Harwood v. Talbert
| Decision Date | 28 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 25210.,25210. |
| Citation | 136 Idaho 672,39 P.3d 612 |
| Parties | Allan HARWOOD, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Katuscha TALBERT, a/k/a Katuscha Lane, a/k/a Katja Lane, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Mitchell Law Office, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. John T. Mitchell argued.
Stephen M. Ayers, Coeur d'Alene, argued for respondent.
The Court's prior opinion dated December 20, 2000, is hereby withdrawn
This case arose from a property dispute between two adjacent landowners regarding the use of a road, located on one owner's property, to access a portion of the other owner's property. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the claimant, Allen Harwood ("Harwood"), determining Harwood possessed an express easement to use the road. On appeal, we affirm the adjudication of the easement, but we vacate the district court's award of attorney fees to Harwood.
Allen Harwood purchased parcel 27 of Highland Springs subdivision located near St. Maries, Idaho, in 1991. In 1992, Katuscha Talbert ("Talbert") and her former husband, bought parcels 28, 29, 31 and part of 30, which are adjacent to Harwood's parcel. A private road allows access to the southern portions of Harwood's and Talbert's properties. However, steep ground in the middle of Harwood's property makes it impossible to drive from the southern portion to the northern portion. The northern portion of Harwood's land is only accessible by a road that crosses Talbert's property. The dispute between the parties arises from Harwood's use of the road on Talbert's property. Harwood used this road to access the northern portion of his property from 1991 until 1992 when Talbert installed a locking gate and informed Harwood he had no right to enter her land to use the road.
In 1977, a written easement had been executed between the former adjacent landowners. The easement included a map titled Exhibit A showing the land and the roads that were upon the land at the time. Harwood asserted that the written easement allowed him to use the road in question to access the northern portion of his land. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute amicably, Harwood filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish an express easement across Talbert's land or, in the alternative, an easement by implication, necessity or prescription. Talbert answered pro se, asserting a counterclaim against Harwood for pointing a loaded shotgun at her. The district court dismissed the counterclaim because Talbert had specified the amount of punitive damages in her pleadings, contrary to I.C. § 6-1604. Talbert then retained counsel and filed an amended answer, and a motion for summary judgment contesting the easement.
Following a hearing on Talbert's motion for summary judgment, the district court granted partial summary judgment to Harwood. The district court found that the road in question existed at the time the easement was granted by the developers, therefore, Harwood possessed an express easement to use the road. Talbert filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied.
A bench trial was held on May 1-2, 1996, to determine the remaining issues of whether Talbert was entitled to maintain the gate across the road, the extent of the express easement granted to Harwood and the recovery of damages. Following the bench trial, the court determined that Talbert could maintain an unlocked gate across the road, but the gate must be left open during the winter. Although Harwood failed to prove actual damages, the court awarded Harwood one dollar in nominal damages. In addition, the court awarded punitive damages, costs and attorney fees to Harwood.
The district court further ordered Harwood to have the centerline of the access road surveyed in a "reasonably diligent manner" and to submit an amended judgment containing a metes and bounds description of the easement as determined by the survey. Harwood submitted a proposed judgment, which failed to include the metes and bounds description as required by the district court. Talbert filed a notice of appeal. This Court directed that an amended judgment containing the metes and bounds description be entered in order to have an appealable judgment. In July of 1999, the district court entered the proper judgment, and in September 1999, Talbert filed an amended notice of appeal. Following the entry of an order taxing costs, the district court filed the Third Amended Judgment.
Harwood then filed a motion with the district court for additional attorney fees for work related to the survey. The trial court granted Harwood's motion and Talbert filed a second amended notice of appeal to include this ruling.
Talbert contends that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing her counterclaim. She argues that the district court should not have dismissed her counterclaim for alleging a claim for punitive damages, but rather simply should have stricken the allegation from the pleading. Harwood, in turn, asserts that the district court properly dismissed Talbert's counterclaim since Talbert knew that Harwood did not request a hearing on the motion and Talbert could have requested one. Harwood also submits that Talbert could have raised this issue to the district court, by moving for reconsideration of the dismissal, rather than filing an amended answer without asserting the counterclaim anew, or by bringing the claim by a separate action.
Talbert's counterclaim against Harwood requested punitive damages in the amount of $100,000 for pointing a loaded shotgun at her. Harwood filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion to strike or a motion for sanctions on the basis that the counterclaim had specified the amount of punitive damages in violation of I.C. § 6-1604 and I.R.C.P 9(g). The motion stated that no oral argument was requested. The following day, the district court dismissed the counter-claim.
Idaho Code § 6-1604 provides that:
In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall allow the motion to amend the pleadings if the moving party establishes at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
I.R.C.P. 9(g) provides that when punitive damages are claimed that no dollar amount or figure should be included beyond a statement that the jurisdictional dollar amount of the controversy is satisfied.
Talbert argues that the district court should have had a hearing on Harwood's motion rather than summarily dismissing the counterclaim. I.R.C.P. 41(b) provides that the defendant, Harwood since this was Talbert's counterclaim, may move for dismissal of an action when the plaintiff, Talbert, has not complied with the rules of civil procedure or any order of the court. We affirm the district court's finding that as a matter of law the counterclaim filed by Talbert was contrary to I.R.C.P. 9(g) and I.C. § 6-1604. Since neither Harwood nor Talbert requested a hearing on the motion, it was not necessary for the district court to hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Further, as Harwood points out, Talbert could have filed a motion to reconsider and requested a hearing on that motion.
Talbert also argues that the district court erred in dismissing the entire counterclaim rather than striking the portion of the pleading specifying the punitive damage claim. To support her argument Talbert cites Mikesell v. Newworld Development Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 878, 840 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Ct.App. 1992). In Mikesell, the complaint requested $10,000 in punitive damages, however, evidently neither party was aware that I.C. § 6-1604 prohibited such a request at the time of the trial and the issue was fully tried. Mikesell, 122 Idaho at 878,840 P.2d at 1100. After the trial, the district court refused to award punitive damages to the Mikesells because of the Mikesells' noncompliance with I.C. § 6-1604(2) and rule 9(g). The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred in dismissing the punitive damages claim after it had been tried, holding that where an issue is improperly raised in the pleadings but tried by the parties without objection, it will be treated as having been properly raised. Id.
This case differs from Mikesell in that Talbert's counterclaim was dismissed long before the trial occurred, not after being litigated at trial. Here, Talbert's counterclaim clearly requested punitive damages in her initial pleading and stated the amount requested contrary to I.C. § 6-1604 and I.R.C.P. 9(g).
Talbert raised the counterclaim in the summer of 1995 when she was representing herself pro se. Harwood filed his motion to dismiss the claim, strike the counterclaim or to impose some other sanction for violating I.C. § 6-1604 and I.R.C.P. 9(g). The district judge acted immediately by granting the motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The counterclaim was dismissed early enough that the statute of limitation would not have constituted a bar. The dismissal does not appear to be with prejudice, thus...
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