] Trailmobile," while the owner of the trailer involved in the accident, Ray Montgomery, said it was a "Beale" trailer. It is clear that the jurors were concerned about this discrepancy by the following question which they...