Haskell v. Champion

• Decision Date: 31 March 1860
• Parties: HASKELL et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. CHAMPION et al., Defendants in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

30 Mo. 136

HASKELL et al., Plaintiffs in Error,

v.CHAMPION et al., Defendants in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1860.

1. One B. F. C. C., member of a partnership firm doing business under the style of “C. & Co.,” executed a promissory note in his own name, B. F. C. C., and procured the signatures of persons not members of said firm as endorsers for his accommodation; before procuring the sale of the note, and without the knowledge of said endorsers, he added to the signature the words ““& Co.”--thus making it “B. F. C. C. & Co.” The same was then sold for his accommodation. Held, in a suit by the purchaser against the maker and endorsers, that the endorsers were discharged by the alteration.

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

This was a suit against Champion as maker and the other defendants as endorsers of a negotiable promissory note. The note was signed “B. F. C. Champion & Co.,” and the signature proved to be in the handwriting of Champion. All the other signatures were proved to be genuine, and due demand, refusal of payment, protest and notice were proved; also the copartnership of plaintiffs, and of defendants C. D. and J. T. Sullivan. The defence rested upon the following facts, which were proved: B. F. C. Champion executed the note and obtained the endorsements of the Sullivans and Papin for his accommodation. He then delivered the note to Myerson to be sold by him. Myerson endorsed and sold the note to plaintiffs. When the note was first handed to Myerson, (after the endorsements of the Sullivans and Papin,) it was executed in the name of “B. F. C. Champion.” Champion was a member of a firm styled “Champion & Co.” Plaintiffs, when they were first asked by Myerson to buy the note, told him they would prefer to have the firm of Champion & Co. as makers. Myerson then took the note back to Champion, who, without consulting the endorsers, Sullivan and Papin, added the words “& Co.” to his individual signature. The note thus altered was bought by the plaintiffs. It was proved that there never was any such firm as “B. F. C. Champion & Co.”--the style of the only firm of which Champion was a member being “Champion & Co.”

Upon this proof, plaintiffs asked the following instructions: “1. If the note in question was originally signed by B. F. C. Champion as maker and the words ““& Co.” were added subsequent to the endorsement thereof and without the consent of the endorsers, yet the alteration does not avoid the note, if said alteration was made before a transfer thereof for value. 2. If notice of the dishonor of the note in question was duly given to the endorsers, then they stand charged as endorsers although the above mentioned alteration of the note may have been made as above stated, and although the notices of protest may have described the note as made by ‘B. F. C. Champion & Co.’ 3. The alteration above spoken of was wholly immaterial, if there was in fact no such firm as ‘B. F. C. Champion & Co.’ The addition of the words ‘& Co.’ did not change the relations of any parties to the note.”

All of which the court refused. The court then rendered judgment for the plaintiffs against defendants Champion and Myerson, and against plaintiffs and for defendants, the Sullivans and Papin.

Krum & Harding, for plaintiffs in error.

I. There being no such firm as “B. F. Champion & Co.,” the addition of the words “& Co.” to the name of B. F. C. Champion did not in any way vary the contract, or affect the rights, liabilities or relations of the parties. It may be treated as a flourish, meaning nothing. (See Chitty on Bills, 184; 15 Pick. 239; 18 Johns. 391; 10 Conn. 192.) The alteration was made before it was issued. It had no vitality until plaintiffs bought it. (5 B. & Ald. 674; Byles on Bills, 390.) In that case the maker had a right to make any alteration not affecting the relations of the parties before issuing it. (Byles on Bills, 390.) The case of Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245, was a case of fraudulent alteration, and had no reference to circumstances like those presented in this case. Whether the alteration was material or not was a question for the court. (4 How., Miss., 231; 7 S. & R. 508; 2 N. H. 543.) The instructions asked should have been given.

A. J. P. Garesché and A. M. & S. H. Gardner, for defendants in error.

I. The change was material. (Greenl. Ev. § 568; Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 247.)

SCOTT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The law, in dealing with the subject of the alteration of written instruments, looks further than to the materiality or immateriality of the alteration. Aware of the danger of countenancing the most trifling change, it has not...