Harvey v. Tyler
Decision Date | 01 December 1864 |
Citation | 17 L.Ed. 871,2 Wall. 328,69 U.S. 328 |
Parties | HARVEY v. TYLER |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
TYLER brought ejectment against Harvey and others in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, to recover one hundred thousand acres of land in what was formerly Kanawha County alone, though afterwards partly Kanawha and partly Mason County; the last-named county having been created out of the former. The defendants set up that this title had been interrupted by a forfeiture of the land for non-payment of taxes to the commonwealth, and the vesting of it in the President and Directors of the Literary Fund, under a statute of Virginia passed 1st April, 1831, 'concerning lands returned delinquent for the non-payment of taxes;' and there was no doubt that this was so unless the forfeiture had been relieved by certain proceedings in the County Court of Kanawha County, under two sections,—the 21st and 22d of the same act.
The provisions of these two sections were, in their material parts, as follows; and the reader will observe how far they authorize redemption for delinquencies prior to the date of the act of 1st April, 1831; and how far for any term after the passage of it.
The records of the County Court of Kanawha disclosed next the following entries:
'At a county court held for Kanawha County, at the courthouse thereof, the 14th day of November, 1831, present David Ruffner, Andrew Donnally, John Slack, and James McFarland, gentlemen, justices, &c.
'Order.—This day came Matthias Bruen, having title to one tract or parcel of land containing one hundred thousand acres, lying partly in the county of Mason and party in the county of Kanawha; the said tract of one hundred thousand acres being also the same charged in said lists of lands and lots to the Bank of Delaware, John Hollingsworth, and John Shallcross, &c., and returned delinquent in said names for the year 1815. And the said Matthias, having proved by evidence satisfactory to this court that prior to the passage of the act entitled 'An act concerning lands returned delinquent for the non-payment of taxes,' &c., passed April 1, 1831, he was a bon a fide purchaser of said tract, and that he has a deed or deeds which was or were duly recorded in the clerk's office of the County Court of Kanawha County previous to the passage of the aforesaid act; and that he has paid all the purchase-money therefor, having no portion thereof in his hands to satisfy and pay the taxes and damages in arrear and unpaid at the date of his purchase, or any part thereof; and further, that he is in legal possession of the said tract, and was so in possession at the time of the passage of the act before recited.
'Therefore this court, in the presence of the attorney prosecuting the pleas of the commonwealth in said court, who hath appeared and defended this application, upon full consideration of all the matters and things on either side alleged, doth render judgment in favor of the said Matthias Bruen, and doth order, adjudge, and decree that the said tract of land above mentioned be released, discharged, and exonerated from all the arrears of taxes and the damages charged or chargeable thereon anterior to the 14th of April, 1815, the date of the purchase thereof by the said Matthias.
'And the said Matthias Bruen, having further proved by evidence satisfactory to this court that during all the years 1815-'16-'17-'18-'19 and 1820, the years for which the said tract is charged to the said Matthias, and in his name returned delinquent for the non-payment of taxes, there was sufficient property whereon the sheriff or collector might have made distress, and out of which the said taxes for the said several years might have been made and collected. Thereupon this court, in the presence of the attorney prosecuting the pleas of the commonwealth in the said court, who hath also appeared and defended this application, upon full consideration of all the matters and things on either side alleged, doth further adjudge, order, and decree, that the said tract of land be released, discharged, and exonerated from all the arrears of taxes and the damages charged or chargeable thereon for the said several years 1815-'16-' 17-'19, and 1820, whether the same be charged to the said Matthias or to any other person or persons whatsoever; all of which is ordered to be certified according to the act of Assembly in that case made and provided.'
An order, dated 12th of November, and similar to this last, exonerated the tract, upon the latter ground, for the years from 1821 to 1831, inclusive.
THE FIRST POINT in the case was as to the effect of these orders; that is to say, whether, under the statute, they exonerated the land; and this again depended, perhaps, part on the character of this County Court of Kanawha, and to what extent it was or was not a court of general jurisdiction. On this point, it appeared that these county courts derived their powers from a statute of Virginia authorizing them, whose seventh and eighth sections read thus:
It depended, also, in part, perhaps, on another question, connected with the location of the land. As already intimated, the land was situated in what was originally Kanawha County, but out of which another county, Mason, had been, of later times, created. At the time of these proceedings (A.D. 1831) in the County Court of Kanawha, the land had come to lie in part in this new county of Mason. It had, however, for the term of thirty-one years,—the term for which the exoneration extended,—been always listed for taxation as one tract, and as being in the County of Kanawha; and, as the bill of exceptions showed, had been charged with taxes nowhere but in that county. Moreover, the Auditor of the State of Virginia, after these orders of the Kanawha County Court were made, entered an exoneration of taxes as to the entire tract.
Upon this whole part of the case, the court below instructed the jury that the two orders 'did exonerate the taxes delinquent on the land in controversy for the year 1831, and all years prior thereto.'
THE SECOND POINT—one, also, which arose on the charge of the court—was, as to whether certain parties, not in possession, but, nevertheless, made defendants, were properly made so.
The code of Virginia1 enacts as follows:
Under this statute the court, on a request to charge in a particular way, charged in substance, that if some of the defendants had made entries and surveys of any part of the land in controversy, under which they were setting...
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