Hash's Estate v. Henderson

Decision Date08 March 1973
Docket NumberNo. 11087,11087
Citation507 P.2d 99,109 Ariz. 174
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE of V. L. HASH, aka Vivian L. Hash, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Laurens L. HENDERSON, Superior Court Judge sitting in Probate, Maricopa County, Arizona, et al.; and the heirs at law of Ossie L. CASSELL, Deceased, Real Parties in Interest, Respondents.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Hash, Cantor & Tomanek, Phoenix, for petitioner.

Charles T. Stevens, Phoenix, for respondent Laurens L. Henderson.

Shimmel, Hill & Bishop, P.C., by Richard B. Johnson, Phoenix, for real parties in interest.

Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty., by David B. Krom, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for intervenor Wilson D. Palmer.

HAYS, Chief Justice.

This is a special action initially brought in this court by the executors of the estate of V. L. Hash, deceased. Because of the novelty of the legal questions involved and of the possible importance to several hundred persons, we accepted jurisdiction on January 2, 1973, and on the same day granted leave to the clerk of the Superior Court to intervene.

V. L. Hash was a highly respected attorney, practicing in Phoenix for many years until his death several years ago. He had a large practice in divorce cases among persons in the lower economic strata. It is a truism, not only in Phoenix, but in most of the United States, that in divorce cases brought on behalf of people who are having a hard time making ends meet, the plaintiff's lawyer is not likely to be paid for his work unless he gets his fee in advance. Since lawyers have nothing to sell but their time, there is a limit to how much free work they can undertake. Some parts of this problem have been partially solved by the establishment of legal aid and 'store-front' offices where the poor may get help from qualified lawyers without pay, but in the days of Mr. Hash's practice, such innovations were not very extensive.

Rule 58(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., provides that in certain cases, including divorce cases, the judge shall promptly settle and approve the form of judgment, which shall be approved and signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of the court. That constitutes the entry of such judgment, and the judgment is not effective before such entry.

There are always times when it is necessary that the trial of a divorce action be expedited, even though the attorney's fee cannot be produced with equal expedition. As a result, until a few years ago, lawyers often tried divorce cases before receiving their fees; they secured a divorce decision, prepared the decree, and had it approved and signed by the trial judge. However, once the client had his divorce, the fee would be low on the list of the client's priorities, unless the lawyer retained some leverage that he could apply to enforce payment. The solution adopted by Mr. Hash was the same as that adopted by most lawyers not only throughout Arizona, but in many other states as well. That solution was to refuse to file the decree until payment of his fee was received and to tell his client that he was not divorced until the decree was filed. No aspersions are intended to be cast upon Mr. Hash's modus operandi, since this was a fairly universal practice during his years at the bar. This practice no longer prevails in this state.

The result of this procedure, over a period of years prior to Mr. Hash's death, is that there were found in his effects nearly two hundred signed divorce decrees that had never been filed. This means that there are nearly two hundred couples whose divorce decrees have been signed but who are not divorced.

It was Mr. Hash's custom to explain this procedure to each and every client for whom he obtained a divorce, but it is by no means clear that all of his clients understood him, believed him, or even remembered the advice. It is also probable that in those cases where the divorce was granted by default, the defaulting party knew nothing about the requirement that the decree be filed before the divorce became effective. Many of them may have remarried, thinking that they had been divorced. In one case, a client remarried and was charged with bigamy. The production of the decree by the executors, and its filing by the defense counsel, enabled the man to get the criminal charges dropped.

These two hundred divorces were obtained in the period between 1927 and 1955, which means that nearly twenty years have elapsed since the most recent divorce, and over forty-five years since the earliest. In the natural course of events, some of the parties have died, some have moved, and some have left the state and perhaps even the country.

The executors have been diligent in their attempts to trace the parties by checking present and past city directories, telephone directories, utility connection records, etc. They have sent, by regular mail, letters to every client or party whose address appears in Mr. Hash's records. Not one of the parties has been located in this way.

(While referring to these matters as divorces, it should be understood that they also include separate maintenance actions).

Mr. Hash's estate has been open for several years and the residuary legatees are demanding distribution. The executors fear that they may, by distributing the assets of the estate, become personally liable to the unknown parties to these divorces, in case they are damaged by any action or inaction of the executors. The executors, for that reason, are demanding that the legatees first execute indemnity bonds for the amounts which they receive in distribution.

