Harvey v. Sines
| Citation | 137 A.3d 1045,228 Md.App. 283 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 0691, Sept. Term, 2015.,0691, Sept. Term, 2015. |
| Parties | Mary HARVEY, et al. v. Joseph SINES, et al. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Robert L. Allen, Jr., McHenry, MD, for appellant.
Justin Gregory (J. Gregory Law Firm, L.C., on the brief) Oakland, MD, for appellee.
Panel: KRAUSER, C.J., BERGER, and ROBERT A. ZARNOCH (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.*
, J. (Retired, Specially Assigned).
The opening of the Marcellus Shale in the late–2000s spawned a resurgence in natural resource extraction across the Northeast and Mid–Atlantic regions, including Western Maryland. In 2010, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Dormant Mineral Interests Act, now codified at Section 15–1201, et seq. of the Environment Article
(“Env.”), Maryland Code (1982, 2014 Repl.Vol.), to allow surface owners to terminate severed mineral interests that had gone unused for twenty years or more.
Toward the end of 2014, Joseph L. Sines and Sandra S. Sines (“the Sineses”), appellees, brought an action in the Circuit Court for Garrett County to terminate an undivided half-mineral interest owned by the descendants of Henry B. Harvey—Mary Harvey and Patricia Sue Lannom née Harvey (“the Harveys”), appellants. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and without a hearing, the court found no material facts in dispute, and entered an order terminating the mineral interest of the Harveys.
The Harveys appealed to this Court and present the following question for our review, which we have rephrased:
Whether the Dormant Mineral Interests Act is unconstitutional under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution
? [1
]
We hold that the Maryland Dormant Mineral Interests Act is constitutional because it does not retroactively impair vested rights, nor does it take property without just compensation. We affirm the decision of the circuit court.
The General Assembly passed the Maryland Dormant Mineral Interests Act (“the Act”) by a unanimous vote in each house during the 2010 legislative session.3 See 2010 Laws, ch. 268 (S.B.288), ch. 269 (H.B.320). The Act created a new cause of action, allowing a surface owner of real property subject to a mineral interest to terminate a dormant mineral interest.4
. The action is “in the nature of and require[s] the same notice as is required in an action to quiet title as set forth in § 14–108 of the Real Property Article.”5 Env. § 15–1203(b)(1). “A court order that terminates a mineral interest merges the terminated mineral interest, including express and implied appurtenant surface rights and obligations, with the surface estate in shares proportionate to the ownership of the surface estate, subject to existing liens for taxes or assessments.” Env. § 15–1203 (d)(2)
.
The Act defines a dormant mineral interest as one that “is unused for a period of 20 or more years preceding the commencement of termination of the mineral interest.” Env. § 15–1203(a)(2)(i)
. Additionally, notice of the mineral interest must not have been recorded during the period of 20 or more years preceding the commencement of the action to terminate the mineral interest. Env. § 15–1203(a)(2)(ii). Several actions constitute “use” of the mineral interest by an owner. These include: (i) active mineral exploration or exploitation; (ii) payment of taxes on a separate assessment of the mineral interest; (iii) recordation of an instrument that evidences the continued existence of the mineral interest; and (iv) recordation of a judgment or decree that makes a specific reference to the mineral interest.6 Env. § 15–1203(c)(1). An owner of a mineral interest may record, at any time, a notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest or a part of a mineral interest. Env. § 15–1204(a)(1)
After a petition to terminate a dormant mineral interest has been filed, an owner of the mineral interest can still “record a late notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest as a condition of dismissal of the action, if the owner of the mineral interest pays the litigation expenses incurred by the surface owner of the real property that is subject to the mineral interest.” Env. § 15–1205(b). However, the Act precludes an owner of a mineral interest that has been unused for a period of 40 years or more preceding the commencement of the action from filing a late notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest. Env. § 15–1205(c). The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted rules to aid the implementation of the Act.7 See Md. Rules 12–701, et seq.
The Act's stated purpose “is to make uniform the law governing dormant mineral interests among the states.” Env. § 15–1202(b). In that vein, Act was patterned on the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act, which in turn was designed “to enable and encourage marketability of real property and to mitigate the adverse effect of dormant mineral interests on the full use and development of both surface estate and mineral interests in real property.” Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Acts § 1(a). The uniform act also provides that it “shall be construed to effectuate its purpose to provide a means for termination of dormant mineral interests that impair marketability of real property.” Id. § 1(b). The Attorney General, in a letter to Governor Martin O'Malley, dated May 3, 2010, approved of the constitutionality of the statute.
The Sineses are the surface owners of approximately twenty acres in Garrett County, and own an undivided one-half interest in the minerals beneath the property. On November 20, 2014, the Sineses filed a petition in the circuit court to terminate any dormant mineral rights on their property. They identified the Harveys as potential owners of a portion of the mineral interest, as descendants of Henry B. Harvey who purchased a one-half interest in the minerals on the property, evidenced by a deed dated March 26, 1912 and recorded in the Garrett County land records.
On April 17, 2015, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The record showed that there had been no use of the mineral interest for at least the past 40 years. The Sineses asserted that because there was no use during the past 40 years, the court should enter an order terminating the dormant mineral rights, pursuant to Env. §§ 15–1203(a)
, –1205(c). The Harveys asserted that, among other things, the statute was facially unconstitutional because it abrogated vested rights. The Sineses opposed the Harveys' motion for summary judgment. Neither party requested a hearing, and the record before the circuit court was sparse.
On May 12, 2015, the court entered an order, granting summary judgment for the Sineses, denying the Harveys' motion, and terminating the dormant mineral interest in the property. The Harveys appealed to this Court on June 11, 2015.
Whether a circuit court's grant of summary judgment is proper in a particular case is a question of law, subject to a non-deferential review on appeal. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs v. Johnson, 393 Md. 248, 263, 900 A.2d 753 (2006)
. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review independently the record to determine whether the parties generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Muskin v. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 554, 30 A.3d 962 (2011) (citing Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 393 Md. at 263, 900 A.2d 753 ). We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the well-pled facts against the moving party. Id. Here, neither party has argued that any of the facts are in dispute; therefore it was proper for the trial court to make a decision on the parties' motions for summary judgment. See id.
The Harveys argue that the Act violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and
because it retroactively impairs vested rights and takes property without just compensation under the Court of Appeals's decisions in two cases: Muskin v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011) and Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 A. 56 (1891). The Sineses assert that the cases are distinguishable and that the statute is constitutional because it does not impermissibly divest the mineral interest owner of a vested right.
In addressing a claim involving the constitutionality of a statute, we begin “with a presumption that the statute is constitutional.” Beattie v. State, 216 Md.App. 667, 678, 88 A.3d 906 (2014)
(citing Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 626, 69 A.3d 1066 (2013) ). We are reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional if, “by any construction, it can be sustained.” Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 611, 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (quoting Beauchamp v. Somerset County, 256 Md. 541, 547, 261 A.2d 461 (1970) ). The appellant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption and establishing the statute's unconstitutionality. Beattie, 216 Md.App. at 678, 88 A.3d 906. We undertake an “independent constitutional appraisal” to determine whether a constitutional right has been infringed. Watkins v. Sec'y, Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Services, 377 Md. 34, 46, 831 A.2d 1079 (2003) (citing Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102 (2001) ).
In light of the posture of and contentions in this case, the Harveys' arguments are tantamount to a facial challenge to the Act. However, they would gain nothing if they contested the constitutionality of the Act as applied to their specific circumstances, considering the protracted time that this property was neither used nor taxed. The Harveys have not asserted their rights since the property was acquired more than 100 years ago in 1912.8
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