Haseltine v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1922
• Docket Number: No. 3049.,3049.
• Citation: 240 S.W. 815
• Parties: HASELTINE v. FARMERS' MUT. FIRE INS. CO. INS. CO. OF BILLINGS, CHRISTIAN COUNTY, MO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

240 S.W. 815

HASELTINE v. FARMERS' MUT. FIRE INS. CO. INS. CO. OF BILLINGS, CHRISTIAN COUNTY, MO.

No. 3049.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 8, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Green County; Guy D. Kirby, Judge.

Action by Lincoln Haseltine against the Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Billings, Christian County, Mo. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wright & Ruffin, of Springfield, for appellant.

W. P. Sullivan, of Billings, and 0. E. Gorman, of Springfield, for respondent.

BRADLEY, J.

Plaintiff sued to recover on a policy issued by defendant. The cause was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts, and the finding and judgment went for defendant, and plaintiff appealed.

Defendant is a farmers' mutual fire insurance company organized and incorporated under what is now section 6464 et seq., R. S. 1919, with its principal office at Billings, Mo. Defendant had authority to do business in Christian, Greene, Lawrence, and Stone counties. Plaintiff made application to defendant for insurance against loss or damage by fire or lightning. This application appears in form as follows:

"I, the undersigned, hereby apply for insurance against loss or damage by fire or lightning to the amount of twenty-nine hundred dollars in the Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Billings, Christian county, Mo., on the following property owned by the undersigned while located on ____ of section 25, township 29, range 23. Greene county, Mo., and not elsewhere, for a period of five years from date. The insurance then to be renewed at the expense of the company, and I hereby accede to the constitution and by-laws of the above-named company, and promise to faithfully adhere to and carry them out.

                             "Description of Property
                  On stone dwelling ......................  $1,500
                  On house property and one piano ........     525
                  Implement shed .........................      50
                  On stone barn ..........................     625
                  On implements and machinery, vehicles and
                   harness ...............................     200
                                                            ______
                     Total amount of insurance ...........  $2,900"
                

On this application defendant issued its policy as follows:

                  "$2900.00       Renewal.         No. 415
                  "Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company of
                      Billings, Christian County, Missouri
                

"Lincoln Haseltine, R. 7, Springfield, Mo.: According to application, you are a member of the above company, and insured since October 7, 1914, against loss by fire and lightning, for the sum of twenty-nine hundred dollars, on the following property, located on ____ of section 25, township 29, range 23, Greene county, Missouri.

                "Description of Property
                  On stone dwelling ..........................  $1,500
                  On house property, and one piano ...........    525
                  On implement shed ..........................     50
                  On stone barn ..............................    625
                  On farm implements and machinery vehicles
                   and harness ...............................    200
                                                                _____
                      Total amount of insurance ..............  $2,900"
                

Attached to the policy is a permit, as follows:

"Permission is hereby granted holder of policy 415 to place additional insurance to the amount of $1,500 on dwelling and $500 on household goods."

On November 30, 1915, while plaintiff's policy was in full force and effect, a fire occurred which destroyed the house, household goods, piano, and farm implements. The total loss as listed in the policy and application amounted to $2,225. Defendant paid $1,668.75, three-fourths of the loss, under an agreement that such payment would not prejudice its right to contest the payment of the remaining one-fourth. Plaintiff contends that defendant is liable for the full $2,225, while defendant contends that it is only liable for three-fourths of that amount, and that, having paid three-fourths, it has fully discharged its obligation.

The application, the policy, and defendant's constitution and by-laws, all a part of the contract, must be considered together in determining and construing the contract of insurance. The provisions of the constitution and by-laws material here are as follows:

Article 3: "The business of the company shall be conducted upon the Mutual Assessment Plan, and no premium shall be paid. An assessment is to be levied in case of actual loss by fire or lightning."