In Mr. Hash's records of these divorces, there appear notations, probably in his handwriting, in some cases to the effect that the divorce was no longer desired and the decree should not be filed. Some of these notations indicate that they were the result of telephone messages from the parties. In other cases there are written letters to that effect from one or both of the parties involved. There is no way to ascertain the authenticity of either the calls or the letters. The petition filed in this court, and duly verified, states that from the knowledge of the executors it is quite possible that many of the parties have resumed their marriages and do not want to be divorced.

The executors express concern over the impact upon various matters if the decrees are now filed nunc pro tunc as permitted by Rule 58(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The matters are: social security payments, veterans' benefits, marital status, retirement benefits, inheritance by children of the parties, property rights, etc.

The executors further state that they filed with the Superior Court, in the estate of which they are executors, a petition for instructions as to what to do with the above-mentioned divorce decrees, that testimony was taken, that the heirs were notified, and that the probate judge entered an order requiring the executors to:

(a) Send notice by certified mail to the last known addresses of the parties to the divorce proceedings, and

(b) Advertise for four successive weeks in two Phoenix and two Tucson newspapers, and

(c) To see that the notice and advertisements require all parties to appear on February 21 to show cause why all of the decrees should not be filed nunc pro tunc with the Maricopa County Superior Court Clerk.

The executors do not want to follow that procedure because:

(a) There is no provision for an indemnity bond.

(b) It will divorce couples who are living together in reliance upon the absence of a divorce decree and Mr. Hash's advice that the divorce was not in effect.

(c) The probate judge involved has no jurisdiction to enter orders in the divorce actions.

(d) A better solution than that ordered by the Superior Court is to 'lodge' the decrees with the clerk of that court, to remain there until one of the parties to the divorce requests the filing.

(e) Since none of the letters previously addressed to the last known addresses were delivered, it is absured to go to the expense of sending certified letters to the same addresses, some of which are vacate lots from which the buildings have been removed.

The probate judge, the clerk of the Superior Court, and the heirs of Mr. Hash have responded or intervened in favor of the procedure set out in the probate order of which the executors complain.

We have studied the possibilities carefully. It is difficult to anticipate every possible problem that may arise from the above situation. The two most easily discernible are (1) parties to these divorces who have, since the date of the divorce decree, become reconciled and are still living together, or were until the death of one, and (2) parties who have remarried. It is obvious that filing the decrees and entering them nunc pro tunc will cause consternation to person in class (1), and allowing the decrees to remain somehow in limbo will make bigamy charges and other problems for those in class (2). There is no one complete solution.

It is, however, clear that filing these decrees and making the entry nunc pro tunc will cause problems for the least number of persons. Bigamy charges will be eliminated for all time. This is the most dangerous and difficult situation. Probably the only persons who will be harmed are the parties who have gone back together, and their harm is slight because (a) most of them will never know of the filing of the decree, and (b) the Superior Court has equitable power, on a proper showing by the parties, to set aside the divorce decree for the very obvious reason that the parties relied upon its not being filed when they decided to live together later.

Basically, therefore, the order of the probate judge is the practical and most just solution. Slight modifications, however, must be made in his order:

1. The publishing, as ordered in the four principal Arizona newspapers, is a proper requirement. Friends of the...

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14 cases
  • State v. Payne
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • July 24, 2009
    ...has unlimited power to impose punishment or reward righteousness as the occasion is deemed suitable. Hash's Estate v. Henderson, 109 Ariz. 174, 178-79, 507 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1973). A superior court "cannot, for example, in [a] criminal case enter an order giving damages to the complaining wi......
  • Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • December 21, 2022
    ...(emphasis added) (quoting Black v. Indus. Comm'n , 83 Ariz. 121, 125, 317 P.2d 553 (1957), overruled in part by Hash's Est. v. Henderson , 109 Ariz. 174, 507 P.2d 99 (1973) ); see also Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Mosher , 48 Ariz. 552, 563, 64 P.2d 1025 (1936) (The "office [of a nunc pro tunc o......
  • DeForest v. DeForest
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • January 24, 1985
    ...responsible for the delay in the instant case and cannot obtain a nunc pro tunc rendition. We note, however, that in Estate of Hash v. Henderson, 109 Ariz. 174, 507 P.2d 99, modified, 109 Ariz. 258, 508 P.2d 334 (1973), our supreme court permitted entries of 200 dissolution decrees nunc pro......
  • Valley Nat. Bank of Arizona v. Meneghin, 14683
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 22, 1981
    ...tunc, it is correct. But any suggestion that a judgment nunc pro tunc has no retroactive effect is incorrect. See Estate of Hash v. Henderson, 109 Ariz. 174, 507 P.2d 99 (1973), overruling Black v. Industrial Commission, In Arizona, judgments can be both rendered and entered nunc pro tunc. ......
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