Hashop v. Rockwell Space Operations Co.

Decision Date09 November 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. G-94-111.
Citation867 F. Supp. 1287
PartiesRicky Dan HASHOP, Cathy Hines-Torregano, Ubaldo Garcia, and James Spencer, Jr. v. ROCKWELL SPACE OPERATIONS COMPANY.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

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F. Eric Fryar, Susman Godfrey, Houston, TX, for plaintiffs.

Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Gary David Eisenstat, Figari & Davenport, Dallas, TX, for defendant.

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KENT, District Judge.

This is an action brought by Plaintiffs Ricky Dan Hashop ("Hashop"), Cathy Hines-Torregano ("Hines-Torregano"), Ubaldo Garcia ("Garcia"), and James Spencer, Jr. ("Spencer") pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. In addition, Plaintiff Hashop has also brought an FLSA retaliatory discharge claim against Defendant Rockwell Space Operations Company ("RSOC") pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 215. Before the Court now are cross-motions for summary judgment brought by Plaintiffs and Defendant. Plaintiffs urge the Court to grant partial summary judgment against Defendant RSOC on the grounds that it does not have an affirmative defense of exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213. By contrast, Defendant argues that the Court should grant summary judgment against all of Plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs are exempt from the overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA because they are exempt "professionals" under 29 U.S.C. § 213, (2) Plaintiffs' FLSA claims are barred by the appropriate statute of limitations, and (3) Plaintiff Hashop's retaliatory discharge claim is invalid. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

1. Factual Background

On January 13, 1993, Plaintiffs filed this purported class action, seeking recovery for uncompensated overtime and retaliation (Hashop only) under the FLSA. This Court denied class certification by an Order on April 6, 1994 and restricted Plaintiffs to their individual claims. Plaintiffs are Network Communication Systems ("NSS") Instructors, who train Space Shuttle ground control personnel during simulated missions. Plaintiffs simulate, and provide instruction on, all communications, data, tracking, and telemetry information that ordinarily flows between the Space Shuttle and the Johnson Space Center Mission Control Center ("Mission Control").1

Mission Control in Houston, Texas tracks, maintains contact with, and controls the Space Shuttle through a network of satellites, ground stations, the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland ("Goddard"), and the White Sands NASA Ground Terminal in New Mexico ("White Sands"). This network makes it possible for Mission Control to send or receive tracking data, telemetry, commands, and voice communications with the Space Shuttle. During simulations, Mission Control remains unchanged; the actual equipment and control personnel are the same for both simulated and real missions. The astronauts and flight crew are aboard the Shuttle Mission Simulator ("Simulator") instead of the actual Space Shuttle. The NSS Instructors provide the link between Mission Control and the shuttle mission Simulator during simulations. As NSS Instructors, Plaintiffs simulate all tracking data, commands, and voice communications between the Simulator and Mission Control. The NSS Instructors also simulate the activities that would ordinarily occur at Goddard, White Sands, and remote ground stations.

Plaintiffs' overall job goal as NSS Instructors is to train Mission Control personnel by simulating the foregoing systems in integrated simulations of Space Shuttle missions. This goal comprises four discrete activities: scripting, console work, post-console work, and support activities. The first of these, scripting, involves the development of the outline for simulated missions. Representatives from each group within RSOC's training division meet to develop mission scripts. RSOC's customer, the Simulation Supervisor ("Simsup"), moderates these meetings. Depending on their work schedules, each Plaintiff takes his or her turn serving as the NSS representative at script meetings unaccompanied by a supervisor.

Once the script is complete, Plaintiffs run the "console," from which they perform NSS functions during simulated missions. The console consists of nine computer screens, three keyboards, light pens, and voice communication interfaces. The console allows Plaintiffs to monitor and alter NSS functions to achieve mission objectives. Plaintiffs also make and receive voice calls with the Simsup, Simulator instructors, Mission Control, and the simulation control area adjacent to Mission Control. In addition, NSS Instructors are responsible for helping to "troubleshoot" problems that arise with the NSS equipment during simulations.

After the simulated mission is over, Plaintiffs take part in debriefing Mission Control. During debriefing, Plaintiffs tell Mission Control personnel whether or not they handled simulated NSS anomalies correctly. In addition, they try to determine if their simulated anomalies faithfully reproduce real ones; if a simulated anomaly is not as realistic as it can be, Plaintiffs attempt to change future simulations.

Finally, Plaintiffs also engage in various activities that support their goal of training Mission Control personnel for upcoming missions. These tasks involve writing workbooks and technical guides and travelling to sites to learn more about the network they simulate.

Plaintiff Hashop worked at RSOC from June, 1990 to November, 1993, when he was terminated. Hashop claims that he began voicing his concerns about uncompensated overtime over two years before he was discharged, primarily in the first half of 1991, when he called the RSOC ombudsman. He also confronted his supervisor, Roger Lawley, at a staff meeting in the same time period.

During the latter part of 1991, Hashop received a Performance Appraisal that stated he did not meet all of his job requirements, though the same report also praised him for other aspects of his job performance. He was consequently placed on a formal Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"), which he successfully completed ahead of schedule by early 1992. This result was confirmed by an internal memo from Lawley that also warned Hashop to sustain his new level of performance.

Throughout 1992, Hashop managed to do just that, but beginning in 1993, his problems with follow-through on the job began to resurface. Jerry Angeley, the supervisor of RSOC's training support group, warned Hashop verbally and in writing about his problems on May 5, June 23, and July 29, 1993. On September 2, 1993, Hashop received a negative performance rating and was placed on a second PIP, which he successfully completed on October 6, 1993. Hashop complained that his performance was not being fairly evaluated, and he accused Angeley of lying about his performance. As a result, Hashop decided to secretly taperecord a conversation with Angeley in October, 1993.

In that same month, Hashop complained about his PIP and Angelely's alleged lying to RSOC's Human Resources Department member Melissa Vaughn. Notably, Hashop did not complain to Vaughn about overtime compensation. Vaughn investigated Hashop's complaint and listened to his secretly recorded audiotape of Angeley. When she learned that Hashop's recording violated both NASA and RSOC rules, Vaughn informed Lawley, who concluded that the accusations against Angeley were unfounded. Believing Hashop's conduct to be disruptive to the employer-employee relationship, Lawley and Vaughn determined that Hashop should be terminated. On November 4, 1993, RSOC discharged Hashop.

2. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is material if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is a genuine issue for trial that must be decided by the trier of fact. In other words, summary judgment should not be granted if the evidence indicates that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor. Credibility determinations, weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of reasonable inferences are left to the trier of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at 585-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56; Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987).

Where the moving party has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... The nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue...

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