Section 3 of article 4: "Duties of the Secretary.—It shall be the duty of the secretary to keep a full and correct record of all business transacted by the company. He shall keep a list of all property insured in the company, which shall contain a full description of the same. If building, of what material, size and value, where situated, giving county township, range and section, if dwelling, by whom occupied, also what house property and of what value. * * *"

Article 6: "All property insured in this company shall be listed at its true value and in case of loss by fire or lightning this company agrees to make good three-fourths of the amount damaged or destroyed thereby."

Article 11: "This company shall not be liable beyond three-fourths of the actual cash value of any building, or any live stock, at the time of any loss, or damage thereto occurs, or three-fourths of the interest of the insured therein, and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated according to the actual cash value and shall in no event exceed three-fourths of the amount it would then cost to rebuild or replace the same. * * *"

Under the constitution defendant could in case of loss repair or rebuild, but was liable for only three-fourths of the costs of repairing or rebuilding. Prior to the loss which gave rise to this cause plaintiff had sustained a loss under his policy, and in that case defendant repaired and plaintiff bore one-fourth of the cost.

Plaintiff, as we gather from the record, seeks to recover on two theories: First, that what is now section 6229, R. S. 1919, is applicable to defendant; and, second, if said section is not applicable, he can still recover, because the amount he claims under his policy is much less than three-fourths of the true value of the property destroyed. Defendant's contention is that plaintiff's property insured by it was listed for the purposes of the policy at its true value, and that by the terms of the contract it is liable only for three-fourths of this value as listed. It is stipulated that the dwelling destroyed was worth $5,000; that the household goods and piano were worth $3,514.95; and that the farm implements were worth $936. Section 6229, to which reference is made supra, provides that, in all suits brought upon policies of insurance against loss or damage by fire, the defendant shall not be permitted to deny that the property insured was worth at the time the full amount for which it was insured, and in case of total loss the measure of damages shall be the amount for which the property was insured less depreciation.

It is not necessary to determine whether section 6229 is applicable to defendant, because defendant is not seeking to avoid liability for less than it insured plaintiff's property, but says that $1,668.75 was the amount for which it insured the property which was destroyed. This construction of the policy is based upon the contract, all parts considered together. Article 6 of defendant's constitution provides that all property shall be listed at its true value. Where listed? Everywhere that a list was required would be the only reasonable answer. A list appears in Plaintiff's application and in his policy. By section 3 of article 4 the secretary was required to keep a list of a:1 property insured in the company, which shall contain a full description of the same; if a building of what material, size, value, etc. It stands admitted in the stipulation that the property destroyed was listed in the application and policy at much less than its actual value. Plaintiff in effect contends, however, that there is no list in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution. He argues that, since his application was "for insurance against loss or damage by fire to the amount of $2,900," and that, since the policy provides that he "was insured against loss by fire for the sum of $2,900," that $2,900 should be construed to mean the amount of his insurance, and not the value of his property. He props this construction with the conclusion of the policy, to wit: "Total amount of insurance $2,900." In view of the constitution requiring insured property to be listed at its true value, the lists appearing, and the expressions in the application and " policy indicating that the amount of the insurance is $2,900, we hold that the contract of insurance is ambiguous. This gets us to the real merits. It was stipulated subject to its competency as follows:

"That at the time of filing application with defendant, and at the time of the issuance of the policy by the company and its acceptance by plaintiff, plaintiff was aware that, in event of a total loss of any item covered by said policy, the company proposed and intended to pay three-fourths of the value thereof only, as shown by the value placed thereon in the application."

Parol evidence is not admissible to construe a written contract that is unambiguous and plain on its face, but, if the language is ambiguous or doubtful, extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine its meaning. National Bank of Commerce v. Elevator Co., 268 Mo. 547, 188 S. W. 117. If the terms of a contract are susceptible of more than one meaning, so that reasonable men may fairly and honestly differ in the construction thereof, extrinsic evidence is admissible to arrive at the true intention. Interior Linseed Co. v. Paint Co., 273 Mo. 433, 202 S. W. 566. The general rule, of course, is that parol evidence is not admissible to aid in the construction...