Harzfeld's, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1953
• Docket Number: No. 8138.,8138.
• Citation: 116 F. Supp. 512
• Parties: HARZFELD'S, Inc. v. OTIS ELEVATOR CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

116 F. Supp. 512

HARZFELD'S, Inc. v. OTIS ELEVATOR CO.

No. 8138.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

October 30, 1953.

William G. Boatright, David L. Sheffrey, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Dietrich, Tyler & Davis, Kansas City, Mo., McKnight, McLaughlin & Dunn, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

RIDGE, District Judge.

Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint is premised on grounds identical with those leveled at plaintiff's original complaint, as to which this Court ruled adversely to defendant's contentions, in our previous memorandum. 114 F.Supp. 480. We believe such ruling consonant with the law of Missouri, and perceive no reason for departing therefrom or for further commentary thereon. Notwithstanding defendant's painstaking effort to distinguish the factual situation in the case at bar from that considered in the authorities cited in our previous memorandum, we find it neither convincing nor legally sound. Identity of facts does not spell out the law of a case. Applicable law is ascertained, not from facts alone, but from a consideration of persuasive data that is available from previous adjudication of rules, and such compelling inferences or logical implications therefrom, and other related adjudications and considered pronouncements, as will lead to the rule determinative of a factual situation. When the Missouri authorities cited in our previous memorandum are objectively and impartially considered, we think Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 924, is revealed as being consonant with Missouri law.

Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint is overruled.

Turning to a more troublesome problem, defendant moves to strike all allegations relating to wanton and reckless conduct and punitive damages from the amended complaint. In this respect, it should be remembered that plaintiff's amended complaint purports to state a single claim in but one count, and that no attempt is made to distinguish acts of wantonness from acts of negligence. This obstrusity clouding plaintiff's theory of relief reflects the equally ambiguous implications found in several Missouri state court decisions regarding recovery of punitive damages for tortious conduct. We shall briefly analyze the salient aspects of what we consider controlling state authority on that subject.

Any such analysis must first concern itself with inherent distinctions between negligence and willfulness. Negligence, by its nature, implies wrongful inadvertence. "Willful, wanton and reckless" conduct connotes some degree of wrongful, conscious intent. As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court, in Evans v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1921, 289 Mo. 493, 233 S.W. 397, loc. cit. 399, 400:

"(An) act cannot be both negligent and intentional at the same time. Such allegations are inconsistent. Raming v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 477, loc. cit. 508, 57 S.W. 268; O'Brien v. St. Louis Transit Co., 212 Mo. 59, 110 S.W. 705, 15 Ann.Cas. 86. * * *

"Willfulness implies intentional wrongdoing. A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose, or in malicious disregard of the rights of others. Recklessness is an indifference to the rights of others and an indifference whether wrong or injury is done or not. As we understand the words `conscious disregard of the life and bodily safety,' they add nothing to the words `willful, wanton, and reckless,' and are included within the meaning of those words. As applied to an act, they necessarily mean that such act was intentionally done without regard to the rights of others, and in full realization of the probable results thereof." (Italics ours.)

To the same effect, State ex rel. Kurn v. Hughes, 1941, 348 Mo. 177, 153 S.W.2d 46, loc. cit. 51.

It can thus be understood that "willful, wanton and reckless" conduct is not negligent conduct, the former implying intentional wrongdoing and the latter implying inadvertence. The categories are, as stated in both the Evans and Kurn cases, supra, mutually exclusive. The difference is not one of degree, for it is well settled that degrees of negligence are not recognized in Missouri. Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1896, 135 Mo. 661, 37 S.W. 904, 34 L.R.A. 492; Reeves v. Lutz, 1914, 179 Mo.App. 61, 162 S.W. 280; Cumming v. Allied Hotel Corporation, Mo.App.1940, 144 S.W.2d 177; Ramel v. Kansas City Public Service Co., Mo.App.1945, 187 S.W.2d 492. The only possible conclusion to be reached is that willful, wanton and reckless conduct is one tort, while negligence is another. Hence, the difference is one not of degree but, quite clearly, a difference in kind. Nichols v. Bresnahan, 1948, 357 Mo. 1126, 212 S.W.2d 570; Plant v. Thompson, 1949, 359 Mo. 391, 221 S.W. 2d 834.

The cold line of demarcation between wanton misconduct and negligence is not always easy to define, and, no doubt, circumstances sufficient to constitute one or the other may be viewed differently by men of ordinary prudence and perception. Though this fact does not alter the cleavage between these two separate and antithetical theories of tort law, it does perhaps account for the misleading language sometimes found in court decisions. In this regard, we...