Harwood v. Johns Hopkins, 5457

• Decision Date: 02 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 5457,5457
• Citation: 130 Md. App. 476,747 A.2d 205
• Parties: Robert J. HARWOOD, Jr. v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

747 A.2d 205

130 Md. App. 476

Robert J. HARWOOD, Jr. v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

No. 5457, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 2, 2000.

Jane E. Brockman, Kingston, RI (Michael E. Kaminkow and Schulman, Treem, Kaminkow & Gilden, P.A., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Gerard D. St. Ours (Estelle A. Fishbein and Frederick G. Savage, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee. ADKINS, Judge.

We are asked in this appeal to decide whether Robert J. Harwood, Jr., appellant, is entitled to receive a diploma from the Johns Hopkins University ("JHU"), appellee. JHU refused to grant appellant his diploma based on appellant's conviction for the murder of a fellow JHU student on the JHU campus. On appellee's motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted judgment in favor of appellee, thereby approving JHU's disciplinary decision to deny appellant a diploma. Appellant noted this appeal.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and for not entering summary judgment in his favor. He argues that 1) appellee had no authority to discipline him because he had completed all of his degree requirements prior to his criminal activity; and 2) appellee denied him due process in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, particularly by failing to take into account appellant's mental condition as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Additionally, appellant contends he is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and punitive damages.

For the reasons that follow we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS

The facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant enrolled at JHU in 1992. By the end of the fall 1995 semester, appellant had completed his course of study. JHU holds a graduation ceremony once annually, at the end of the spring semester. Appellant did not register for classes or pay tuition for the spring 1996 semester. During the spring semester, appellant was living with his grandmother in Rhode Island. Appellant, however, continued to maintain consistent contact with the JHU community. According to an affidavit filed by JHU's Dean of Students, Susan Boswell, appellant manned a student election table on campus in March of 1996. Additionally, Dean Boswell affirmed that she communicated with appellant on numerous occasions during the spring semester regarding complaints of harassment brought by a fellow JHU student, Rex Chao. During the course of these communications, Dean Boswell informed appellant that he would have to notify the campus security or her office when he intended to be on campus. Appellant notified Dean Boswell of his intention to attend a meeting of a student political organization on April 10, 1996.

Appellant attended the meeting. While there, appellant spoke and passed out flyers opposing the candidacy of Mr. Chao for the organization's president. After the meeting, while still on the JHU campus, appellant pursued Mr. Chao and confronted him. At this point, appellant shot and killed Mr. Chao. Appellant pled guilty to murdering Mr. Chao in addition to related handgun violations and is currently serving a thirty-five year prison sentence.

On May 15, 1996, Dean Boswell wrote to appellant and informed him that his diploma would be withheld pending the resolution of his criminal charges. JHU rested its decision to withhold appellant's diploma on provisions of JHU's Student Handbook ("Handbook"). The Handbook provides, in pertinent part:

In order for a student to be approved for graduation, s/he must resolve any outstanding charges of fees or of misconduct... and must have complied with the terms of any penalties imposed as a result of misconduct....

The university does not guarantee the award of a degree or a certificate of satisfactory completion of any course of study or training program to students enrolled in any instructional or training program. The award of degrees and certificates of satisfactory completion is conditioned upon satisfaction of all current degree and instructional requirements at the time of such award, compliance with the university and divisional regulations, as well as performance meeting bona fide expectations of the faculty. (emphasis added).

After Dean Boswell learned of appellant's guilty plea, she wrote him again on July 17, 1997, to notify appellant that the Dean's Office was initiating disciplinary proceedings against him under the provisions of JHU's 1995-96 Student Handbook and Academic Manual. Dean Boswell further informed appellant that she would make her decision on August 1, 1997, and that he could submit any materials that he wished her to consider, and that he or his parents could speak to her by telephone.

At appellant's request, Dean Boswell granted appellant an extension to reply to the charges and provided him with relevant provisions of the Handbook. On August 12, 1997, appellant sent Dean Boswell a letter accompanied by a "Motion to Dismiss Any and All Charges Against Mr. Robert J. Harwood, Jr." In his motion, appellant claimed, inter alia, that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Dean's Office because he was no longer a student, that his actions were not punishable under the Undergraduate Student Conduct Code ("Conduct Code"), and that Dean Boswell "continues to violate [the Conduct Code] by denying [him] a hearing."

Dean Boswell wrote to appellant on August 28, 1997, and informed him that he was expelled from JHU and would not be awarded his degree. In doing so, Dean Boswell informed appellant that he remained subject to the Conduct Code until the award of his diploma. Appellant appealed this decision to Larry G. Benedict, Dean of Homewood Student Affairs, who affirmed Dean Boswell's decision on September 10, 1997.

On May 1, 1998, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking the award of his diploma. With its answer, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion on November 18, 1998, and the hearing judge found that appellant was subject to the disciplinary action of JHU and that JHU did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying appellant his degree. The court entered an order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on November 19, 1998.

Additional facts will be added as necessary to supplement our discussion.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Md. Rule 2-501. In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we review the trial court's ruling as a matter of law. See Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). In other words, we must determine whether the trial court was legally correct. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tufts, 118 Md.App. 180, 186, 702 A.2d 422 (1997), cert. denied, 349 Md. 104, 707 A.2d 89 (1998). Additionally, we review the same information from the record and decide the same issues of law as the trial court. See Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990).

While "summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action is `the exception rather than the rule,' summary judgment may be warranted when there is no dispute" of material facts. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md.App. 690, 695, 647 A.2d 1297 (1994),cert. denied, 337 Md. 214, 652 A.2d 670 (1995) (quoting Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md.App. 112, 117, 436 A.2d 493 (1981)). The moving party has the burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Bond v. NIBCO, Inc., 96 Md.App. 127, 135, 623 A.2d 731 (1993). Once the movant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify "with particularity the material facts that are disputed." Md. Rule 2-501(b). As the trial judge correctly noted, neither party in the present controversy disputes any material facts. Therefore, resolution of this controversy by summary judgment is appropriate.

B.

JHU acted within its power when it expelled appellant and refused to issue him a diploma.

Both parties claim they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellant contends he is entitled to summary judgment and the award of his diploma because, at the time of his crimes, he had completed all of his required course work and was no longer subject to the disciplinary authority of JHU. Appellee contends that summary judgment in its favor was properly granted because its "policy clearly empowered it to withhold a degree from [appellant] even though he had finished his course work prior to committing murder on its campus." We agree with appellee, and hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment in its favor.

The relationship between a student and a private university is largely contractual in nature. See Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 186 N.J.Super. 548, 453 A.2d 263, 273 (1982) (citing cases); see also Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 636, 57 A. 14 (1904). "When a student is duly admitted by a private university... there is an implied contract between the student and the university that, if [the student] complies with the terms prescribed by the university, [the student] will obtain [a] degree." Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834, 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962); see 15A Am.Jur.2d Colleges and Universities § 31 at 292-93 (1976). The "`terms of the contract are contained in the brochures, course offering bulletins, and other official statements, policies and publications'" of a university, and the university is required to conduct its hearings and enforce its policies consistent with the terms. Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F.Supp. 238, 242 (D.Vt.1994) (quoting Merrow v....