Harward v. the St. Clair
| Decision Date | 31 January 1869 |
| Citation | 51 Ill. 130,1869 WL 5283 |
| Parties | CHARLES HARWARD et al.v.THE ST. CLAIR AND MONROE LEVEE AND DRAINAGE COMPANY et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Monroe county; the Hon. SILAS L. BRYAN, Judge, presiding.
This suit was begun by bill in equity, filed in the Circuit Court of Monroe county, praying an injunction to restrain the collection of certain taxes or assessments, levied by William Wilson, sen., Sidney Todd, William B. Quigley, William Kinney and Hyacinthe Demete, commissioners appointed under and acting by virtue of the powers granted by an act of the general assembly of Illinois, entitled “An Act to provide for the constructing of a levee from Prairie du Pont village, in St. Clair county, to Harrisonville, in Monroe county,” approved February 24th, 1859; and of an act to amend that act, approved February 16, 1865, declaring the commissioners appointed by virtue of the amended act a body corporate, under the name and style of “The St. Clair and Monroe Levee and Drainage Company;” and of an amendment to the amendment, approved February 22, 1867, legalizing the assessments made by the commissioners, and authorizing proceedings to collect unpaid taxes levied under sec. 31 of the act of February 16th, 1865. A further statement of the facts necessary to a full understanding of this case will be found in the opinion.
Mr. THOMAS G. ALLEN, for the appellants.
Mr. WM. H. UNDERWOOD, for the appellees.
By an act of the legislature, approved February 24, 1859, entitled “An Act to provide for constructing a levee from Prairie Du Pont village, in St. Clair county, to Harrisonville, in Monroe county,” five persons named in the act were appointed commissioners to construct the levee, and authorized to ascertain what lands between the river and the bluffs, in the designated district, were liable to overflow, and to levy a tax against the owners of not more than one dollar per acre, for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the act. By another act, passed February 16, 1865 (Pr. Laws of 1865, vol. 2, page 2), these commissioners were declared to be a body corporate, under the name of “The St. Clair and Monroe Levee and Drainage Company,” with perpetual succession, and power to hold real and personal property. The act defines the object of the incorporation to be, to levee and drain a certain district defined in the act, and comprising portions of St. Clair and Monroe counties, and it authorizes the company to assess an annual tax of $20,000 upon the lands in the designated district, in proportion to the benefits to accrue to each tract, and where no benefit is to arise, the land not benefited is not to be assessed. Of this the corporation is left to be the sole judge, as no mode is pointed out for determining that question. The act was never, in any mode, submitted to a vote of the inhabitants of the district embraced in the bill, and the property holders who are to be taxed have no voice in the control of the company, the selection of its officers, or the imposition of a tax. If a vacancy occurs among the corporators, it must be filled at the discretion of the survivors, as no other mode is pointed out, and the corporation is expressly endowed with perpetual succession. Although the object of the corporation will be, when accomplished, a public benefit, yet the corporation itself, in its composition and management, is strictly private. The public, or the persons to be taxed, have no more voice in its control than they have in the management of our railroads and banks. The five persons who constitute this corporation are clothed by this act, if it is valid, with the right to erect and keep up a levee for a certain distance along the Mississippi river, to cause as much or as little work to be done as they may see proper, to collect an annual tax of $20,000, and enforce its payment by the sale of the real estate upon which, in the discretion of the company, it is levied, and to do all this without rendering any account, or incurring any species of responsibility, either to the persons who pay the tax or to any others; and these powers and privileges are conferred without limitation of time.
The bill in the record before us was filed by certain property holders of the district in question, to enjoin the collection of a tax imposed by this company. A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the complainants appealed.
The mere statement of the substance of this extraordinary legislation would seem almost sufficient, of itself, for a disposition of this case, but we will briefly declare the grounds upon which this tax must be held illegal.
The 5th section of the 9th article of our Constitution, provides that “the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages, may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same.”
We believe it has always been understood, that this clause limited local or corporate taxation to local or corporate purposes, and it has always been so construed whenever its construction has come before this court. This case presents the question, whether it was not also intended as a limitation upon the power of the legislature to grant the right of corporate or local taxation to any other persons than the corporate or local authorities.
Without expressing an opinion as to the power of the legislature, itself, directly to impose a corporate tax for a corporate purpose, and without denying its power to create a district for special purposes, from portions of contiguous counties or towns, and providing for the election or appointment, in some proper mode, of public officers in such district, to be clothed with the power of levying taxes for such special purposes, we nevertheless are clearly of the opinion, that this clause does forbid the legislature to grant the power of such local or corporate taxation to any other persons than the local or corporate authorities. Under our constitution,...
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