Haskin v. City of Madison

• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 39A05–1308–CT–422.,39A05–1308–CT–422.
• Citation: 999 N.E.2d 1047
• Parties: Brad HASKIN, Appellant, v. CITY OF MADISON, Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

999 N.E.2d 1047

Brad HASKIN, Appellant
v.
CITY OF MADISON, Indiana, Appellee.

No. 39A05–1308–CT–422.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 31, 2013.

999 N.E.2d 1048

Fred Schultz, Greene & Schultz, Bloomington, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

James S. Stephenson, Ian L. Stewart, Stephenson Morow & Semler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

Brad Haskin appeals the trial court's summary judgment ruling in favor of the City of Madison, Indiana (the “City”). Haskin raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Madison Regatta includes festivities, events, and boat races on the Ohio River, and thousands of people visit Madison for the event. Haskin was a member of a racing team crew and arrived in Madison on or about July 3, 2008, for the Regatta. Haskin and several others with the team stayed at a rental cottage on Jefferson Street within walking distance of the pit area. On the evening of July 5, 2008, after viewing a fireworks show from the pit area, Haskin and several others began to walk to the rental cottage. They walked east on Vaughn Drive and turned left to walk north on Jefferson Street. An

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Army PT Cruiser was parked on Jefferson Street very close to the corner and about four or five feet away from the curb. There was “a solid mass of people” leaving the area. Supplemental Appendix at 27. Haskin walked between the curb and the parked vehicle. A cement depression or trough existed as part of the design of the curb on Jefferson Street which sloped downward leading to the sewer. As Haskin stepped onto the depression, the front end of his foot touched the higher portion of the cement, and his heel landed on the lower end of the depression. As a result, he ruptured his Achilles tendon. Additional facts as set forth in the designated evidence will be discussed below.

On June 22, 2009, Haskin filed a complaint for damages against the City which alleged in part that he stepped into a storm sewer drain that had a partial iron grate covering the center of the drain with large openings on either side. The complaint alleged that the City was negligent in designing, constructing, and maintaining the sewer drain, in failing to properly illuminate the drain and provide proper signage warning pedestrians of the condition around it, in the planning and coordination of the special event, and by failing to properly coordinate pedestrian pathways that were free of dangerous conditions. The complaint also alleged that the City knew or should have known that pedestrians would be walking in the streets due to the large crowds and had in fact closed off the streets from vehicular traffic for just this purpose, and that as a direct and proximate result Haskin ruptured his Achilles tendon.

On November 18, 2011, the City filed a motion for summary judgment together with designated evidence and a supporting memorandum. The City argued that it is immune from liability for Haskin's claims pursuant to Ind.Code § 34–13–3–3(18) because the gutter, sewer intake, and concrete trough all remained unchanged for twenty years prior to the accident; that it owed no duty to Haskin because the street where the accident occurred was not within its control at the time as it ceded control of the area to Madison Regatta, Inc. (“MRI”) for the event; and that Haskin's claim against the City is barred because he was contributorily negligent. Haskin filed a response and designation of evidence in opposition to summary judgment on February 24, 2012, and argued that the City is not immune under Ind.Code § 34–13–3–3(18) and owed a duty of reasonable care, that the City retained control over its own improvements and did not transfer control of the area to MRI (and was not permitted to delegate its duty to maintain the area), and that his claim is not barred by contributory negligence as there is nothing in the evidence showing that as a matter of law his conduct was negligent or unreasonable. The City filed a reply on February 29, 2012.

The trial court held a summary judgment hearing on April 24, 2012,¹ and on July 30, 2013, entered an order granting the City's motion. The court found that Haskin was injured while walking on Jefferson Street and stepping into a trough-shaped gutter abutting the curb, and that the storm water gutter system was designed more than twenty years prior to July 5, 2008 and therefore the City is immune from liability for Haskin's injuries pursuant to Ind.Code § 34–13–3–3(18). The court further found that the City owed no duty to Haskin because it had transferred control of Jefferson Street in the area where the injury occurred to MRI and thus there could be no negligence on the part of the City. The court also found

999 N.E.2d 1050

that Haskin was not paying attention to his surroundings and chose not to remain on the pedestrian sidewalk, that his conduct fell below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection and safety, that therefore he was contributorily negligent, and that his claim against the City is barred. Haskin now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City and against Haskin. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ; Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 973. Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Id. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the Indiana Trial Rule 56 materials. Catt v. Bd. of Commr's of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2002). The entry of specific findings and conclusions does not alter the nature of a summary judgment which is a judgment entered when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.1996). In the summary judgment context, we are not bound by the trial court's specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. They merely aid our review by providing us with a statement of reasons for the trial court's actions. Id.

DISCUSSION

The trial court's summary judgment ruling in favor of the City was premised in part on the conclusions that the City was immune from liability under Ind.Code § 34–13–3–3(18) and that the City did not owe a duty to Haskin relating to Jefferson Street.² The tort of negligence has three elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant

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to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach. Beta Steel v. Rust, 830 N.E.2d 62, 69 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind.2004) ). Summary judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one element of a claim. Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 385. In the absence of the existence of a duty, there can be no negligence. Harris v. Traini, 759 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Haskin argues that, even under Ind.Code § 34–13–3–3(18), a governmental entity has a duty to provide public roadways in a reasonably safe condition...