Harvick v. Oak Hammock Pres. Cmty. Owners Ass'n Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:14-cv-937-Orl-40GJK |
| Parties | RAY HARVICK, Plaintiff, v. OAK HAMMOCK PRESERVE COMMUNITY OWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., BARRY RUBIN, KAREN VARASDI, and WALTER C. ANGELL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause comes before the Court on the following:
Upon consideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
This dispute arises out of Defendants' allegedly discriminatory conduct toward Plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff, Ray Harvick ("Harvick"), owned a home governed by Defendant, Oak Hammock Preserve Community Owners Association, Inc. ("Oak Hammock"), where he lived with his wife and child, both of whom are of Asian descent. (Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 1-2). On December 9, 2010, Defendants filed a lawsuit against Harvick in state court to foreclose on his home due to a dispute regarding the maintenance of his yard. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 4). On May 2, 2011, the parties in the foreclosure action voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 6). On August 8, 2013, Defendants initiated a second lawsuit against Harvick in state court, this time based purely on breach of contract, for the same yard maintenance dispute as the foreclosure action. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 7).
In June 2013, Harvick and his family moved out of their home in Oak Hammock due to Defendants' harassment, stalking, and discriminatory conduct. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 9).On April 19, 2014, Harvick and his wife began the process of selling the home. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 10). On June 4, 2014, Harvick and his wife finalized an agreement to sell their home. (Id. at p. 5, ¶ 11). At the time he filed the Complaint, Harvick expected that the sale of the home would occur on July 25, 2014. (Id. at p. 6, ¶ 23). Harvick's responses in opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss disclose that the closing occurred on July 18, 2014 and that Harvick and his family no longer live in the house. (Doc. 17, p. 6; Doc. 18, p. 6).
Harvick, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on June 17, 2014 by filing the Complaint. (Doc. 1). The essence of Harvick's claims is that Defendants interfered with the sale of his home by placing a false lien on his property and that these actions caused his home to depreciate in value. (Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 25-28). Harvick believes that Defendants' motivation was to discriminate against his family as a mixed Asian-American household. (Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 25, 30, 32). To that end, Harvick alleges six claims against all Defendants. Count 1 alleges that Defendants violated the federal Fair Housing Act. (Id. at pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 24-28). Count 2 alleges that Defendants violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. (Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 29-30). Count 3 is titled as a claim for mental anguish. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32). Count 4 alleges a claim for abuse of process. (Id. at p. 8, ¶¶ 33-34). Count 5 purports to enforce a Florida criminal statute for stalking and harassment. (Id. at p. 8, ¶¶ 35-36). Finally, Count 6 alleges breach of fiduciary duty. (Id. at pp. 8-9, ¶¶ 37-38). Defendants now move to dismiss Harvick's Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docs. 13, 14).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that all complaints set out "a short and plain statement" of each claim the plaintiff intends to make and the relief he seeks. Fed.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3). Rule 8 advises that all statements within the complaint be "simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 additionally requires that a plaintiff state his claims "in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Overall, a plaintiff will satisfy these pleading requirements as long as the complaint gives each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff is claiming and the factual grounds for each claim. Synergy Real Estate of Sw. Fla., Inc. v. Premier Prop. Mgmt. of Sw. Fla., LLC, 578 F. App'x 959, 961 (11th Cir. 2014).
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. In order to survive a motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff alleges enough facts that "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Mere legal conclusions or recitation of the elements of a claim are not enough. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. District courts must accept all well-pleaded allegations within the complaint as true. Id. Courts must also view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any doubts as to the sufficiency of the complaint in the plaintiff's favor. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994).
The Court additionally has a duty to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint and to afford greater leeway in alleging a claim than what is given to licensed attorneys. Tennyson v. ASCAP, 477 F. App'x 608, 609-10 (11th Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, "a pro se party must follow the rules of procedure and evidence, and the district court has noduty to act as [a pro se party's] lawyer." Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Porter v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 406 F. App'x 460, 462 (11th Cir. 2010). Further, a district court may not "rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Counts 1 and 2 of Harvick's Complaint allege violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, and the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 760.20-.37, respectively. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 24-30). Although the Complaint does not identify which provision or provisions of each statutory scheme Defendants have allegedly violated, Harvick reveals in his responses to Defendants' motions to dismiss that he intends to sue for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), (c), (e), and (f). (Doc. 17, p. 8; Doc. 18, p. 9). The Court will additionally assume that Harvick intends to sue under Florida's counterparts to those provisions, Fla. Stat. §§ 760.23(1), (2), (3), (5), and (7).
"The FHA and the [FFHA] are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal analysis applies to each." Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). In order to prevail on any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, "a plaintiff must demonstrate 'unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.'" Robinson v. Section 23 Prop. Owner's Ass'n, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-675-FtM-29CM, 2014 WL 4358486, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2014) (quoting Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994)). A plaintiff may establishunequal treatment in one of three ways: (1) the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's conduct disparately impacted the plaintiff's race as a group, or (3) the defendant refused to make a reasonable accommodation because of the plaintiff's race. See Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App'x 581, 583 (11th Cir. 2009).
Harvick alleges that Defendants discriminated against his family because his wife and daughter are of Asian descent. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 22, 25, 30). However, Harvick has failed to allege any facts or conduct by Defendants to support a claim of discrimination. The most that the Court is able to infer from the Complaint is that Defendants sued Harvick due to a yard maintenance dispute (id. at pp. 4-7, ¶¶ 4, 7, 25-28, 30) and that Harvick's wife and daughter are Asian (id. at pp. 4-6, ¶¶ 1, 22). There are no allegations of any intentional conduct by Defendants amounting to discrimination based on race, any policies or actions by Defendants that disparately impacted Asian families, or any refusal by Defendants to make a reasonable accommodation because of race. There is simply no link between the conduct Harvick alleges and the race of his wife and daughter. For these reasons, Counts 1 and 2 fail to state claims for discrimination under either the FHA or the FFHA and will be dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants also move to dismiss Harvick's FHA claim as barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 13, pp. 4-5; Doc. 14, p. 4). Defendants correctly state the law that claims made under the FHA must be made within two years from when a reasonably...
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