Harvison v. Little

• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-01103-JDB-jay
• Decision Date: 03 March 2023
• Parties: RAY HARVISON, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTY LITTLE, JODY PICKENS, ROBERT DUCK, and TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

RAY HARVISON, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTY LITTLE, JODY PICKENS, ROBERT DUCK, and TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-01103-JDB-jay

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division

March 3, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JON A YORK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On May 20, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Ray Harvison (“Plaintiff”) filed this Complaint against Christy Little, Jody Pickens, Robert Duck, and the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Division. Docket Entry “D.E.” 1. The Complaint was accompanied by a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. D.E. 3. On July 6, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis D.E. 9. This case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management of all pretrial matters and for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate. Admin. Order 2013-05.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court is required to conduct a screening of the Complaint because Plaintiff sought and received in forma pauperis status. Because the facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims fall beyond the statute of limitations, the Defendants all enjoy immunity from suit, and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS DISMISSAL of all Plaintiff's claims.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action against four Defendants, levying a total of sixteen claims against them.^[1] D.E. 1. The Defendants are: Judge Christy Little, District Attorney General Jody Pickens Director Robert Duck, and the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Division who Plaintiff refers to as “IV-D Agency.” D.E. 1.

The Complaint alleges various claims against these actors in relation to the proceedings against him seeking child support. These claims include federal question claims such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations, procedural and substantive due process violations, 18 U.S.C. § 514 violations, and 31 U.S.C. § 3720 violations. The Complaint also includes state law causes of action such as trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a claim of respondeat superior.

All of Plaintiff's claims stem from state court rulings in a child support action. Plaintiff complains that a state court required Plaintiff to provide a DNA sample in order to determine paternity; the state allegedly failed to provide proper notice of the proceedings against him, and Plaintiff makes various complaints against the existence and management of the state's Title IVD child support program. D.E. 1.

SCREENING STANDARDS

The Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action-

(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-66, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1951) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1950; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied (Jan. 19, 1990); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading'”) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Secretary of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne's claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, 124 S.Ct. 2441, 2446, 159 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”).

Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court has the discretion to refuse to accept allegations in a complaint that are “clearly baseless,” a term encompassing claims that may be described as “fanciful, fantastic, delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational.” Bumpas v. Corr. Corp. of America, No. 3:10-1055, 2011 WL 3841674, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2011) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)). Furthermore, “a district court may, at any time, suasponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999).

ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge recommends a finding that this case be dismissed on multiple grounds. As an initial matter Plaintiff cannot bring an action for damages against the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Division (who Plaintiff refers to as IV-D Agency). The Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon States and their agencies. Bey v. Ohio, No. 1:11-CV-01048, 2011 WL 4007719, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2011) citing Latham v. Office of Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir.2005); Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F.Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.Ohio 1985).

Next, Plaintiff's case should be dismissed in its entirety because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). This doctrine applies where the plaintiff complains of “an injury allegedly caused by the state court decision itself . . . .” Brent v. Wayne County Dept. of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 674 (citing McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Here, Plaintiff is claiming injury from state court rulings in the child support action and is asking this Court to change those rulings. Insofar as he complains that he was unfairly required to provide a DNA sample, required to pay child support, seeks a refund of child support payments already made, or requests that any child support arrearages be eliminated, the claims all stem from the state court judgment obligating Plaintiff to pay child support. The requested relief effectively asks the court to review and reject that judgment. Under Rooker-Feldman, this court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief. See Jackson v. Peters, 81 Fed.Appx. 282, 285-86 (10th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Domestic Rels. Sec., No. 18-1294-JWB-GEB, 2019 WL 1915563, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2019). The “federal district courts ‘do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to statecourt decisions in particular cases arising out ofjudicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in [the United States Supreme] Court.' ” Jackson, 81 Fed.Appx. at 285-86 (affirming dismissal of action challenging judgment regarding child support obligations) (quoting Johnson v. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff's claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decisions in his child support case because they “assert injuries based on the [state court decisions] and, for [him] to prevail, would require the district court to review and reject those [decisions].” See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). This deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because they either seek to overturn the state court decisions or pursue damages from these Defendants for actions taken in compliance with those decisions.

While these grounds are adequate for complete dismissal of this case, there are myriad additional reasons for dismissal. The Magistrate Judge will examine some...