Harvey v. Mohammed

Decision Date26 June 2013
Docket NumberCivil No. 02–2476 (RCL).
PartiesDavid HARVEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MOHAMMED, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Harvey S. Williams, Washington, DC, Jeffrey P. Matthews, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Robert W. Hesselbacher, Jr., Wright, Constable & Skeen, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Veronica S. Ascarrunz, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC, Elizabeth Sarah Gere, Steven J. Anderson, Dwayne C. Jefferson, Joseph Alphonso Gonzalez, Office of the Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff David Harvey, Personal Representative for the Estate of Curtis Suggs, moves [276] for attorneys' fees and costs from defendant the District of Columbia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). Plaintiff initially requested $1,675,946.55, plus interest to be calculated as of the time of the award.1 The District of Columbia Opposes [282] the motion and argues that plaintiff should be awarded “no more than” $890,312.55 in attorneys' fees and costs.

The District has also moved [281] for limited discovery to obtain time entries plaintiff's counsel excised from their billing records, information regarding the fee arrangement between plaintiff and counsel with respect to settling defendants, and time records from counsel in their original electronic format, apparently to facilitate searching and analyzing the records for purposes of responding to the motion for attorneys' fees.

The Court will award $1,118,976.30 in attorney's fees and costs. The Court denies the District's request for discovery given that the information sought is no longer relevant.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are described in greater detail in earlier memorandum opinions. See Harvey v. Mohammed, 941 F.Supp.2d 93, 2013 WL 1749899 (D.D.C.2013); Harvey v. Mohammed, 841 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.D.C.2012). This Court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff in January 2012, holding for him on his § 1983 claim against the District, and his negligence claims against the District and two other defendants. Harvey, 841 F.Supp.2d at 174–80, 186–92. The Court later held for plaintiff with respect to his claim under D.C.Code § 7–1305.14. Pretrial Order 13, ECF No. 196. Defendants Symbral and the Mohammeds (“the Symbral defendants) settled before trial, Order, ECF No. 221, and the case against another defendant was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Pretrial Order 17.

After a jury trial on damages, judgment in the amount of $2,650,000 was entered against the District of Columbia. The Court denied a subsequent motion for new trial or remittitur, Harvey, 941 F.Supp.2d 93, 2013 WL 1749899, and plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Pl.'s Mot. Att'y Fees, Expert Fees, Expenses and Costs, ECF No. 276 [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot.].

The District of Columbia thereafter appealed the Court's Judgment and the denial of its motion for new trial; plaintiff cross-appealed. Notice of Appeal, May 20, 2013, ECF No. 296; Notice of Cross Appeal, June 3, 2013, ECF No. 298. These appeals are pending in the D.C. Circuit. However, in the interest of justice, the fee issues should be considered at this time, rather than held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal. See LCvR 54.2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A fee applicant “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to [a fee] award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).

Section 1988 of Title 42 provides that, in an action to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). [T]he prevailing party ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)).

[P]laintiffs may be considered prevailing parties ... if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir.1978)); see also id. at 433 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir.1981) ([T]he proper focus is whether the plaintiff has been successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he has acquired the primary relief sought.”)). “This is a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’ Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

Without defining the term, § 1988 provides that a court may award a “reasonable attorney's fee.” In general, “a ‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1672, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010); see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (quoting the Senate Report and explaining that ‘a reasonable attorney's fee’ is one that is ‘adequate to attract competent counsel, but ... [that does] not produce windfalls to attorneys.’).

The “lodestar approach” has become the dominant method used by federal courts in calculating “reasonable” fees. Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1672. Under that approach, the attorney's fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 94, 109 S.Ct. 939.

To determine reasonable hourly rates, it is customary in this District to apply the Laffey Matrix developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,746 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.1984). Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 151, 155–56 (D.D.C.2006). Federal courts need not automatically award Laffey rates, but can use their discretion to determine whether such rates are warranted. Fisher v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch., 880 F.Supp.2d 149, 154 (D.D.C.2012).2

The number of hours claimed by a prevailing party must also be reasonable. A district court may exercise discretion to reduce a fee award by particular amounts “in response to specific objections,” DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 239, 243 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 250 (D.C.Cir.1982)), or ‘by a reasonable amount without providing an item-by-item accounting.’ Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973 (D.C.Cir.2004).

As discussed in more detail below, a reasonable attorney's fee may also include certain other expenses. For example, in this Circuit, work performed by paralegals and law clerks is compensable. Sexcius v. Dist. of Columbia, 839 F.Supp. 919, 926 (D.D.C.1993) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 287, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)), as well as certain other expenses. This is discussed in more detail below. Finally, § 1988 also allows for the recoupment of “costs” which are likewise described in greater detail below.

When claims for attorney's fees are brought against the government, courts should exercise “special caution” in scrutinizing the fee petition. This is “because of the incentive which the [agency's] ‘deep pocket’ offers to attorneys to inflate their billing charges and to claim far more as reimbursement [than] would be sought or could reasonably be recovered from most private parties.” Eureka Inv. Corp., N.V. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C.Cir.1984) (internal citation omitted); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 2005 WL 6127286, at *1 (D.D.C.2005) (Courts must review fee applications carefully to ensure that taxpayers only reimburse prevailing parties for reasonable fees and expenses that contributed to the results achieved....”). However, the D.C. Circuit has also noted, in the context of the Title VII attorney's fee provision, that although “the government has a ‘deep pocket’ and ... any fee request should be examined with care, ... fees should be neither lower, nor calculated differently, when the losing defendant is the government.” Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 896 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc).

III. ANALYSISA. Plaintiff is a Prevailing Party

Plaintiff argues that he is a “prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. in Support of Mot. Att'y Fees, Expert Fees, Expenses and Costs, ECF No. 276 [hereinafter Pl.'s Mem.]. The District does not challenge this contention and thus concedes the issue. Moreover, plaintiff appears to meet the statutory requirement given that the Court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on his § 1983 claim.

B. Laffey Rates May Be Used as Reasonable Hourly Rates

Plaintiff claims compensation for the time spent by at least three attorneys, lead counsel Harvey Williams, co-counsel Jeffrey P. Matthews, and associate attorney Gunella Lilly, as well as four paralegals.3 He seeks application of the Laffey rates, as updated in the USAO Matrix. See Pl.'s Mem. 9; see also http:// www. justice. gov/ usao/ dc/ divisions/ civil_ Laffey_ Matrix_ 20032013. pdf. To account for a delay in payment, he also seeks application of the current Laffey rates for all time expended, including time expended in the early 2000s.

The District does not contest the application of the Laffey rates and therefore has conceded that they apply. The District also does not appear to contest the application of current rates to account for the...

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